I welcome Professor Patterson's robust reply, not least because it affords me the chance to clarify my appreciative critique. Our differences and misunderstandings, such as they are, are products of propinquity. We read many of the same books, work on similar themes, care about common issues, and, more often than not, as he notes, share interpretations of American history in the past half-century. We broadly agree about how to straddle the divide of analysis and narrative. We both would wish to distinguish our ambitions from simple sequential chronological description and from social theory too removed from history. We also are committed to mutual learning and collaboration across disciplinary lines.

A quarter century and more has passed since the 1970s made its debut. History, always problematic as an objective undertaking, encourages present-mindedness when proximity to events in question governs our perspectives. This article does not pretend to have avoided this pitfall. Today the animus against government dominates political discourse. “Outsiders” who aspire to office boast of that status; “insiders” obscure theirs. All politicians design to show their commonness, their oneness with the people, the beleaguered people, victims of the socially privileged, of haughty bureaucrats, and the sundry occult forces that sustain their misery. Ours, it has been observed, has become a dominantly “populist” culture, its anti-elitism resounding from local Serb Halls in Milwaukee and elsewhere to the very chambers of the Capitol itself.

In August 1969, President Richard M. Nixon approached the American people with a radical proposal to do what the federal government had never done before: guarantee a minimum level of income for every American family unable to provide one for itself. Eight years later, in August 1977, President Jimmy Carter announced a similar proposal for a federal guarantee of income, this time along with an expansion of public works jobs. Like Nixon before him, Carter soon abandoned his bill, and with it the quest for a federal income guarantee. Thus, inconclusively, ended a decade-long struggle to replace the nation's uncoordinated, incomplete collection of welfare programs with a single, comprehensive system of federal relief. This struggle took place against a backdrop of economic stagnation and demographic change that sent social spending soaring and made existing poor-relief arrangements seem increasingly obsolete. It also tapped into growing taxpayer resentment and a rising tide of popular animosity toward welfare. In part for these reasons, the quest for a guaranteed income marked the end of an era of liberal government activism against poverty, and ushered in a new era of poor-law reform. Welfare, not poverty, was the social problem of the 1970s. And the idea of a guaranteed income was the solution embraced by a new, more chastened and conservative, ideological center.

In late August 1994, Alan Blinder was concluding his second month of service as vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. A former member of the CEA and a distinguished economist, Blinder had achieved a reputation as a“hard-headed liberal economist.”

The adoption of Proposition 13 in 1978 sent shock waves throughout the American polity. California's attack on property taxes was not the first fiscal limitation adopted in the 1970s, but it carried clear national implications that the earlier measures lacked. By successfully challenging the political establishment, the initiative drive in the Golden State energized campaigns elsewhere to restrict taxes. The echo of Proposition 13 reverberated in Massachusetts, whose voters approved a cap on property taxes (Proposition 2 ½) in 1980. Citizens on the nation's two coasts had signaled thumbs down on fiscal affairs in their states.