Let L(Q) be first order logic with Keisler's quantifier, in the λ+ interpretation (= the satisfaction is defined as follows: M ⊨ (Qx)φ(x) means there are λ+ many elements in M satisfying the formula φ(x)).

Theorem 1. Let λ be a singular cardinal; assume □λ and GCH. If T is a complete theory in L(Q) of cardinality at most λ, and p is an L(Q) 1-type so that T strongly omits p( = p has no support, to be defined in §1), then T has a model of cardinality λ+ in the λ+ interpretation which omits p.

Theorem 2. Let λ be a singular cardinal, and let T be a complete first order theory of cardinality λ at most. Assume □λ and GCH. If Γ is a smallness notion then T has a model of cardinality λ+ such that a formula φ(x) is realized by λ+ elements of M iff φ(x) is not Γ-small. The theorem is proved also when λ is regular assuming λ = λ<λ. It is new when λ is singular or when ∣T∣ = λ is regular.

Theorem 3. Let λ be singular. If Con(ZFC + GCH + ∃κ) [κ is a strongly compact cardinal]), then the following is consistent: ZFC + GCH + the conclusions of all above theorems are false.

In the 1960's, it was conjectured that a complete first order theory in a countable language would have a nondecreasing spectrum on uncountable cardinals. This conjecture became known as Morley's conjecture. Shelah has proved this in [10]. The intent of this paper is to give a different proof which resembles a more naive way of approaching this theorem.

Let I(T, λ) = the number of nonisomorphic models of T in cardinality λ. We prove:

Theorem 0.1. If T is a complete countable first order theory then for ℵ0 < κ < λ, I(T,K) ≤ I(T, λ).

In some sense, one can view Shelah's work on the classification of first order theories as an attack on Morley's conjecture. Over the years, he has shown that certain assumptions on a first order theory would lead to its having maximal spectrum in powers larger than the cardinality of its language (see §6 for precise references). At some point it must have seemed that Morley's conjecture would be a corollary to an exact calculation of all possible spectrums. In the end, this did not occur and, in fact, the exact spectrum functions are still not known (see [10]). Let us consider a naive approach to the proof.

If we have two nonisomorphic models of the same cardinality and their cardinality is “large enough” then there should be some reason, irrespective of their cardinalities, which causes this nonisomorphism. If we could isolate this property and extend these models to a larger cardinality preserving this property, then the larger models would also be nonisomorphic. The notion of extendibility introduced in §2 is such a property which allows a version of this naive proof to work. Let us preview the sections.

In [GS] Gurevich and Shelah introduce a novel method for proving that every satisfiable formula in the Gödel class has a finite model (the Gödel class is the class of prenex formulas of pure quantification theory with prefixes ∀∀∃ … ∃). They dub their method “random models”: it proceeds by delineating, given any F in the Gödel class and any integer p, a set of structures for F with universe {1, …, p} that can be treated as a finite probability space S. They then show how to calculate an upper bound on the probability that a structure chosen at random from S makes F false; from this bound they are able to infer that if p is sufficiently large, that probability will be less than one, so that there will exist a structure in S that is a model for F. The Gurevich-Shelah proof is somewhat simpler than those known heretofore. In particular, there is no need for the combinatorial partitionings of finite universes that play a central role in the earlier proofs (see [G] and [DG, p. 86]). To be sure, Gurevich and Shelah obtain a larger bound on the size of the finite models, but this is relatively unimportant, since searching for finite models is not the most efficient method to decide satisfiability.

Gurevich and Shelah note that the random model method can be used to treat the Gödel class extended by initial existential quantifiers, that is, the prefix-class ∀…∀∃…∃; but they do not investigate further its range of applicability to syntactically specified classes.

Equational logic for total functions is a remarkable fragment of first-order logic. Rich enough to lend itself to many uses, it is also quite austere. The only predicate symbol is one for a notion of equality, and there are no logical connectives. Proof theory for equational logic therefore is different from proof theory for other logics and, in some respects, more transparent. The question therefore arises to what extent a logic with a similar proof theory can be constructed when expressive power is increased.

The increase mainly studied here allows one both to consider arbitrary partial functions and to express the condition that a function be total. A further increase taken into account is equivalent to a change to universal Horn sentences for partial and for total functions.

Two ways of increasing expressive power will be considered. In both cases, the notion of equality is modified and nonlogical function symbols are interpreted as ranging over partial functions, instead of ranging only over total functions. In one case, the only further change is the addition of symbols that denote logical functions, such as the binary projection function Ae that maps each pair ‹a0, a1› of elements of a set A into the element a0. An addition of this kind results in a language, and also in a system of logic based on this language, which we call equational In the other case, instead of adding a symbol for Ae, one admits those special universal Horn sentences in which the conditions expressed by the antecedent are, in a sense, pure conditions of existence. Languages and systems of logic that result from a change of this kind will be called near-equational. According to whether the number of existence conditions that one may express in antecedents is finite or arbitrary, the resulting language and logic shall be finite or infinitary, respectively. Each of our finite near-equational languages turns out to be equivalent to one of our equational languages, and vice versa.

We prove that the cofinality of the smallest covering of R by meager sets is bigger than the additivity of measure.

In [9] and [12], Shelah defined a certain type of Scott sentence which he called excellent. He proved, among other things, that if a Scott sentence is excellent and categorical in some uncountable power then it is categorical in all uncountable powers: the analog of the Morley categoricity theorem. Proving such an analog is often the starting point in the classification of a family of classes. Before beginning this classification in the case of excellent Scott sentences, let us say a few words about what this paper is and what it is not.

It is not the beginning of a classification theory for complete sentences in where is countable. Although excellence arises in the study of the model theory of Scott sentences, it is not a dividing line in a classification of them. In particular, the assumption of nonexcellence does not yield much information. In fact, in [3] there is an example of a nonexcellent Scott sentence, categorical in ℵ1 which is. not fully categorical. It seems to the second author that a classification of sentences analogous to the classification of first order theories is a long way off and may not be accomplishable in ZFC.

This is not to say that the study of excellent Scott sentences (or the class of models of such which we will call excellent classes) is unproductive. Besides its extreme usefulness in [12], Mekler and Shelah have shown that excellence plays a decisive role in the study of almost free algebras (see [7]). Moreover, as the class of ω-saturated models of an ω-stable theory is an example of an excellent class, the study of excellent classes is at least as difficult as the study of first order ω-stable theories.

We show that a cardinal κ is a (strongly) Mahlo cardinal if and only if there exists a nontrivial κ-complete κ-normal ideal on κ. Also we show that if κ is Mahlo and λ ≧ κ and λ<κ = λ then there is a nontrivial κ-complete κ-normal fine ideal on Pκ(λ). If κ is the successor of a cardinal, we consider weak κ-normality and prove that if κ = μ+ and μ is a regular cardinal then (1) μ< μ = μ if and only if there is a nontrivial κ-complete weakly κ-normal ideal on κ, and (2) if μ< μ = μ < λ<μ = λ then there is a nontrivial κ-complete weakly κ-normal fine ideal on Pκ(λ).

Let S and T be countable complete theories. We assume that T is superstable without the dimensional order property, and S is interpretable in T in such a way that every model of S is coded in a model of T. We show that S does not have the dimensional order property, and we discuss the question of whether Depth(S) ≤ Depth(T). For Mekler's uniform interpretation of arbitrary theories S of finite similarity type into suitable theories TS of groups we show that Depth(S) ≤ Depth(TS) ≤ 1 + Depth(S).

In [1] and [2] there is a development of a class theory, whose axioms were formulated by Bernays and based on a reflection principle. See [3]. These axioms are formulated in first order logic with ∈:

(A1) Extensionality.

(A2) Class specification. If ϕ is a formula and A is not free in ϕ, then

Note that “x is a set“ can be written as “∃u(x ∈ u)”.

(A3) Subsets.

Note also that “B ⊆ A” can be written as “∀x(x ∈ B → x ∈ A)”.

(A4) Reflection principle. If ϕ(x) is a formula, then

where “u is a transitive set” is the formula “∃v(u ∈ v) ∧ ∀x∀y(x ∈ y ∧ y ∈ u → x ∈ u)” and ϕPu is the formula ϕ relativized to subsets of u.

(A5) Foundation.

(A6) Choice for sets.

We denote by B1 the theory with axioms (A1) to (A6).

The existence of weakly compact and -indescribable cardinals for every n is established in B1 by the method of defining all metamathematical concepts for B1 in a weaker theory of classes where the natural numbers can be defined and using the reflection principle to reflect the satisfaction relation; see [1]. There is a proof of the consistency of B1 assuming the existence of a measurable cardinal; see [4] and [5]. In [6] several set and class theories with reflection principles are developed. In them, the existence of inaccessible cardinals and some kinds of indescribable cardinals can be proved; and also there is a generalization of indescribability for higher-order languages using only class parameters.

The purpose of this work is to develop higher order reflection principles, including higher order parameters, in order to obtain other large cardinals.

Posner [6] has shown, by a nonuniform proof, that every degree has a complement below 0′. We show that a 1-generic complement for each set of degree between 0 and 0′ can be found uniformly. Moreover, the methods just as easily can be used to produce a complement whose jump has the degree of any real recursively enumerable in and above ∅′. In the second half of the paper, we show that the complementation of the degrees below 0′ does not extend to all recursively enumerable degrees. Namely, there is a pair of recursively enumerable degrees a above b such that no degree strictly below a joins b above a. (This result is independently due to S. B. Cooper.) We end with some open problems.

In this paper we generalize the pigeonhole principle by using isols as our fundamental counting tool.

The motivation for the results presented here comes from the following two known theorems which concern countable, recursively saturated models of Peano arithmetic.

(1) if is a countable, recursively saturated model of PA, then for each infinite cardinal κ there is a resplendent which has cardinality κ. (See Theorem 10 of [1].)

(2) if is a countable, recursively saturated model of PA, then is generated by a set of indiscernibles. (See [4].)

It will be shown here that (1) and (2) can be amalgamated into a common generalization.

(3) if is a countable, recursively saturated model of PA, then for each infinite cardinal κ there is a resplendent which has cardinality κ and which is generated by a set of indiscernibles.

By way of contrast we will also get recursively saturated models of PA which fail to be resplendent and yet are generated by indiscernibles.

(4) if is a countable, recursively saturated model of PA, then for each uncountable cardinal κ there is a κ-like recursively saturated generated by a set of indiscernibles.

None of (1), (2) or (3) is stated in its most general form. We will make some comments concerning their generalizations. From now on let us fix a finite language L; all structures considered are infinite L-structures unless otherwise indicated.

Does every countable set of hyperdegrees have a minimal upper bound?

This question remains unanswered. In this paper, we extend the known results.

The standard way to construct minimal upper bounds for degrees is to force with pointed perfect trees. This works for hyperdegrees, in the right context. Sacks [Sa] showed that if an admissible set A satisfies Σ1 DC, then forcing with its uniformly hyperarithmetically pointed perfect trees yields a minimal upper bound for the degrees in A.

A next question is whether Σ1DC is necessary. Abramson [A] built an admissible set such that Sacks forcing, or anything like it, would not produce a minimal upper bound. He left open the question, though, whether there is such a bound for his set.

We answer this question affirmatively.

In §II we summarize the previous relevant results, including Steel forcing. In §III we give a construction different from Abramson's of an admissible set for which Sacks forcing does not produce the desired bound. We present this alternative because it is different (although still based on Steel forcing), simpler than the original, and fully illustrates the technique of finding the bound, which applies equally well to the earlier example. §IV describes the construction of the bound. §V closes with questions.

I thank Professor Sy Friedman for bringing this problem to my attention. This paper is dedicated to Professor Alexander Kechris on the occasion of his fortieth birthday, and to the Los Angeles VIGOL on its tenth anniversary.

We present a critical discussion of the claim (most forcefully propounded by Chaitin) that algorithmic information theory sheds new light on Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.

In [KP] we have studied the problem of determining when a subset of a (countable) model M of PA can be coded in an elementary end extension of M. Sets with this property are called elementary extensional. In particular we can ask whether there are elementary extensional subsets of a model which have order type ω. It turns out that having elementary extensional subsets of order type ω is an interesting property connected with other structural properties of models of PA. We will call this property the ω-property. In [KP] the problem of characterizing models with the ω-property was left open. It is still open, and the aim of this paper is to present a collection of results pertaining to it. It should be mentioned that the same notion was studied by Kaufmann and Schmerl in [KS2] in connection with some weak notions of saturation which they discuss there. Our notion of a model with the ω-property corresponds to the notion of an upward monotonically ω-lofty cut.

It is fairly easy to see that countable recursively saturated models (or in fact all recursively saturated models with cofinality ω) and all short recursively saturated models have the ω-property (Proposition 1.2 below). On the other hand, if we had asked the question about the existence of models with the ω-property before 1975 (when recursively saturated models were introduced) the answer would probably not have been that easy and we would have to come to notions close to recursive saturation.

We introduce a notion of complexity for interpretations, which is used to prove some new results about interpretations of sequential theories. In particular, we give a new, elementary proof of Pudlák's theorem that sequential theories are connected. We also demonstrate a counterexample to the infinitary distributive law

in the lattice of chapters, in which the chapters a and bi are compact. (Counterexamples in which a is not compact have been found previously.)

Since Gilmore showed that some theory with a positive comprehension scheme is consistent when the axiom of extensionality is dropped and inconsistent with it (see [1] and [2]), the problem of the consistency of various positive comprehension schemes has been investigated. We give here a short classification, which shows clearly the importance of the axiom of extensionality and of the abstraction operator in these consistency problems. The most difficult problem was to show the consistency of the comprehension scheme for positive formulas, with extensionality but without abstraction operator. In his unpublished thesis, Set theory in which the axiom of foundation fails [3], Malitz solved partially this problem but he needed to assume the existence of some unusual kind of large cardinal; as his original construction is very interesting and his thesis is unpublished, we give a short summary of it. M. Forti solved the problem completely by working in ZF with a free-construction principle (sometimes called an anti-foundation axiom), instead of ZF with the axiom of foundation, as Malitz did.

This permits one to obtain the consistency of this positive theory, relative to ZF. In his general investigations about “topological set theories” (to be published), E. Weydert has independently proved the same result. The authors are grateful to the Mathematisches Forshungsinstitut Oberwolfach for giving them the opportunity of discussing these subjects and meeting E. Weydert during the meeting “New Foundations”, March 1–7, 1987.

Let M be a saturated model of a superstable theory and let G = Aut(M). We study subgroups H of G which contain G(A), A the algebraic closure of a finite set, generalizing results of Lascar [L] as well as giving an alternative characterization of the simple superstable theories of [P]. We also make some observations about good, locally modular regular types p in the context of p-simple types.