The evolution of public policies in the United States has been characterized as a process involving long periods of stability followed by abrupt episodes of substantial change. In this project, we identify strands in the literature and synthesize policy theories into a policy regime model useful in explaining both stability and change. This model focuses on power arrangements, policy paradigms and organization - factors that operate to maintain long periods of stability. We demonstrate how stressors - catastrophic events, economic crises, demographic changes, shifts in modes of production, and others - impact policy regimes and create pressures for change. We argue that the process of policy regime change - the abrupt episodes of substantial change - occurs with changes in the policy paradigm, alterations in patterns of power and shifts in organizational arrangements. The old policy regime disintegrates and the new one emerges with a new policy paradigm, new patterns of power and new organizational arrangements that operate to maintain long periods of stability.

This article assumes that a central problem for effective implementation of European legislation is the impact of national administrative traditions, since the formal and practical transformation of EU law rests mainly at the national level. The article investigates the interplay of national administrative traditions and European policy implementation. National administrative traditions prevalent in a policy field may differ from country to country. It is argued, that implementation effectiveness depends on the ‘’institutional scope'' of European adaptation pressure, which is not only affected by European requirements, but also by the embeddedness of the respective administrative traditions and national capacities for administrative reform. According to the degrees of adaptation pressure, different paths are distinguished, suggesting more or less effective implementation.

The role of semi-public intermediary institutions is underestimated in political research. This paper elaborates the dynamics of the interaction pattern of mission-agencies, promoting and conducting research in the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany. The principal-agent-model serves as the organizing theoretical concept. By stressing the role of the third party, usually neglected in the model, it is shown that intermediary agencies in policy-making are drawn into cooperative and almost symbiotic relationships with the recipients of programs. The use of intermediary agencies becomes a double-edged sword for policy-makers. While close relationships with the scientific community improve the acceptance of political research programs, the formulation of research policies becomes subject to compromise and coalition building within funding agencies.

Little attention has been given in policy analysis to the creative process of designing solutions to public policy problems. There are a number of difficulties in applying macro-level theories – whether from economics, sociology, philosophy or macro-systems theory – in the policy process. Any macro-level theory will tend to provide inadequate guidance in one or more of three aspects of policy-making: a model of causation, a model for evaluating alternatives and outcomes, and a model of how interventions operate. Our current knowledge about which policy strategies work best under which conditions is at best rudimentary. Academic disciplinary perspectives focus on a narrow repertoire of policy instruments. What is required is a design focus which draws on instruments associated with a range of disciplines and professions. A design perspective involves both a systematic process for generating basic strategies and a framework for comparing them. Such an approach will require at least the following elements: (1) the characteristics of problems (scale, collectiveness, certainty, predictability, independence); (2) characteristics of goals (value-laden, operational, process of goal-setting); (3) characteristics of instruments (suitability of different instruments).

Studies of policy change have advanced to the point where the basic contours and factors driving policy sequences are now reasonably well identified and understood with a great deal of empirical evidence pointing to the prevalence of punctuated equilibrium processes in many policy fields. However the reasons why such processes occur is less well understood. Most attention to date has focused upon homeostatic models in which exogenously-driven shocks undermine institutionally entrenched policy equilibria. This article addresses the difficulties this account faces and the conceptual challenges which must be overcome to provide a solid grounding for the understanding and analysis of long-term policy dynamics. It focuses on the merits and demerits of alternative explanations featuring either random junctures and ‘positive-return’ sequences – path dependency – or embedded junctures and ‘reactive’ sequences – process sequencing. Models of policy-making over time using the latter two concepts, it is argued, are more likely to account for the large majority of policy dynamic than the former.

Concern about corruption has stimulated the creation of a multiplicity of indicators by a multiplicity of methods by the World Bank, World Economic Forum, Transparency International and commercial rating agencies. However, the construction of indices varies, raising substantive and methodological issues, which are reviewed with particular reference to post-Communist transition societies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This paper systematically examines indicators, starting with the definitional distinction between measures of administrative corruption as distinct from state capture. It pays particular attention to problems arising from the aggregation of indicators from multiple sources, and the extent to which the changing composition of cross-country indicators limits trend analysis. It concludes that many of the problems of aggregation may be avoided by using single source and single dimension indexes.

The concept of regulatory capture is multidimensional according to data from Australian nursing home inspectors. There are three empirically distinct forms of capture: identification with the industry, sympathy with the particular problems that regulated firms confront in meeting standards, and absence of toughness. Inspectors who have prior senior management experience in the industry tend to be less tough in their attitudes to regulatory enforcement. For the other two types of capture, it is not coming in the revolving door (from an industry job), but aspirations to go out of the revolving door (to an industry job) that predicts capture. Captured regulatory attitudes and revolving door variables have little power, however, in explaining the toughness of actual enforcement practices. We do find that over time tougher inspectors are more likely to leave the regulatory agency than softer inspectors. These data are used to inform a policy analysis of capture and corruption. It is concluded that there is limited analytical merit in a conception of capture as an enduring unitary character trait that is structurally determined by a history of interest group affiliations. Capture, we attempt to show, is instead a situational problem that requires situational solutions. Constraining the free movement of the revolving door by restricting regulatory appointments from or to the regulated industry is an example of a flawed policy grounded in an overdrawn structural determinism.

This article examines how evidence about Program A in Country A may be utilized in Country B, and thus how utilization may explain the adoption of the same program. Elites and activists have a number of interests in using policy evidence from another country: to put an issue to a systemic or institutional agenda, mollify political pressure, provide an exemplar, indicate the range of options or reinforce conclusions already reached. The interests of the importer dictate the nature, timing and origins of the evidence injected into policy debate. This framework is applied to the case of freedom of information policy. An analysis of how and why evidence about the United States Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was utilized in Canada and Britain reveals that FOIA was used as an exemplar in Canada and the reverse in Britain.

Europeanization involves the transposition and implementation of European legislation in EU member states. Whereas EU policy implementation is explicitly recognized as the responsibility of the member states, the new emphasis on benchmarking recognizes that different implementation strategies can be beneficial, provided the outcome is appropriate. New data representing the full EU transport acquis from 1957 to 2004 and the national transposition instruments derived from data bases for Germany, Greece, the UK, Spain and the Netherlands show that only 39 per cent of the acquis was transposed in time. Why do member states not transpose EU directives on time? Logistic and multinomial logistic analysis explains this in terms of the level of complexity of EU directives; the use of national legal instruments that include considerable de facto veto players; and the shorter the transposition time set in the directive, the more delayed the transposition process.

Professional economists have for a long time had significant roles as advisers to policy makers. In recent years they have gone well beyond this in many countries and have come to occupy the highest positions in government. While their technical knowledge is an important reason for their influx into governments, their acquisition of the highest positions of authority, we contend, is to an important degree a ceremonial display. The symbolic aspect of the appointment of high-level economist-politicians is as significant as any specific stock of knowledge they bring to political life and is a part of an emerging transnational political culture in which economists occupy a sacerdotal role.

Because events occur too fast and ideas mature too slowly for responses to be designed anew for each pressing problem, policy innovation often relies on pre-existing models, foreign or domestic. This seems to be especially true for regulatory policymaking, since public regulation is typically introduced in conditions of crisis. In this paper we examine several cases of policy innovation in the area of economic and social regulation where the influence of foreign models is quite clear: the development of competition policy in Europe in the 1950s, the growth of European Community regulation, and the impact of the American deregulation movement on the telecommunications policies of different European countries. The analysis shows that while utilization of preexisting models is a common feature of policy innovation, such models are not literally translated into current policy. More or less extensive adaptations to a particular political, institutional and economic context are usually required. We also identify two distinct ways – push or pull – in which foreign models can affect domestic policy.

The degree to which interest groups gain access to policymakers has often been explained by focusing on the exchange of resources in a dyadic relation between interest groups and policymakers. This article argues that the position an interest group occupies within a coalition and the relations it has outside its coalition substantially affect the likelihood of gaining access to policymakers. Our empirical focus is on the Dutch interest group system for which we examine how coalitions among groups and the network position of interest groups within and between such coalitions shape access. The analysis, based on data collected among 107 Dutch interest groups and 28 policymakers, leads to the conclusion that network positions count differently for elected and non-elected officials, and that network ties that bridge different coalitions add significant explanatory leverage to resource-based explanations of access.

In this paper, I enquire whether 37 governments in industrial and in Latin American countries privatised as a result of learning from experience. Using a rational updating model, I examine whether the decision in the 1980s and 1990s to streamline the public sector was the outcome of a revision of beliefs about the effectiveness of privatisation or whether, alternatively, it was triggered by international pressures or mimicry. The results suggest that rational learning and especially emulation were two important factors in the decision to privatise. International pressures, here proxied by the presence or absence of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and by European Union membership, are irrelevant to explanations of the decision to privatise. Finally, domestic political conditions appear relevant to the decision to launch privatisation but only when the analysis is carried out for each of the regional sub-samples. In the OECD countries, centre-left governments were more likely to privatise whereas in Latin American more repressive regimes were more willing to divest.

Statutory design is the source of many problems encountered in implementation, yet policy scholars have not made much headway in providing coherent and consistent advice for framing smarter statutes. There is a great deal of disagreement about how much discretion statutes should leave to implementers, and four distinct and conflicting schools of thought have emerged. This article advises that none of the perspectives is always correct and patterns for allocating discretion should take into account the implementation context. Contexts vary from statute to statute and may change for different policy elements within particular policies. The core elements in policy content are identified and linked in a scheme that is more comprehensive and relevant to policy results than previous work. The article also provides a ‘value-added’ conception of implementation in which the extent of discretion exercised by implementers is measured by changes they make in the core elements of policy.

This study builds a conceptual framework to guide empirical studies of learning in public policy. Learning in public policy is defined here as a process in which individuals apply new information and ideas to policy decisions. This topic is examined by adapting relevant concepts from studies of organizational learning to the context of public policy. Recent work in the organizational learning literature focuses on institutional structures, procedures, and customs (learning arrangements) that act to promote individual learning. Further work in the policy literature suggests that focusing events (incidents that focus public and political attention on a policy issue) can also shape learning in public policy. Combining insights from these two literatures, this study proposes that both learning arrangements and focusing events can play observable roles in shaping policy change over time. These concepts are developed and examined in the context of hazardous systems.

This paper argues that we need to bring government back into discussions about network governance, via the concept of metagovernance which uses water reform in an Australian state as an example. Metagovernance is defined as the government of governance, and is a vital but under researched and under theorised problem because it is difficult and contentious. The paper identifies a range of metagovernance failures in this case and suggests that the lessons learnt by the Australian authorities from the experience have led to some rethinking about the benefits and desirable scope of network governance.

How does the salience of environmental issues influence climate policy adoption in the American states? This article considers how two aspects of public salience, issue problem status and issue attention, work with environmental interest group membership to influence climate policy adoption in the American states. We contribute to the theoretical development of issue salience and offer alternative measures that capture differences in salience across subnational units. We find evidence that states where climate change is perceived to be a problem, and where attention to environmental issues is high, are more likely to adopt relevant policies. Furthermore, states with Republican majorities in either legislative chamber are less likely to adopt climate policies. Our findings have implications for the impact of salience on the policy process.

The financial cost of corruption has recently been estimated at more than 5 per cent of global GDP. Yet, despite the widespread agreement that corruption is one of the most pressing policy challenges facing world leaders, it remains as widespread today, possibly even more so, as it was when concerted international attention began being devoted to the issue following the end of the Cold War. In reality, we still have a relatively weak understanding of how best to measure corruption and how to develop effective guides to action from such measurement. This paper provides a detailed review of existing approaches to measuring corruption, focusing in particular on perception-based and non-perceptual approaches. We highlight a gap between the conceptualisation of corruption and its measurement, and argue that there is a tension between the demands of policy-makers and anti-corruption activists on the one hand, and the motivations of academic researchers on the other. The search for actionable answers on the part of the former sits uncomfortably with the latter’s focus on the inherent complexity of corruption.

Studies of lobbying try to determine the influence and power of non-governmental actors on public policy. Although influence is very difficult to measure empirically, many continue to push for better research design to solve the problem. Through case studies of business-government relations in the United States and the European Union, this article argues that the difficulties with power and influence concern not only their operationalisation, but they also reflect conceptual confusions. Trying to determine the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of a policy issue can be misleading, since power also structures apparently harmonious exchange relationships. The perceived success of business lobbying in the cases studied depended on the governments' receptiveness to their demands, which in turn depended on strategic advantages they saw for themselves in international negotiations. Even when business appears to lead the dance, it is more promising to look at resource distribution and the interdependence of both sides, instead of assuming the domination of business power over policy outcomes.

Apart from the preoccupation with raising revenue for the welfare state, the question of popular support is central to its future. Arguments about the prospects for the welfare state, about its social and political bases of support and about classifying different types of regime provide the context of our investigation. Our approach is to examine empirical evidence of the connection between support for the welfare state and (a) different types of regime and (b) social and political factors. The analysis of these relationships has important implications for policy-makers who are concerned about consent to their programmes and about the experiences of comparable regimes.