This essay traces the rise of longitudinal studies of courts. In the United States, the rise of a sociolegal school of history (the “Wisconsin school”) was the immediate stimulus. Longitudinal studies, in Europe and the United States, explored the relationship between law and the economy; they tended to find an inverse relationship. But more recent findings suggest some reversal of this trend. Changes in the nature of business relationships have stimulated increases in some forms of major business litigation. Moreover, in modern legal culture, freedom is conceived of in substantive terms; and the courts appear more and more to be the place where true justice can be found.

The Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Dutch Supreme Court), founded in 1838, has grown from an insignificant body to a politically important institution in Dutch society. Partisan politics, however, does not influence appointments of justices, although the formal procedure of appointments gives the lower house of Parliament ample opportunity to exercise such influence. This nonpolitical appointment to a highly politically active highest court is unique among highest courts in Western democracies. In this article, I examine the history of both the decisionmaking of the Court and the appointments of justices and suggest explanations for the disparity between the political role of the Court and the nonpolitical appointments. I also compare the Dutch exception to the practice of highest courts in other Western democracies, concluding that there is evidence that partisan political interference in appointments to the Dutch Supreme Court will grow in the future.

Little is known about the reactions of tort litigants to traditional and alternative litigation procedures. To explore this issue, we interviewed litigants in personal injury cases in three state courts whose cases had been resolved by trial, court-annexed arbitration, judicial settlement conferences, or bilateral settlement. The litigants viewed the trial and arbitration procedures as fairer than bilateral settlement, apparently because they believed that trials and arbitration hearings gave their case more respectful treatment. They were less satisfied with the outcome of judicial settlement conferences than with the outcome of bilateral settlements, because judicial settlement conference outcomes were more likely to fall below their expectations. In general, procedural justice judgments and outcome satisfaction were little related to objective outcome, cost, or delay; instead the evaluations appeared to be determined largely by perceptions of whether the procedure met litigants' criteria for procedural fairness and expectations on outcomes and costs. Gender, income, and race did not have much effect on evaluations.

Despite the advances made in the study of appellate courts in the past several decades, little attention has been devoted to evaluating the role of appellate courts cross-nationally. This article examines appellate courts in England and in America, particularly the English Court of Appeal and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The American and English systems are proposed as alternative models of the relationship between courts and their respective political systems in Western common law regimes. Focusing on the intervention behavior of the intermediate appellate courts and their interaction with their respective courts of last resort, the data presented reveal more commonality than divergence in the behavior of the two judicial hierarchies.

Much of the judicial process literature assumes that appellate courts routinely publish all decisions they make. In fact, even with the proliferation of case law in the United States, since the 1970s many appeals court decisions have not been published. In England, however, selective publication of appellate decisions has always been an integral part of how courts interact with the broader legal and political system. This article explores some theoretical implications of selective reporting of appellate decisions within common law systems that rely on the published appellate ruling as a primary mechanism of communication between courts and the broader legal and political environments. The focus is on how appellate decisions are selected for publication, especially in the English Court of Appeal. The author proposes an empirical model that conceptualizes reporting as a communications process. He hypothesizes that the basis of selection can be viewed in the context of a cue theory that dichotomizes the communication of passive and dynamic cues between senders in the Court of Appeal and receivers within the community of law reporters.

Those who champion the representation of blacks on the bench argue that black judges may make a difference. Indeed, some suggest that increasing the proportion of black judges might result in more equitable treatment of black and white defendants. In this study we test these expectations. Using data on defendants charged with violent felonies, we compare the sentencing decisions of black and white judges in Detroit. We find remarkable similarities and conclude that judicial race has relatively little predictive power. More important, we find that both black and white judge sentence black offenders more severely than white offenders. Our results raise questions about the appropriate interpretation of racial disparity in incarceration rates and suggest that the harsher treatment of black offenders cannot be attributed to the racism of white judges.

The image of courts as impartial and independent sources of authority is considered a prerequisite if they are to play a legitimizing role. Yet many studies suggest that courts systematically support and uphold state-sponsored policies. I ask how courts can support dominant political interests and at the same time appear impartial. A solution is suggested by looking at highly publicized judicial decisions by Israel's High Court of Justice in which state policies concerning the Israeli occupied territories were overruled. Such cases, while rare, nevertheless reinforce the legitimacy of courts. Consequently, decisions that counter some governmental practices allow courts to confer legitimacy on other and sometimes similar governmental policies. Finally, I place the findings in a comparative context and outline a possible explanation for the circumstances under which landmark decisions are reached.

This article applies the dispute processing model developed by Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat (1980–81) to disputing between patients and doctors. We conducted interviews with 240 dissatisfied patients to examine the dispute resolution choices they made in response to unsatisfactory medical experiences. Probit models were constructed for each of five resolution choices, incorporating independent variables derived form the Felstiner et al. conceptual model. These analyses go beyond previous studies of medical malpractice by (a) presenting a comparative analysis of suers and nonsuers, (b) not relying on closed malpractice case data, and (c) presenting the perspective of aggrieved patients.

This study uses a framework in which disputants' litigation decisions are based on optimizing expected returns and minimizing losses to analyze outcomes of medical malpractice disputes—the probability of payment, stage of resolution, and amounts paid, based on closed medical malpractice claims from Florida and jury verdict reporter abstracts from five jurisdictions. Using judgments of an expert panel and other indicators, the analysis reveals that cases are more likely to result in paid claims when the defendant appears to be liable. By contrast, cases brought to satisfy a claimant motive of vindication are less likely to result in payment; such cases have a higher probability of being tried. Claimants with more serious injuries tend to receive higher payments. Payment appears equitable vertically, but there is appreciable variability in payment for similar injuries which may reflect horizontal inequities.

This article argues that some of the weaknesses in the longitudinal study of courts derive from an excessively macro-law focus on legal processes relatively uninformed by micro-law processes. Greater attention to the micro-macro relationship offers new opportunities for longitudinal studies themselves and for the integration of their findings into the mainstream of law and social science.

This article develops an agenda setting framework for studying the role of American courts in protecting and promoting the interests of the politically disadvantaged. Drawing from work on agenda setting processes in local political systems, the author presents a framework that examines the ways in which varying configurations of organizational power influence the types of issues that reach lower court agendas. The framework and its implications are illustrated with findings from empirical research on legal mobilization on behalf of the poor by federally funded legal services lawyers. The article shows the variety of mechanisms employed by powerful local interests to constrain poverty lawyers who wish to mobilize issues of social reform. The findings suggest that judicial agendas may reflect prevailing distributions of power to a much greater extent than is implied by conventional views of the legal system's utility in effecting social reform.

This article examines violations of the employer sanctions provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 as a case study in white-collar crime. Using interviews with 103 “immigrant-dependent” employers in three southern California counties, the study reveals that employer sanctions violations are numerous and that violators feel relatively protected from detection and punishment. It then traces both the prevalence of this crime and the impunity felt by violators beyond a simple cost/benefit analysis on the part of employers to the nature of the law itself. The study shows how legislative and implementation processes produced a low-risk crime, indicating that the shape the law took from the beginning ensured that its effect would be primarily symbolic and that violations would be widespread. This pattern suggests that the symbolic nature of the law and subsequent violations are dialectically linked and that both stem from contradictions inherent in immigration lawmaking. The article concludes that lawmaking and lawbreaking, while analytically distinct processes, must be seen as connecting pieces of the same theoretical puzzle.

Each term 4,000 or more cases arrive at the doorstep of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court narrows the field of decision from all possible choices to a smaller set of the most plausible ones; in a typical term, the Conference places 20 to 30 percent (around 500) of the cases filed on its “discuss list,” only 150 or so of which will be selected for plenary review. Here we investigate the composition, sources, and implications of the Court's discuss list. What criteria do the justices use in creating the list of cases for discussion in conference? Do these criteria differ from those ultimately applied in the decision to grant or deny a writ of certiorari? What, if any, implications does the operation of the discuss list hold for the composition of the agenda and the outcome of decisions on the merits in the Supreme Court?

We test two chief sets of hypotheses: (1) the justices weigh the various formal and informal criteria differently across the two stages of agenda building, and (2) despite differences in weighting, the justices rely on briefs amicus curiae as well as ideological predispositions to help them both to identify logical candidates for discussion and to decide whether to grant certiorari. We explain the variation in the weighting of the criteria as being largely due to the cost and accuracy of information and the different risk of errors during the two phases of choice.

Social science research on civil litigation has concentrated either on explaining variations in aggregate litigation levels or on explaining individual-level mobilization of the law. This article attempts to connect the two approaches by analyzing variations in state-level employment civil rights litigation within a framework based on individual-legal decisionmaking. Because the structure of our court system forces individuals to consider the costs and benefits of pursuing litigation, the model developed here incorporates factors that would affect individuals' cost/benefit decisionmaking with regard to civil rights litigation. The multivariate regression model based on this framework explains, with increasing strength, much of the state-level variation in civil rights litigation levels for the years 1970, 1975, and 1980. Although the framework has certain limitations, it may serve to enhance our understanding of aggregate litigation levels.

The article presents preliminary findings of a caseload study which covers preindustrial and industrial periods of judicial activity in Bremen, Germany. It discusses the historical comparability of the data and opposes evolutionary approaches in longitudinal research. Waves and exponential trends are examined as stable elements in the time series. Five historical periods of different growth patterns are distinguished. Higher litigation rates of previous times lead to the conclusion that modern society handles far more potential legal conflict with relatively less litigation than did society in earlier periods.

We propose that significant others and conscience function as agents of social control in a manner similar to the State. All three pose possible threats or costs that are more or less certain and severe which actors take into account in considering whether or not to violate the law. State-imposed costs, which have been addressed in the literature on deterrence, are material deprivations in the form of fines and incarceration. Socially imposed costs are the embarrassment or loss of respect actors might experience when they violate norms which significant others support. Self-imposed costs are shame or guilt feelings which actors might impose upon themselves when they offend their own conscience by engaging in behaviors they consider morally wrong. The threats of shame and embarrassment, like the threat of legal sanctions, affect the expected utility of crime and, thus, the likelihood that crime will occur. In the research reported here, parallel measures are developed of the perceived threats of each of these three kinds of punishment for three illegal behaviors (tax cheating, petty theft, drunk driving). The effects of these perceived threats on people's intentions to violate the law are then examined in a random sample of adults. Threats of shame and of legal sanctions inhibit the inclination to commit each of the three offenses, but the findings for embarrassment appear less compatible with the expected utility model.