Little evidence exists on whether boards help managers make better decisions. We provide evidence that strong and independent boards help overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) avoid honest mistakes when they seek to acquire other companies. In addition, we find that once-overconfident CEOs make better acquisition decisions after they experience personal stock trading losses, providing evidence that a manager’s recent personal experience, and not just educational and early career experience, influences firm investment policy. Finally, we develop and validate a new CEO overconfidence measure that is easily constructed from machine-readable insider trading data, unlike previously used measures.

Executive pay disparity, as measured by chief executive officer (CEO) pay slice (CPS), is positively associated with the implied cost of equity, even after controlling for other determinants of the cost of equity. The difference in the cost of equity can explain 43% of the difference in the valuation effect attributable to CPS reported by Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). Further analysis shows that the positive association is stronger when agency problems of free cash flow are more severe and when CEO succession planning is more important. Our evidence suggests that a large CPS is associated with CEO entrenchment and high succession risk.

Using a unique data set with detailed information on the derivative positions of upstream oil and gas firms during 1996–2008, we find that hedging intensity is positively related to factors that amplify chief executive officer (CEO) entrenchment and free cash flow agency costs. There is also robust evidence that hedging is motivated by the reduction of financial distress and borrowing costs, and that it is influenced by both intrinsic cash flow risk and temporary spikes in commodity price volatility. We present a comprehensive perspective on the determinants of corporate hedging, and the results are consistent with the predictions of the risk management and agency costs literatures.

The paper explains why firms with high dispersion of analyst forecasts earn low future returns. These firms beat the capital asset pricing model in periods of increasing aggregate volatility and thereby provide a hedge against aggregate volatility risk. The aggregate volatility risk factor can explain the abnormal return differential between high- and low-disagreement firms. This return differential is higher for firms with abundant real options, and this fact can be explained by aggregate volatility risk. Aggregate volatility risk can also explain why the link between analyst disagreement and future returns is stronger for firms with high short-sale constraints.

This article analyzes the effect of liquidity risk on the performance of equity hedge fund portfolios. Similarly to Avramov, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), (2011), we observe that, before accounting for the effect of liquidity risk, hedge fund portfolios that incorporate predictability in managerial skills generate superior performance. This outperformance disappears or weakens substantially for most emerging markets, event-driven, and long/short hedge fund portfolios once we account for liquidity risk. Moreover, we show that the equity market-neutral and long/short hedge fund portfolios’ “alphas” also entail rents for their service as liquidity providers. These results hold under various robustness tests.

This paper examines diversification as a source of value creation and destruction in private equity (PE) funds. Previous literature has focused on the “diversification discount” in corporations. However, in PE funds, diversification might increase returns by ameliorating managerial risk aversion and facilitating knowledge sharing. I examine a sample of 1,505 PE funds and show that industry and geographic diversification can increasePE fund returns. This is likely due to knowledge sharing and learning, not merely risk reduction. Diversification can reduce returns if it spreads staff too thinly across industries or is motivated by risk aversion rather than performance bonuses.

We classify a unique and comprehensive data set of corporate press releases into topics and study the market reaction to various types of news. While confirming prior findings regarding strong stock price responses to financial news, we also document significant reactions to news about corporate strategy, customers and partners, products and services, management changes, and legal developments. Consistent with regulators' expectations, the level of informational asymmetry in the market declines following most types of press releases. At the same time, return volatility frequently increases in the post-announcement period, which we show can be attributed to higher levels of valuation uncertainty.

We examine capital structures of 2,572 project-financed investments in 124 countries for the period 1997–2006. In contrast to the general prediction of the trade-off theory, we find that project companies use more leverage when project risk is high, but they use less leverage in the presence of risk-reducing features including offtake agreements. Project companies use less leverage and instead rely more on offtake agreements when the control benefits of cash flow from the project are high, suggesting that leverage and contract structures in the project company are important hedging mechanisms.

We consider whether sentiment affects the profitability of momentum strategies. We hypothesize that news that contradicts investors’ sentiment causes cognitive dissonance, slowing the diffusion of such news. Thus, losers (winners) become underpriced under optimism (pessimism). Short-selling constraints may impede arbitraging of losers and thus strengthen momentum during optimistic periods. Supporting this notion, we empirically show that momentum profits arise only under optimism. An analysis of net order flows from small and large trades indicates that small investors are slow to sell losers during optimistic periods. Momentum-based hedge portfolios formed during optimistic periods experience long-run reversals.

Based on theoretical advice and empirical evidence suggesting that risk taking in asset allocation enhances pension returns, we evaluate empirically whether good corporate governance leads to a larger allocation of pension assets to risky securities as compared to safe investments. Our findings suggest that firms with good external and internal corporate governance take more risk by investing heavily in equities and allocating a smaller share of the plan assets to cash, government debt, and insurance company accounts. The main underlying mechanisms appear to be higher investment returns and better pension funding status associated with higher equity and lower safe asset allocations.

We compile a comprehensive international dividend and capital gains tax data set to study tax-based explanations of corporate payout for a panel of 6,035 firms from 25 countries for the period 1990–2008. We find robust evidence that the tax penalty on dividends versus capital gains corresponds closely with firms’ propensity to pay dividends and repurchase shares, and with the amount of dividends and shares repurchased. Our coefficient estimates suggest a smaller tax effect than reported in recent single-country, single-event studies. Instead, our results correspond more closely with historic long-term estimates of the elasticity of dividends.

We examine the 2007 stock market bubble in China. Using multiple measures of bubble intensity for each stock, we find significantly smaller bubbles in stocks for which there is greater analyst coverage. We further show that the abating effect of analyst coverage on bubble intensity is weaker when there is greater disagreement among analysts. This suggests that, in line with resale option theories of bubbles, one channel through which analyst coverage may mitigate bubbles is by coordinating investors’ beliefs and thus reducing its dispersion. Stock turnover provides further evidence consistent with this particular information mechanism.

We study the empirical determinants of corporate ownership dynamics using a unique, hand-collected 20-year data set on the ownership structure of Chilean companies. Controllers’ blockholdings are on average high and stable over time. Controllers still make changes to their holdings through issuance and block trades. In a typical year controllers’ blockholdings decrease (increase) by 5 percentage points or more in approximately 6% (7%) of firms. We find that the separation between controllers’ voting and cash-flow rights reduces the likelihood of ownership dilution. Dilution is preceded by high stock returns and predicts low stock returns in the future when done through issuance.

This paper describes estimation methods, based on the generalized method of moments (GMM), applicable in settings where time series have different starting or ending dates. We introduce two estimators that are more efficient asymptotically than standard GMM. We apply these to estimating predictive regressions in international data and show that the use of the full sample affects inference for assets with data available over the full period as well as for assets with data available for a subset of the period. Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate that reductions hold for small-sample standard errors as well as asymptotic ones.

This paper presents the first empirical evidence showing that the marriage of a member of the controlling family adds value to public corporations. The results, based on a uniquely comprehensive data set from Thailand, show that the family firm’s stock price increases when the partner is from either a prominent business or a political family. Abnormal returns tend to be higher for firms whose operation depends on extensive networks. In contrast, marriages to ordinary citizens are not associated with any abnormal returns. These findings are generally supportive of the value of networks in general and marriage in particular.

We examine how research and development (R&D) incoming spillovers affect long-run firm performance following firms’ R&D increases. We use a stochastic frontier production method to capture R&D incoming spillover effects. Firms reaping more benefits from R&D investment made by other firms experience more improvement in profitability and more favorable long-run stock performance in the post-R&D-increase period. Firms with higher levels of R&D incoming spillovers recruit more key employees from other firms, suggesting that obtaining know-how through hiring is an important source of incoming spillovers. The evidence also shows that firms experiencing more R&D outgoing spillover effects tend to underinvest in R&D.

We investigate whether there are predictable patterns in the dynamics of higher-order risk-neutral moments (RNMs) extracted from the market prices of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index options. To this end, we conduct a horse race among alternative forecasting models within an out-of-sample context over various forecasting horizons. We consider both a statistical and an economic setting. We find that higher RNMs can be statistically forecasted. However, only the 1-day-ahead skewness forecasts can be economically exploited. This economic significance vanishes once we incorporate transaction costs. The results have implications for the dynamics of implied volatility surfaces.

An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.