The absence of democracy in the Arab–Muslim world is a ‘striking anomaly’ for democratization scholars. This cannot be seen as caused by religion as such, as there are now several democratic Muslim-majority states. Popular explanations such as values, culture, economic development, natural resources, or colonial legacy have been refuted. Based on Ostrom's approach regarding local groups’ ability to establish institutions for ‘governing the commons’, we present a novel explanation for this puzzle, based on historical variations in institutions for financing religion. In Northwestern Europe, religion and secular services managed by local religious institutions have been financed ‘from below’, creating local systems for semi-democratic representation, transparency, and accountability. In the Arab–Muslim region, religion and local secular services have been financed ‘from above’, by private foundations lacking systems for representation and accountability. It is thus not religion, but how religion has been financed, that explains lacking successful democratization in the Arab–Muslim world.

This paper shows how the literature on identity can enhance the so-far underdeveloped appreciation of social context in the theory of the firm. While taking context into account, I explain why the literatures overlap in significant ways and I propose an analytical map which relies on and matches the three central questions of both literatures. The three central questions on identity – identification, individuation and multiple social identities – are coupled respectively with the three central questions on the firm – the nature of the firm, internal organization and firm boundaries. This identity-based extension of the economics of the firm contributes to the organization of the literature by extending the analysis of identity to questions that go beyond the primary question of identification. In doing so, it identifies two key research agendas: the role of internal organization in enabling individuation and the role of firm boundaries in enabling collective intentions.

This paper develops an account of the normative basis of priority setting in health care as combining the values which a given society holds for the common good of its members, with the universal provided by a principle of common humanity. We discuss national differences in health basket in Europe and argue that health care decision-making in complex social and moral frameworks is best thought of as anchored in such a principle by drawing on the philosophy of need. We show that health care needs are ethically ‘thick’ needs whose psychological and social construction can best be understood in terms of David Wiggins's notion of vital need: a person's need is vital when failure to meet it leads to their harm and suffering. The moral dimension of priority setting which operates across different societies’ health care systems is located in the demands both of and on any society to avoid harm to its members.

Why do economic agents conform with existing institutions? Drawing on economics and organizational institutionalism, this article identifies existing explanations, extends or refines some of them, suggests new ones, classifies these various explanations, and integrates them into an organized framework. One set of explanations focuses on conformity out of habit. The other refers to more conscious thought and behavior and considers coordination and increasing returns to adoption, social sanctions, informational differences, uncertainty, legitimacy, naturality, and lack of power/resources to deviate.

The slow growth of the stock of human capital in Spain has been related to weak levels of economic development and a low commitment of Spanish institutions to primary education. This paper adds to these explanations by showing that common lands positively contributed to achieving significantly higher levels of both schooling expenditure and literacy rates. By supporting both municipal and households’ incomes, these collective resources sustained not only the local supply of education, but also the demand for it, although their influence decreased over time. Likewise, either low levels of economic development prevented human capital from growing endogenously or demand factors were not as important as previously argued. Lastly, even though the active intervention of the central government was crucial to promote education, its effort was not enough and human capital in Spain lagged behind other European countries in the early stages of economic development.

Despite the static image of formal common pool resource institutions (CPRIs), interest communities always attempted to adapt their institutional framework to their particular needs and interests. The hypothesis of Ensminger, that formal and informal institutional environments were steered by the interplay of external socioeconomic factors, ideology and bargaining power, will be tested by a comparative analysis of three regions within the North Sea area, namely the Campine, within the Low Countries, the Brecklands in England and the Geest area in Schleswig Holstein. Due to this scope, we will advance that especially the distribution of power was vital for the evolution of one specific aspect of CPRIs, namely accessibility. Only communities with relatively balanced distributions of power could retain an inclusive access regime throughout the early modern period, while polarised societies evolved towards more restrictive access to the common wastelands.

This paper is about the mind of the embedded individual in heterodox economics. Beginning from Margaret Archer's analysis of modes of reflexivity and following the respective contributions of Geoff Hodgson and John Davis, the paper seeks to integrate into Archer's approach a place for habitual beliefs and an analysis of the ‘relative autonomy’ of the embedded individual. Archer's identification of modes of reflexivity is endorsed but her avoidance of any dispositional place for habit in the mind is questioned. It is argued that by excluding habits in this way, Archer, unlike Davis, implausibly assumes most individuals have achieved relative autonomy in their group associations. The essay develops an approach to the mind that articulates underlying relationships between habits and internal conversation, potentially enriching Archer's explanation of modes of reflexivity while locating Davis's notion of relative autonomy within that framework. Specific economic implications are then briefly considered.