Economic interests, ideas, and politics have been put forward as explanations for the Repeal of the British Corn Laws. This article evaluates these competing explanations using the case of the Belgian Corn Laws between 1834 and 1873. A detailed quantitative analysis assesses the success of party affiliation and personal and constituency economic interests in predicting representatives' voting behavior. These factors prove to be insufficient to explain the shift towards free trade. This article then moves on to a qualitative analysis, which points to the importance of political strategy and ideas in the liberalization of corn tariffs.

Historians and economists have long been in need of index numbers to measure both the volume (real value) of activity that is undertaken to produce process or product innovations over time, and also a counterpart index that might capture the outcome of that activity (the volume of inventions) that come on stream year after year. For purposes of measurement the first index can in principle be equated (within tolerable limits of accuracy) with the real annual expenditures on research and development as recorded (at least for recent times) in governmental, corporate, company, and other accounts. Alas, for years before 1914 national or even industry-wide research and development expenditures are very rarely recorded in a form that might allow for the construction of an index number.

In the Netherlands a kind of urban system emerged very early in the sea provinces, but inland the country cities functioned as regional capitals without many links to cities outside their regions. After 1800 political and economic unification accelerated and the peripheral towns lost their independence. Using two indicators—the division of labor and migration—the article analyzes how this process of integration took shape after 1850.

Between 1812 and 1815, the United States authorized five Treasury note issues. In total, over $36 million in denominations of $3 to $1000 were emitted. The last issue included small circulating notes in denominations of less than $100. Because of the shortage of adequate circulating medium and revenue to conduct the War of 1812, these notes proved to be extremely useful as they were transferable by delivery and receivable for duties, taxes, and public use at par plus accrued interest. They also served as interest-bearing reserves for banks since they were convertible into any kind of money and bore interest simultaneously. The success of the Treasury notes was demonstrated by the fact that they were fully subscribed and accepted by the banks and merchants. In addition, the small Treasury note issues of 1815 indirectly served to increase the circulating medium of the country. They were used to buy goods and services by individuals, pay custom duties by merchants, and acted as cash reserves for banks, preventing bank notes from being discounted. They thus became the first circulating paper currency issued by the United States after ratification of the Constitution.

The article reexamines the connection between rural landownership and income distribution in light of recent evidence suggesting economic growth in China in the early twentieth century. The study utilizes a government-organized national survey of landholding and income-earning in 1930s’ China and three household-level village surveys conducted by Japanese researchers in the 1930s. Our investigations produce evidence contrary to the currently held view of substantial (and increasing) income inequality. We suggest an alternative scenario of economic opportunities.

We examine the strategies interwar working-class British households used to “smooth” consumption over time and guard against negative contingencies such as illness, unemployment, and death. Newly discovered returns from the U.K. Ministry of Labour's 1937/38 Household Expenditure Survey are used to fully categorize expenditure smoothing via nineteen credit/savings vehicles. We find that households made extensive use of expenditure-smoothing devices. Families' reliance on expenditure-smoothing is shown to be inversely related to household income, while households also used these mechanisms more intensively during expenditure crisis phases of the family life cycle, especially the years immediately after new household formation.

Financial network structure is an important determinant of systemic risk. This article examines how the U.S. interbank network evolved over a long and important period that included two key events: the founding of the Federal Reserve and the Great Depression. Banks established connections to correspondents that joined the Federal Reserve in cities with Fed offices, initially reducing overall network concentration. The network became even more focused on Fed cities during the Depression, as survival rates were higher for banks with more existing connections to Fed cities, and as survivors established new connections to those cities over time.

During World War II the United States attempted to prevent Germany from acquiring wolfram (tungsten ore) in Spain by buying it in the open market. Preemptive buying forced the Germans to pay more for and to consume less tungsten, a material crucial for the production of machine tools and armor-piercing shells. The income provided an important incentive for Spain to remain neutral. The naval blockade and the relatively low elasticity of the supply of wolfram contributed to the success of the wolfram-buying campaign.

It is a widely held belief that significant wage rate differentials existed between Britain and the United States during the period 1790–1830. Indeed, the existence of such differentials is a pivotal factor in at least one theory of the nature and rate of growth of American and British technology and in the explanation of relative factor combinations in the two countries during the nineteenth century.

The most interesting and distinctive feature of the first Bank of the United States was its nation-wide operation through a system of branches. It is difficult to present an even reasonably definitive analysis of that system. The records available, although more adequate than formerly, are still sadly incomplete. Enough is known, however, to reveal many complexities, political, entrepreneurial and administrative. This paper is designed to offer only a rather sketchy treatment of the following phases or aspects of the subject: prototypes and predecessors of the Bank with special reference to branch-banking; the establishment of the eight branches of the Bank; the actual operation of the branches; and the relative measure of their liquidity when the Bank was subjected to the acid test of winding up its affairs.

We present new estimates of the outcomes of first-generation Mexicans and their descendants between 1880 and 1940. We find zero convergence of the economic gap between Mexicans and non-Mexican whites across three generations. The great-grandchildren of immigrants also had fewer years of education. Slow convergence is not simply due to an inheritance of poverty; rather, Mexican Americans had worse outcomes conditional on the father’s economic status. However, the gap between third-generation Mexican Americans and non-Mexican whites is about half the size today as it was in 1940, suggesting that barriers to Mexican American progress have significantly decreased over time.

The paper examines the economic role played by poor relief in early nineteenth-century England. A three-equation model is estimated to explain cross-parish variations in per capita relief expenditures, agricultural laborers' annual wage income, and unemployment rates. Relief expenditures are found to be related to crop mix, the political power of labor-hiring farmers, distance from London, and employment opportunities in cottage industry. The results strongly support the revisionist analysis of the Old Poor Law, and reject the analysis contained in the Report of the Royal Poor Law Commission.

Did preparations for the Second World War account for the precipitous drop in the growth rate of Soviet industrial production from 10–12 percent per annum in the period 1928–1937 to only 2–3 percent per annum in the period 1937–1940? According to some who study the Soviet economy the answer is “yes.” This view has been succinctly expressed by Stanley Cohn: “After 1937, the rising spectre of Hitler forced the Soviet leadership to shift resources into armaments on a massive scale. As a result, the growth rate fell drastically to 3.6 percent per year between 1937 and 1940.” Such a sequence of events, however, has never been empirically demonstrated. The purpose of this paper is to investigate formally the validity of this explanation, via aggregate production functions, particularly of the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) variety, as well as to explore an alternative hypothesis, espoused, among others, by Naum Jasny, Alec Nove and Warren Nutter. This hypothesis stresses a domestic factor as the major contributor to the disruption in industrial production: namely, the impact of Stalin's terror in the form of chaos-producing political purges.

It may seem odd to disinter an economic theory—in this instance, William Stanley Jevons's claim that sunspots caused macroeconomic fluctuations—which no one now believes or much cares about. In fact, my purpose is not to scoff at a dead theory, but to use it as a pretext to discuss the following issues: economic historians often have suggested a dichotomy between a premodem and industrial macroeconomy, with the premodern economy largely at the mercy of weather and other natural phenomena; the dichotomy is rooted in early neoclassical economic theory (here restricting ourselves to Jevons); there is little historical evidence that premodern macro fluctuations were caused by natural disturbances, such as the weather (here restricting ourselves to the case of England); and the above three theses have some interesting implications for the way economic policy is conceived, both then and now.

The countryside of Europe in the Roman period was one of dispersed villas and farmsteads placed in a regular grid. That of post-Roman Europe was one of nucleated villages surrounded by irregular fields and “spider's web” tracks. The change occurred between the sixth and the ninth centuries, when the countryside was largely emptied of its population. The reasons for this change should be explored, for this reconstruction of the countryside was the start of the medieval economic expansion that gave Europe a density of population and intensity of land exploitation it had never before achieved.

In the early nineteenth century, five versions of stationary steam engines were in widespread use. In America, the high-pressure engine was dominant in the West, but on the eastern seaboard the low-pressure engine was viable. In Britain, the low-pressure engine was overwhelmingly dominant. Here we analyze the evidence on cost and performance of high- and low-pressure engines, and show that fuel-price and interest-rate differentials were sufficient to explain the distribution of steam engine types in America.