The impact of China's demand for silver on global trade in specie and monetary metals during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries remains poorly understood. Conventional wisdom postulates that seventeenth-century China became so dependent on foreign silver to sustain domestic economic growth that a sharp fall in silver imports in the 1640s led to the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644. This hypothesis rests on dubious theoretical and empirical grounds. The demand for silver in China was determined by long-term changes in indigenous demand for money rather than short-term fluctuations in the flow of silver imports.

A debate has recently been re-ignited over the pace of long-run productivity growth in nineteenth-century agriculture. Before 1966 the view was one of accelerated productivity over the course of the century, and this view was confirmed by the statistics on farm gross product published in 1960 by Marvin Towne and Wayne Rasmussen. The appearance in 1966 of Stanley Lebergott's labor force series changed this traditional perspective. When combined with Towne and Rasmussen's output figures, Lebergott's figures suggested that productivity growth was slower after the Civil War than before, calling into question the more plausible pattern of postbellum increases. A few historians were skeptical of these new findings, but were unable to dispute the seemingly solid foundation upon which they were built. Finally in 1993, Thomas Weiss argued that the skeptics were in fact correct to be wary of Lebergott's revisions.

Tenant-right, or a tenant's right to sell his holding, was one of the most puzzling institutions of nineteenth-century Irish land tenure. Historians have argued that the institution reflects the tenants' assertions of a proprietary interest in the land, an assertion often backed up by threats and violence. In this article we argue that landlords respected tenant-right because they could profit from the instistution. Our model reflects comments by contemporaries and explains that tenant-right functioned as a bond aganist nonpayment of rent and was part of a rational landlord's income-maximizing strategy.

An analysis of all appellate cases involving slave-sales reveals that southern courts helped minimize the costs of trading in slaves. Slave-sales law also surpassed other contemporaneous commercial law in sophistication. Why? Greater information gaps between slave buyers and sellers called for more complex institutional support. The enormous property value embodied by slaves also led to more litigation, greater need for settled law, and a more even match of power between plaintiff and defendant. Additionally, legal rules surrounding slave sales substituted for the employment law governing free-labor markets.

In recent years a number of papers have appeared offering explanations of the long-noted, long-unresolved note issue paradox in both the free and national banking eras. Some have argued that previous profit calculations overstate the true cost of note issue because they fail to account for risks and costs that are not easily modeled. Others have argued that profit calculations are reasonably accurate and demonstrate that the bankers acted irrationally in failing to reap easily gathered profits. Yet another approach radically modified the basis of the calculation and found potential profits to be quite small. This note offers an explanation overlooked by most previous studies: that although note issue was profitable, a more profitable avenue existed. Because of legal and institutional restrictions, banks found it more profitable at the margin to create deposits rather than issue notes in extending credit.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century Spanish America had about 400,000 slaves, which made 3 percent of the population. Before this time the importance of slavery had been greater, having received a large stimulus because of the sharp demographic decline of the natives following the Conquest. The arrival of Africans meant that in 1650 the proportion of slaves to total population was from 5 to 10 percent.

Infrastructure construction is often associated with excessive, even corrupt, profits. This article argues that construction profits earned in Spanish railroads in the mid-nineteenth century were a response to the lack of credibility of the Spanish state. It also makes the first attempt to document excess construction profits in Spanish railroads by demonstrating, for example, financial links between railroad stockholders and the providers of construction goods and services and by directly estimating construction profits. The estimated excess construction profits only provided railroad entrepreneurs with a normal rate of return to their entire railroad-related investments.