On Mar. 21, 2007, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 to make it easier for cross-listed firms to deregister from the U.S. market and escape its regulatory costs. Using difference-in-difference (DD) tests, we find that, on average, Rule 12h-6’s passage induced an increase in voting premium, a decline in equity raising, and a decline in cross-listing premium. These effects are observed for exchange-listed firms and for firms from countries with weak investor protection. We conclude that although cross-listed firms are still valued at a significant premium over non-cross-listed firms, the rule decreased the value of commitment to the U.S. regulatory system.

We find that stock liquidity increases stock price crash risk. To identify the causal effect, we use the decimalization of stock trading as an exogenous shock to liquidity. This effect is increasing in a firm’s ownership by transient investors and nonblockholders. Liquid firms have a higher likelihood of future bad earnings news releases, which are accompanied by greater selling by transient investors, but not blockholders. Our results suggest that liquidity induces managers to withhold bad news, fearing that its disclosure will lead to selling by transient investors. Eventually, accumulated bad news is released all at once, causing a crash.

Prior research shows that splitting firms earn positive abnormal returns and that they experience an increase in stock return volatility. By examining option-implied volatility, we assess option traders’ perceptions on return and volatility changes arising from stock splits. We find that they do expect higher volatility following splits. There is only weak evidence, though, of option traders anticipating an abnormal increase in stock prices. We also show that our option measures can predict both stock volatility levels and changes after the announcement. However, there is little evidence that they can predict the returns of splitting firms.

Equity index volatility variation and its interaction with the index return can come from three distinct channels. First, index volatility increases with the market’s aggregate financial leverage. Second, positive shocks to systematic risk increase the cost of capital and reduce the valuation of future cash flows, generating a negative correlation between the index return and its volatility, regardless of financial leverage. Finally, large negative market disruptions show self-exciting behaviors. This article proposes a model that incorporates all three channels and examines their relative contribution to index option pricing and stock option pricing for different types of companies.

Banks have much more leverage than nonbanks. In this article, we use a joint sample of banks and nonbanks between 1965 and 2013 to analyze the determinants of this leverage difference. We find that a single factor, asset risk, is able to explain up to 90% of this difference. Banks’ assets consist of a diversified portfolio of nonbank debt. Therefore, banks have much lower asset risk than do nonbanks. Because asset risk is a major determinant of capital structure choice, this factor is able to explain a large fraction of the difference between bank and nonbank leverage.

Exchange rate models with uncertain and incomplete information predict that investors focus on a small set of fundamentals that changes frequently over time. We design a model selection rule that captures the current set of fundamentals that best predicts the exchange rate. Out-of-sample tests show that the forecasts made by this rule significantly beat a random walk for 5 out of 10 currencies. Furthermore, the currency forecasts generate meaningful investment profits. We demonstrate that the strong performance of the model selection rule is driven by time-varying weights attached to a small set of fundamentals, in line with theory.

We compare the stock return forecasting performance of alternative payout yields. The net payout yield produces more accurate forecasts relative to alternatives, including the traditional dividend yield. This remains true even after excluding several years during the Great Depression when issuance was unusually high. The measure of cash flow used to form the yield matters economically. Long-term investors’ hedging demand for stock is considerably reduced when net payout, rather than dividends, serves as the cash-flow measure. An agent relying on an incorrect payout measure is willing to pay an economically significant “management fee” to switch to the optimal policy.

We solve for optimal consumption and portfolio choice in a life-cycle model with short-sales and borrowing constraints; undiversifiable labor income risk; and a predictable, time-varying, equity premium and show that the investor pursues aggressive market timing strategies. Importantly, in the presence of stock market predictability, the model suggests that the conventional financial advice of reducing stock market exposure as retirement approaches is correct on average, but ignoring changing market information can lead to substantial welfare losses. Therefore, enhanced target-date funds (ETDFs) that condition on expected equity premia increase welfare relative to target-date funds (TDFs). Out-of-sample analysis supports these conclusions.

We design an experiment to test the hypothesis that, in violation of Bayes’ rule, some people respond more forcefully to the strength of information than to its weight. We provide incentives to motivate effort, use naturally occurring information, and control for risk attitude. We find that the strength–weight bias affects expectations but that its magnitude is significantly lower than originally reported. Controls for nonlinear utility further reduce the bias. Our results suggest that incentive compatibility and controls for risk attitude considerably affect inferences on errors in expectations.

We test whether model misspecification or liquidity spirals primarily explain the observed excess dependence in filtered (for economic fundamentals) hedge fund index returns and the links between volatility, liquidity shocks, and hedge fund return clustering. Evidence supports the model misspecification hypothesis: i) hedge fund filtered return clustering is symmetric, ii) filtered Short Bias fund returns exhibit negative dependence with filtered returns for other hedge fund types, iii) negative liquidity shocks are associated with clustering in both tails and market volatility subsumes the role of negative liquidity shocks, and iv) these same patterns appear in size-sorted equity portfolios.

This paper examines how culture affects information asymmetry in financial markets. We extract firms traded in the United States but headquartered in regions sharing Chinese culture (“Chinese firms”), and we manually identify a group of U.S. analysts of Chinese ethnic origin (“Chinese analysts”). We find that Chinese analysts issue more accurate forecasts on Chinese firms than non-Chinese analysts. The effect is stronger among firms with less transparent information environments. Further evidence suggests that cultural proximity can go beyond language commonality and analysts’ pre-existing channels for information. Market reaction is stronger when Chinese analysts issue favorable forecast revisions or upgrades about Chinese firms.

We model the pricing implications of screens adopted by socially responsible investors. The model reproduces the empirically observed abnormal return to sin stock and implies a premium for systematic investor boycott risk that affects targeted as well as nontargeted firms. The investor boycott premium is not displaced by litigation risk, measures of neglect effect, illiquidity, industry momentum, or concentration. The investor boycott risk factor is useful in explaining mean returns across industries, and its premium varies with the relative wealth of socially responsible investors and the business cycle.

In this article, I study the predictability of bond risk premia by means of expectations to future business conditions using survey forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. I show that expected business conditions consistently affect excess bond returns and that the inclusion of expected business conditions in standard predictive regressions improve forecast performance relative to models using information derived from the current term structure or macroeconomic variables. The results are confirmed in a real-time out-of-sample exercise, where the predictive accuracy of the models is evaluated both statistically and from the perspective of a mean-variance investor that trades in the bond market.

We present CoMargin, a new methodology to estimate collateral requirements in derivatives central counterparties (CCPs). CoMargin depends on both the tail risk of a given market participant and its interdependence with other participants. Our approach internalizes trading externalities and enhances the stability of CCPs, thus reducing systemic risk concerns. We assess our methodology using proprietary data from the Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation that include daily observations of the actual trading positions of all of its members from 2003 to 2011. We show that CoMargin outperforms existing margining systems by stabilizing the probability and minimizing the shortfall of simultaneous margin-exceeding losses.

The slope of the implied volatility term structure is positively related to future option returns. I rank firms based on the slope of the volatility term structure and analyze the returns for straddle portfolios. Straddle portfolios with high slopes of the volatility term structure outperform straddle portfolios with low slopes by an economically and statistically significant amount. The results are robust to different empirical setups and are not explained by traditional factors, higher-order option factors, or jump risk.

This study analyzes detailed minutes of board meetings of business companies in which the Israeli government holds a substantial equity interest. Boards with at least 3 directors of each gender are found to be at least 79% more active at board meetings than those without such representation. This phenomenon is driven by women directors in particular; they are more active when a critical mass of at least 3 women is in attendance. Gender-balanced boards are also more likely to replace underperforming chief executive officers (CEOs) and are particularly active during periods when CEOs are being replaced.

I develop a new predictive approach using Bayesian model averaging to account for incomplete knowledge of the true model behind corporate default and bankruptcy filing. I find that uncertainty over the correct model is empirically large, with far fewer variables being significant predictors of default compared with conventional approaches. Only the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and the volatility of market returns are robust default predictors in the overall sample and individual industry groups. Model-averaged forecasts that aggregate information across models or allow for industry-specific effects substantially outperform individual models.

Theory predicts that capping brokers’ compensation exacerbates the exploitation of retail investors. We show that regulated caps on mutual fund 12b-1 fees, effectively sales commissions, are associated with negative equity fund performance, but only after a structural shift toward maximum permitted levels of the fees around 2000. Past this break point, flow–performance sensitivity shifts from the middle- to the highest-performing funds, suggesting that the fee cap increases performance-chasing behavior by constraining brokers’ incentives to learn about lower-ranked funds. The policy implication is that regulators must reevaluate the efficacy of caps on brokerage fees.