When bounds on complexity of some aspect of a structure are preserved under isomorphism, we refer to them as intrinsic. Here, building on work of Soskov [34], [33], we give syntactical conditions necessary and sufficient for a relation to be intrinsically on a structure. We consider some examples of computable structures and intrinsically relations R. We also consider a general family of examples of intrinsically relations arising in computable structures of maximum Scott rank.

For three of the examples, the maximal well-ordered initial segment in a Harrison ordering, the superatomic part of a Harrison Boolean algebra, and the height-possessing part of a Harrison p-group, we show that the Turing degrees of images of the relation in computable copies of the structure are the same as the Turing degrees of paths through Kleene's . With this as motivation, we investigate the possible degrees of these paths. We show that there is a path in which ∅′ is not computable. In fact, there is one in which no noncomputable hyperarithmetical set is computable. There are paths that are Turing incomparable, or Turing incomparable over a given hyperarithmetical set. There is a pair of paths whose degrees form a minimal pair. However, there is no path of minimal degree.

Working in the theory ”ZF + There is a nontrivial elementary embedding j : V → V“, we show that a final segment of cardinals satisfies certain square bracket finite and infinite exponent partition relations. As a corollary to this, we show that this final segment is composed of Jonsson cardinals. We then show how to force and bring this situation down to small alephs. A prototypical result is the construction of a model for ZF in which every cardinal μ ≥ ℵ2 satisfies the square bracket infinite exponent partition relation . We conclude with a discussion of some consistency questions concerning different versions of the axiom asserting the existence of a nontrivial elementary embedding j: V → V. By virtue of Kunen's celebrated inconsistency result, we use only a restricted amount of the Axiom of Choice.

We prove that Standardization fails in every nontrivial universe definable in the nonstandard set theory BST, and that a natural characterization of the standard universe is both consistent with and independent of BST. As a consequence we obtain a formulation of nonstandard class theory in the ∈-language.

We characterize (both from a syntactic and an algebraic point of view) the normal K4-logics for which unification is filtering. We also give a sufficient semantic criterion for existence of most general unifiers, covering natural extensions of K4.2+ (i.e., of the modal system obtained from K4 by adding to it, as a further axiom schemata, the modal translation of the weak excluded middle principle).

We study reals with infinitely many incompressible prefixes. Call A ∈ 2ωKolmogorov random if . where C denotes plain Kolmogorov complexity. This property was suggested by Loveland and studied by Martin-Löf. Schnorr and Solovay. We prove that 2-random reals are Kolmogorov random. Together with the converse—proved by Nies. Stephan and Terwijn [11]—this provides a natural characterization of 2-randomness in terms of plain complexity. We finish with a related characterization of 2-randomness.

Let n be a positive integer. By a βn-model we mean an ω-model which is elementary with respect to formulas. We prove the following βn-model version of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. For any recursively axiomatized theory S in the language of second order arithmetic, if there exists a βn-model of S, then there exists a βn-model of S + “there is no countable βn-model of S”. We also prove a βn-model version of Löb's Theorem. As a corollary, we obtain a βn-model which is not a βn+1-model.

The paper discusses the notion of finite model truth definitions (or FM-truth definitions), introduced by M. Mostowski as a finite model analogue of Tarski's classical notion of truth definition.

We compare FM-truth definitions with Vardi's concept of the combined complexity of logics, noting an important difference: the difficulty of defining FM-truth for a logic does not depend on the syntax of , as long as it is decidable. It follows that for a natural there exist FM-truth definitions whose evaluation is much easier than the combined complexly of would suggest.

We apply the general theory to give a complexity-theoretical characterization of the logics for which the classes (prenex classes of higher order logics) define FM-truth. For any d ≥ 2, m ≥ 1 we construct a family of syntactically defined fragments of which satisfy this characterization. We also use the classes to give a refinement of known results on the complexity classes captured by .

We close with a few simple corollaries, one of which gives a sufficient condition for the existence, given a vocabulary σ, of a fixed number k such that model checking for all first order sentences over σ can be done in deterministic time nk.

A Turing degree a is said to be almost everywhere dominating if, for almost all X ∈ 2ω with respect to the “fair coin” probability measure on 2ω, and for all g: ω → ω Turing reducible to X, there exists f: ω → ω of Turing degree a which dominates g. We study the problem of characterizing the almost everywhere dominating Turing degrees and other, similarly defined classes of Turing degrees. We relate this problem to some questions in the reverse mathematics of measure theory.

We define the notion of approximate Euler characteristic of definable sets of a first order structure. We show that a structure admits a non-trivial approximate Euler characteristic if it satisfies weak pigeonhole principle : two disjoint copies of a non-empty definable set A cannot be definably embedded into A, and principle CC of comparing cardinalities: for any two definable sets A, B either A definably embeds in B or vice versa. Also, a structure admitting a non-trivial approximate Euler characteristic must satisfy .

Further we show that a structure admits a non-trivial dimension function on definable sets if and only if it satisfies weak pigeonhole principle : for no definable set A with more than one element can A2 definably embed into A.

In the following we try to answer a simple question, “what does forking look like in an o-minimal theory”, or more generally, “what kinds of notions of independence with what kinds of properties are admissible in an o-minimal theory?” The motivation of these question begin with the study of simple theories and generalizations of simple theories. In [3] Kim and Pillay prove that the class of simple theories may be described exactly as those theories bearing a notion of independence satisfying various axioms. Thus it is natural to ask, if we weaken the assumptions as to which axioms must hold, what kind of theories do we get? Another source of motivation, also stemming from the study of simple theories, comes from the work of Shelah in [8] and [7]. Here Shelah addresses a “classification” type problem for class of models of a theory, showing that a theory will have the appropriate “structure” type property if one can construct a partially ordered set, satisfying various properties, of models of the theory. Using this criterion Shelah shows that the class of simple theories has this “structure” property, yet also that several non-simple examples do as well (though it should be pointed out that o-minimal theories can not be among these since any theory with the strict order property will have the corresponding “non-structure” property [8]). Thus one is lead to ask, what are the non-simple theories meeting this criterion, and one is once again led to study the types of independence relation a theory might bear. Finally, Shelah in [6] provides some possible definitions of what axioms for a notion of independence one should possibly look for in order to hope that theories bearing such a notion of independence should be amenable closer analysis. In studying all of the above mentioned situations it readily becomes clear that dividing and forking play a central role in all of them, even though we are no longer dealing with the simple case where we know that dividing and forking are very well behaved. All of these considerations lead one to look for classes of non-simple theories of which something is known where one can construct interesting notions of independence and consequently also say something about the nature of forking and dividing in these contexts. Given this one is naturally lead to one of the most well behaved classes of non-simple theories, namely the o-minimal theories.

Let us say that a geometric theory T is of presheaf type if its classifying topos is (equivalent to) a presheaf topos. (We adhere to the convention that geometric logic allows arbitrary disjunctions, while coherent logic means geometric and finitary.) Write Mod(T) for the category of Set-models and homomorphisms of T. The next proposition is well known; see, for example, MacLane–Moerdijk [13], pp. 381-386, and the textbook of Adámek–Rosický [1] for additional information:

Proposition 0.1. For a category , the following properties are equivalent:

(i) is a finitely accessible category in the sense of Makkai–Paré [14], i.e., it has filtered colimits and a small dense subcategory of finitely presentable objects

ii) is equivalent to Pts, the category of points of some presheaf topos

(iii) is equivalent to the free filtered cocompletion (also known as Ind-) of a small category .

(iv) is equivalent to Mod(T) for some geometric theory of presheaf type.

Moreover, if these are satisfied for a given , then the —in any of (i), (ii) and (iii)—can be taken to be the full subcategory of consisting of finitely presentable objects. (There may be inequivalent choices of , as it is in general only determined up to idempotent completion; this will not concern us.)

This seems to completely solve the problem of identifying when T is of presheaf type: check whether Mod(T) is finitely accessible and if so, recover the presheaf topos as Set-functors on the full subcategory of finitely presentable models. There is a subtlety here, however, as pointed out (probably for the first time) by Johnstone [10].

A compact complex space X is viewed as a 1-st order structure by taking predicates for analytic subsets of X, X x X, … as basic relations. Let f: X → Y be a proper surjective holomorphic map between complex spaces and set Xy ≔ f−1(y). We show that the set

is analytically constructible, i.e.. is a definable set when X and Y are compact complex spaces and f: X → Y is a holomorphic map. The analogous result in the context of algebraic geometry gives rise to the definability of Morley degree.

We prove consistent, assuming there is a supercompact cardinal, that there is a singular strong limit cardinal μ, of cofinality ω, such that every μ+-chromatic graph X on μ+ has an edge colouring c of X into μ colours for which every vertex colouring g of X into at most μ many colours has a g-colour class on which c takes every value.

The paper also contains some generalisations of the above statement in which μ+ is replaced by other cardinals > μ.