In the 1730s and 1750s the English government proposed to refinance the redeemable debt by “lowering the interest rate.” In the ensuing coordination game among creditors, large investors like the Bank of England could block the policy change by demanding cash. Using 4 percent and 3 percent annuities prices to analyze market expectations, this article studies two refinancing episodes with very different fates. Lord Barnard failed in 1737 because his terms were too strict and financial agents induced a temporary market crash. Lord Pelham succeeded in 1750 because his better terms fit market prices, and interest rates had fallen much faster than expected.

The debate over the institutions that link economic growth to public finance tends to disregard the need for savings to finance growing public debt. In seventeenth-century Holland the structure, size, and issuing rates of the debt were determined by investors' preferences, wealth accumulation, and changing private investment opportunities. The growth of savings enabled the creation of a huge debt largely with short-term bills. Issuing rates dropped because savings outstripped private investment alternatives. In Holland, and probably elsewhere as well, credible commitment and efficient fiscal institutions were necessary, but not sufficient to create liquid secondary markets and low costs of capital.

Economic development requires both secure property rights and the ability to reallocate property in response to technological and other changes. Significant reallocations have occurred repeatedly throughout U.S. history and have often been involuntary. This essay considers the question of how property rights can be subject to frequent involuntary reallocation and still be considered secure.

Andrew Carnegie

Department stores represented one of the most advertising-intensive sectors of American interwar retailing. Yet it has been argued that a competitive spiral of high advertising spending, to match the challenge of other local department stores, contributed to an inflation of operating costs that eroded long-term competitiveness. We test these claims, using both qualitative archival data and establishment-level national data sets. The quantitative analysis confirms that the relationship between advertising expenditure and sales deteriorated markedly over the period, but indicates that the growing negative impact of retaliatory advertising by rival department stores was less important than contemporaries perceived.

Between 1933 and 1936 the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation purchased more than a million delinquent mortgages from private lenders and refinanced those loans for the borrowers. Its primary goal was to break the cycle of foreclosure, forced property sales and decreases in home values that was affecting local housing markets throughout the nation. We find that the volume of HOLC lending was related to measures of distress in local (county-level) housing markets and that these interventions increased 1940 median home values and homeownership rates, but not new home building.

“[A] tremendous surge of residential building in the [last] decade… was matched by an ever-increasing supply of homes sold on easy terms [and only]… a small decline in prices was necessary to wipe out this equity. Unfortunately, deflationary processes are never satisfied with small declines in values. They feed upon themselves and produce results out of all proportion to their causes… In the field of real estate finance, particularly, we have depended so much upon credit that our whole value structure can be thrown out of balance by relatively slight shocks. When such a delicate structure is once disorganized, it is a tremendous task to get it into a position where it can again function normally.”1

Henry Hoagland, 1935

Technology shocks and declining productivity have been advanced as important factors driving the Great Depression in the United States, based on real business cycle theory. We estimate an improved measure of technology for interwar manufacturing, using data from the U.S. census reports. There is clear evidence of increasing returns to scale and we find no statistical proof that technology shocks led to changes in hours worked or other inputs. This contradicts a key prediction of real business cycle theory. We find that increasing returns to scale are not due to market power but to labor and capital hoarding.

The Mexican expropriation of 1938 was the first large-scale non-Communist expropriation of foreign-owned natural resource assets. The literature makes three assertions: the United States did not fully back the companies, Mexico did not fully compensate them for the value of their assets, and the oil workers benefitted from the expropriation. This article finds that none of those assertions hold. The companies devised political strategies that maneuvered a reluctant President Roosevelt into supporting their interests, and the Mexican government more than fully compensated them as a result. Neither wages for oil workers nor Mexican government oil revenue rose after the expropriation.

The Knappschaft was a mutual association through which German miners insured themselves against accident, illness, and old age. The Knappschaft underlies Bismarck's sickness and accident insurance legislation, and thus Germany's system today. This article focuses on moral hazard, which plagued the Knappschaften in the later nineteenth century. Sick pay made it attractive for miners to feign illness that made them unable to work. We outline the moral hazard problem the Knappschaften faced as well as the mechanisms they devised to control it, and then use econometric models to demonstrate that those mechanisms were at best imperfect.

The frequency of bad harvests and price elasticity of demand are measured using new data on English grain yields 1268–1480 and 1750–1850 and a revised price series. The analysis shows that major harvest shortfalls were a significant component of most historical subsistence crises, as back-to-back shortfalls were of the worst famines. Although serious harvest shortfalls long remained an unavoidable fact of economic life, by c.1800 yields had become less variable and prices less harvest sensitive. By the eve of the Industrial Revolution, England had become effectively famine-free.

Focusing on the New York banking sector, we analyze a neglected, but profound impact of the National Banking Acts. By resisting federal banking legislation and “boycotting” newly chartered national banks, the New York Clearing House Association members created market opportunities for the new entrants to dominate the correspondent banking market. The new entrants’ aggressive tactics including interest payments on deposits increased their vulnerability to panicky withdrawals by country banks. They also magnified conflicts of interest within the clearinghouse, which weakened its central banking functions and further destabilized the macroeconomy.

This article analyzes the economics of “badmouthing” in the context of the pre-1914 French capital market. We argue that badmouthing was a means through which racketeering journals sought to secure property rights over issuers' reputation. We provide a theoretical study of the market setup that emerged to deal with such problems, and we test our predictions using new evidence from contemporary sources.

“A newspaper that wishes to make its fortune should never waste its columns and weary its readers by praising anything. Eulogy is invariably dull—a fact that Mr. Alf had discovered and utilized.”

A. Trollope, The Way We Live Now, 1875

“And did you threaten him with the newspapers?”

H. de Balzac, La maison Nucingen, 1837

Using longitudinal data linked to the 1850 and 1860 U.S. federal census manuscript schedules, this article examines the effect of migration to high-risk malaria counties on real estate wealth accumulation. Although the migrants recognized the risk of malaria, they still migrated to malarial regions. Those who migrated to areas with higher risk of malaria experienced smaller increases in real estate wealth than migrants to less malarial areas. The findings in this study provide historical evidence with which to estimate the potential modern-day economic benefit of malarial eradication.

This article takes advantage of an exogenous shift towards patenting in chemicals to test whether patents contribute to the geographic diffusion of innovations. Data on U.S. innovations that were exhibited at four world fairs between 1851 and 1915 suggest that innovative activity became less localized after patenting rates increased. These changes cannot be explained by changes in the localization of chemical production or economy-wide changes in the localization of innovations.

We examine the relationships between warfare, taxation, and political change in the context of the political unification of the Italian peninsula. Using a comprehensive new database, we argue that external and internal threat environments had significant implications for the demand for military strength, which in turn had important ramifications for fiscal policy and the likelihood of constitutional reform and related improvements in the provision of nonmilitary public services. Our analytic narrative complements recent theoretical and econometric works about state capacity. By emphasizing public finances, we also uncover novel insights about the forces underlying state formation in Italy.

Educational institutions and intergenerational mobility are closely related; access to schools is a major determinant of a child's future success. This article offers new insight into this relationship with a study of mobility at the beginning of the United States' expansion of public schools in the early twentieth century. A new intergenerational data set is used to establish high rates of income mobility at the start of the century and a negative relationship between school quality and mobility. Educational attainment estimates reveal that this was a product of high-income families being more responsive to improving schools than poor families.

The last remaining gap in the national accounts of Russia and the USSR in the twentieth century, 1913 to 1928, includes the Great War, the Civil War, and postwar recovery. Filling this gap, we find that the Russian economy did somewhat better in the Great War than was previously thought; in the Civil War it did correspondingly worse; war losses persisted into peacetime, and were not fully restored under the New Economic Policy. We compare this experience across regions and over time. The Great War and Civil War produced the deepest economic trauma of Russia's troubled twentieth century.

Building on a large sample of elderly French individuals, we evaluate the resources that were available to the old. We find that a considerable percentage of the French population did not have sufficient assets to live off of when aged. We compare the savings behaviors of pensioners and non-pensioners at a time when only a small part of the labor force was entitled to a pension. We show that pensioners were better able to accumulate wealth than were non-pensioners, even when we take into account their occupation and inherited wealth.

“Oh! La misère des vieux sans pain, des vieux sans espoir, sans enfants, sans argent, sans rien autre chose que la mort devant eux, y pensons-nous? Y pensons-nous, aux vieux affamés des mansardes? Pensons-nous aux larmes de ces yeux ternes qui furent brillants, émus et joyeux, jadis?”1

Guy de Maupassant

I reexamine Douglass North and Barry Weingast's argument regarding credible commitment and sovereign debt in post-revolution England. The central problem that the architects of the revolution settlement had to solve, I argue, was not the king's frequent reneging on financial commitments (a symptom), but the moral hazard that generated the kings' malfeasance (the underlying cause). The central element of the revolution settlement was thus not better holding kings to their commitments, but better holding royal advisors to account for all consequences of the Crown's policies—through what we now call ministerial responsibility.

The First World War radically altered the political landscape of Central Europe. The new borders after 1918 are typically viewed as detrimental to the region's economic integration and development. We argue that this view lacks historical perspective. It fails to take into account that the new borders followed a pattern of economic fragmentation that had emerged during the late nineteenth century. We estimate the effects of the new borders on trade and find that the “treatment effects” of these borders were quite limited. There is strong evidence that border changes occurred systematically along barriers which existed already before 1914.