A vast and interesting family of natural semantics lor belief revision is defined. Suppose one is given a distance d between any two models. One may then define the revision of a theory K by a formula α as the theory defined by the set of all those models of α that are closest, by d. to the set of models of K. This family is characterized by a set of rationality postulates that extends the AGM postulates. The new postulates describe properties of iterated revisions.

In this paper we study a reducibility that has been introduced by Klaus Weihrauch or, more precisely, a natural extension for multi-valued functions on represented spaces. We call the corresponding equivalence classes Weihrauch degrees and we show that the corresponding partial order induces a lower semi-lattice. It turns out that parallelization is a closure operator for this semi-lattice and that the parallelized Weihrauch degrees even form a lattice into which the Medvedev lattice and the Turing degrees can be embedded. The importance of Weihrauch degrees is based on the fact that multi-valued functions on represented spaces can be considered as realizers of mathematical theorems in a very natural way and studying the Weihrauch reductions between theorems in this sense means to ask which theorems can be transformed continuously or computably into each other. As crucial corner points of this classification scheme the limited principle of omniscience LPO, the lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO and their parallelizations are studied. It is proved that parallelized LLPO is equivalent to Weak Kőnig's Lemma and hence to the Hahn–Banach Theorem in this new and very strong sense. We call a multi-valued function weakly computable if it is reducible to the Weihrauch degree of parallelized LLPO and we present a new proof, based on a computational version of Kleene's ternary logic, that the class of weakly computable operations is closed under composition. Moreover, weakly computable operations on computable metric spaces are characterized as operations that admit upper semi-computable compact-valued selectors and it is proved that any single-valued weakly computable operation is already computable in the ordinary sense.

This is a continuation of Believing the axioms. I, in which nondemonstrative arguments for and against the axioms of ZFC, the continuum hypothesis, small large cardinals and measurable cardinals were discussed. I turn now to determinacy hypotheses and large large cardinals, and conclude with some philosophical remarks.

Determinacy is a property of sets of reals. If A is such a set, we imagine an infinite game G(A) between two players I and II. The players take turns choosing natural numbers. In the end, they have generated a real number r (actually a member of the Baire space ωω). If r is in A, I wins; otherwise, II wins. The set A is said to be determined if one player or the other has a winning strategy (that is, a function from finite sequences of natural numbers to natural numbers that guarantees the player a win if he uses it to decide his moves).

Determinacy is a “regularity” property (see Martin [1977, p. 807]), a property of well-behaved sets, that implies the more familiar regularity properties like Lebesgue measurability, the Baire property (see Mycielski [1964] and [1966], and Mycielski and Swierczkowski [1964]), and the perfect subset property (Davis [1964]). Infinitary games were first considered by the Polish descriptive set theorists Mazur and Banach in the mid-30s; Gale and Stewart [1953] introduced them into the literature, proving that open sets are determined and that the axiom of choice can be used to construct an undetermined set.

Given two (positive) equivalence relations ~1, ~2 on the set ω of natural numbers, we say that ~1 is m-reducible to ~2 if there exists a total recursive function h such that for every x, y ∈ ω, we have x ~1y iff hx ~2hy. We prove that the equivalence relation induced in ω by a positive precomplete numeration is complete with respect to this reducibility (and, moreover, a “uniformity property” holds). This result allows us to state a classification theorem for positive equivalence relations (Theorem 2). We show that there exist nonisomorphic positive equivalence relations which are complete with respect to the above reducibility; in particular, we discuss the provable equivalence of a strong enough theory: this relation is complete with respect to reducibility but it does not correspond to a precomplete numeration.

From this fact we deduce that an equivalence relation on ω can be strongly represented by a formula (see Definition 8) iff it is positive. At last, we interpret the situation from a topological point of view. Among other things, we generalize a result of Visser by showing that the topological space corresponding to a partition in e.i. sets is irreducible and we prove that the set of equivalence classes of true sentences is dense in the Lindenbaum algebra of the theory.

We present a faithful axiomatization of von Mises' notion of a random sequence, using an abstract independence relation. A byproduct is a quantifier elimination theorem for Friedman's “almost all” quantifier in terms of this independence relation.

‘In Time rigorous abstraction, in Time the highest, in Time divine knowledge, is comprehended’

Atharva Veda

Following McTaggart [17], we may distinguish two aspects of time: The A-series, running through the past to the present and on into the future, and the B-series, running from earlier to later. In Indo-European languages at least, verbs are tensed, so we cannot help but place whatever we speak of in one of the three divisions of the A-series. But these divisions are not permanent: what is present was future and will be past. Hence a typical statement, e.g. ‘Socrates is sitting’, may well be true at one time and false at another. The instability of truth-value over time was a commonplace among pre-Renaissance logicians, but most modern writers have ‘abstracted from’, i.e. ignored, this feature of ordinary language.

Early logicians were quite interested in time: Aristotle questioned the applicability of the excluded middle to predictions of future contingencies in the famous ‘sea-fight’ passage of On interpretation. Later Greek logicians debated whether that which neither is nor will be can legitimately be called possible, and whether, in order for the conditional ‘if p, then q’ to be true, it is required that ‘not both p and not ∼q’ be true (not just now but) always. Mediaeval logicians in Western Europe struggled with logical difficulties created by the Dogmas of the Church, Omniscience and Free Will. Their counterparts in the Islamic world puzzled over the semantics of the temporal adverbs, ‘always’, ‘usually’, ‘often’, ‘sometimes’, ‘seldom’, ‘never’.

We prove that there are uncountably many sets that are low for the class of Schnorr random reals. We give a purely recursion theoretic characterization of these sets and show that they all have Turing degree incomparable to 0′. This contrasts with a result of Kučera and Terwijn [5] on sets that are low for the class of Martin-Löf random reals.

Church's simple theory of types is a system of higher-order logic in which functions are assumed to be total. We present in this paper a version of Church's system called PF in which functions may be partial. The semantics of PF, which is based on Henkin's general-models semantics, allows terms to be nondenoting but requires formulas to always denote a standard truth value. We prove that PF is complete with respect to its semantics. The reasoning mechanism in PF for partial functions corresponds closely to mathematical practice, and the formulation of PF adheres tightly to the framework of Church's system.

The notion of forking has been introduced by Shelah, and a full treatment of it will appear in his book on stability [S1]. The principal aim of this paper is to show that it is an easy and natural notion.

Consider some well-known examples of ℵ0-stable theories: vector spaces over Q, algebraically closed fields, differentially closed fields of characteristic 0; in each of these cases, we have a natural notion of independence: linear, algebraic and differential independence respectively. Forking gives a generalization of these notions. More precisely, if are subsets of some model and c a point of this model, the fact that the type of c over does not fork over means that there are no more relations of dependence between c and than there already existed between c and . In the case of the vector spaces, this means that c is in the space generated by only if it is already in the space generated by . In the case of differentially closed fields, this means that the minimal differential equations of c with coefficient respectively in and have the same order. Of course, these notions of dependence are essential for the study of the above mentioned structures. Forking is no less important for stable theories. A glance at Shelah's book will convince the reader that this is the case.

What we have to do is the following. Assuming T stable and given and p a type on , we want to distinguish among the extensions of p to some of them that we shall call the nonforking extensions of p.

A recursively enumerable (r.e.) set is mitotic if it is the disjoint union of two r.e. sets both of the same degree of unsolvability. A. H. Lachlan has shown in [3] that there exists a nonmitotic r.e. set. In this paper we make an initial investigation into the class of mitotic sets.

The following results are proved, (i) An r.e. set is mitotic if and only if it is auto-reducible, (ii) There is a nonmitotic r.e. set of degree 0′, (iii) If d is an arbitrary non-recursive r.e. degree then there exists a nonmitotic r.e. set of degree ≤d. (iv) There exists a maximal set which is mitotic and a maximal set which is nonmitotic.

Albert R. Meyer had independently proved (ii) and (iii) for nonautoreducible sets before (i) was known.

In this paper we discuss subsystems of number theory based on restrictions on induction in terms of quantifiers, and we show that all the natural formulations of ‘n-quantifier induction’ are reducible to one of two (for n ≠ 0) nonequivalent normal forms: the axiom of induction restricted to (or, equivalently, ) formulae and the rule of induction restricted to formulae.

Let Z0 be classical elementary number theory with a symbol and defining equations for each Kalmar elementary function, and the rule of induction

restricted to quantifier-free formulae. Given the schema

let IAn be the restriction of IA to formulae of Z0 with ≤n nested quantifiers, IAn′ to formulae with ≤n nested quantifiers, disregarding bounded quantifiers, the restriction to formulae, the restriction to , formulae. IRn, IRn′, , are analogous.

Then, we show that, for every n, , , IAn, and IAn′, are all equivalent modulo Z0. The corresponding statement does not hold for IR. We show that, if n ≠ 0, is reducible to ; evidently IRn is reducible to . On the other hand, IRn′ is obviously equivalent to IAn′ [10, Lemma 2].

This paper reorganizes and further develops the theory of partial meet contraction which was introduced in a classic paper by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. Our purpose is threefold. First, we put the theory in a broader perspective by decomposing it into two layers which can respectively be treated by the general theory of choice and preference and elementary model theory. Second, we reprove the two main representation theorems of AGM and present two more representation results for the finite case that “lie between” the former, thereby partially answering an open question of AGM. Our method of proof is uniform insofar as it uses only one form of “revealed preference”, and it explains where and why the finiteness assumption is needed. Third, as an application, we explore the logic characterizing theory contractions in the finite case which are governed by the structure of simple and prioritized belief bases.

I am very grateful to the Association for Symbolic Logic for inviting me to give this address—an honor which I am conscious of having done very little to deserve. My efforts during the last fifteen years (seconded by those of a number of younger collaborators, whose devoted help has meant more to me than I can adequately express) have been directed wholly towards a unified exposition of all the basic branches of mathematics, resting on as solid foundations as I could hope to provide. I have been working on this as a practical mathematician; in matters pertaining to pure logic, I must confess to being self-taught, and laboring under all the handicaps that this implies; and if, after no little self-questioning, I am speaking here today, I am doing so chiefly in order to enjoy the benefit of your professional advice and criticism, by which I hope to correct my views before I venture into print with them.

In this paper a formalized logic of propositions, PA1, is presented. It is proven consistent and its relationships to traditional logic, to PM ([15]), to subjunctive (including contrary-to-fact) implication and to the “paradoxes” of material and strict implication are developed. Apart from any intrinsic merit it possesses, its chief significance lies in demonstrating the feasibility of a general logic containing the principle of subjunctive contrariety, i.e., the principle that ‘If p were true then q would be true’ and ‘If p were true then q would be false’ are incompatible.

Fraenkel-Mostowski models are a particularly simple and conceptual tool for proving consistency results involving the axiom of choice, AC. These models satisfy the theory, FM, of a well founded universe of sets built from a ground set of individuals. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF, is the extension of FM in which the set of individuals is assumed to be empty. In this paper we show that there is a large class of statements whose consistency with ZF can be proven directly by means of a Fraenkel-Mostowski model.

A statement, Φ, of set theory is said to be transferable if there is a metatheorem: If Φ is true in a Fraenkel-Mostowski model then Φ is consistent with ZF. Jech and Sochor introduced, in [12], the class of boundable statements and proved them to be transferable. Most existential contradictions of AC are boundable. It remains to find criteria under which Ψ ∧ Φ is transferable where Ψ is a universal consequence of AC and Φ is an existential contradiction of AC. To this end we give two classes of statements. Each class is closed under conjunction, contains the boundable statements, and contains a number of universal consequences of AC. Nearly every Fraenkel-Mostowski consistency in the literature falls into one of these two classes.

In §2 we give two generalizations of the boundable statements. In §§3 and 4 the classes of transferable statements are discussed. In §5 we discuss the transfer problem and prove a metatheorem concerning nontransferable statements.

The following is a self-contained proof theoretic treatment of two of the principal axiom schemata of current intuitionistic analysis: the axiom of bar induction (Brouwer's bar theorem) and the axiom of continuity. The results are formulated in terms of formal derivability in elementary intuitionistic analysis H(§ 1), so the positive (i.e., derivability) results also apply to elementary classical analysis Z1 (Appendix 1). Both schemata contain the combination of quantifiers νfΛn, where f, g, … are intended to range over free choice sequences of suitable kinds of objects x, y, …; for example, natural numbers or sequences of natural numbers, and n, m, p, r, … over natural numbers (non-negative integers).

I shall prove in this paper that Gentzen's Hauptsatz is extendible to simple type theory, i.e., to the predicate logic obtained by admitting quantification over predicates of arbitrary finite type and generalizing the second order quantification rules to cover quantifiers of other types. (That Gentzen's Hauptsatz is extendible to this logic has been known as Takeuti's conjecture; see [4].) Gentzen's Hauptsatz has been extended to second order logic in a recent paper by Tait [3]. However, as remarked by Tait, his proof seems not to be extendible to higher orders. The present proof is rather an extension of a different proof of the Hauptsatz for second order logic that I have presented in [1].

Modal logics are studied in their algebraic disguise of varieties of so-called modal algebras. This enables us to apply strong results of a universal algebraic nature, notably those obtained by B. Jónsson. It is shown that the degree of incompleteness with respect to Kripke semantics of any modal logic containing the axiom □p→P or containing an axiom of the form □mp↔□m+1p for some natural number m is . Furthermore, we show that there exists an immediate predecessor of classical logic (axiomatized by p↔□p) which is not characterized by any finite algebra. The existence of modal logics having immediate predecessors is established. In contrast with these results we prove that the lattice of extensions of S4 behaves much better: a logic extending S4 is characterized by a finite algebra iff it has finitely many extensions and any such logic has only finitely many immediate predecessors, all of which are characterized by a finite algebra.

An algorithm recognizing admissibility of inference rules in generalized form (rules of inference with parameters or metavariables) in the intuitionistic calculus H and, in particular, also in the usual form without parameters, is presented. This algorithm is obtained by means of special intuitionistic Kripke models, which are constructed for a given inference rule. Thus, in particular, the direct solution by intuitionistic techniques of Friedman's problem is found. As a corollary an algorithm for the recognition of the solvability of logical equations in H and for constructing some solutions for solvable equations is obtained. A semantic criterion for admissibility in H is constructed.