The structural retardation hypothesis locates the source of stagnation in French agriculture primarily within agriculture — inthe economic, political, and sociological consequences of a peasant system of agricultural production. It is argued in this paper that the poor performance of French agriculture from the 1870s to the 1940s is to be found in the limited opportunities for agricultural growth provided by the French economy. Evidence suggests that the slow growth in demand for agricultural output, the slow growth in demand for labor by the non-agricultural sector, and the limited investment in the institutional infrastructure to support agricultural development were the primary sources of stagnation.

In this paper, I will discuss three classic problems in economic history. I label them “classic” because they are problems of general interest that share the central characteristic of classic problems: an extensive literature has not led to general agreement. They are taken from the literature on the history of the United States because of the wealth of data and secondary material on this country's history, but they all have their analogues or reflections in European history. They are the problems of labor scarcity in America, the depression of the 1930's (which Americans call the Great Depression), and the deflation of the late nineteenth century (which the British call the Great Depression).

The history of the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate before World War I demonstrates that a cartel can be established and maintained in the face of significant disintegrative forces, including many members, heterogeneous production and cost conditions, dynamic markets, competition from outside producers, and cheating. Opportunities for individualistic behavior, including contractual loopholes and horizontal combinations, combined with a collusive objective function that emphasized overall control and stability, allowed the cartel to survive for over two decades without government interference or support.

The sort of document which explicitly formulates policy is, in any field of history, rather hard to come by. That is especially true when we search for formulations of business policy and especially for medieval formulations of medieval business policy.

This article offers an explanation for the regional differences in the use of African and European bound labor in colonial America. The migrations of Africans and Europeans to the Americas set in motion an evolutionary process that caused regional changes in the disease ecology of the New World. Biological and epidemiological differences among populations explain the different regional labor supply choices. This article emphasizes the interactions between changing populations and disease environments. Diseases are intermediaries through which populations interact by causing illness and death. Not all populations are equally afflicted by specific diseases. Therein lies the story.

Credit financing of automobile sales and dealer inventories was provided primarily by hundreds of sales finance companies in the interwar United States. The few finance companies tied to auto manufacturers wrote 90 percent of credit business. Manufacturers initially established finance companies not to bolster retail sales but to finance dealers' wholesale inventory so manufacturers could lower average costs by smoothing seasonal production patterns. Moreover, until the Justice Department intervened, manufacturers apparently illegally coerced franchised dealers into using the manufacturer's preferred finance company rather than an independent.

An important tenet of the Chicago School of antitrust asserts that the Sherman Act's framers sought to foster consumer welfare. This article challenges that interpretation by re-examining the legislative history. That history suggests that a consumer-welfare standard did not survive the legislative process and that, if anything, Congress focused on the behavior of producers.

Although they had recourse to both the perfectly partible and the perfectly impartible systems of inheritance, nineteenth-century Ontarion farmers commonly employed a unique English-Canadian variation on the perfectly impartible pattern. They devised their estates upon one, or occasionally two of their children, binding them to pay out of their inheritance or other resources the provisions for remaining survivors made in the will. The purpose of this system was to allow land rich and money poor agrarians to pass on their principal asset intact, and it reflects their belief that favorable man/land ratios were the essence of security and prosperity. At the same time, the system made the principal heir the instrument of the deceased parent's desire to treat all of his surviving dependents more or less equally in terms of the value of their inheritances. The system guaranteed that those who inherited land would acquire sufficient land to pursue time tested agricultural methods, but it promoted severe demographic and social dislocations.

The importance of tariff protection in the U.S. cotton textile industry is examined quantitatively for the period around 1833. In sharp contradiction to past writings it is found that the industry was almost entirely dependent on protection.

Volumes, prices, and composition of Hungarian trade are analyzed, focussing on the effects of association with Austria in a political and customs union in a time of increasing protectionism. The author concludes that the relative improvement in terms of trade with Austria compared to overall trade was an incomplete amelioration of a strong pre-existing pro-Austrian bias in the tariff system. Tariff policy strongly favored both countries' traditional exports, with the consequence that the structure of trade with Austria changed little, while that with the outside world was dramatically altered. Hungary's efforts at quasi-independence, especially with respect to import substitution in manufactures at Austrian expense, were essentially ineffective. The text and appendices contain numerous tables and descriptions of trade for important commodities and commodity groups.

Since the beginning of the world-wide depression of the 1930's thewritings of J. M. Keynes have furnished the chief stimulus for serious discussion of economic policy and economic theory. There is implicit in the Keynesian position an interpretation of capitalism strikingly similar to that of P. J. Proudhon, the French socialist of the nineteenth century. Yet whatever similarities there are between the economic ideas of Keynes and Proudhon must be explained by time-separated reaction to more or less comparable problems. The only formal linkage between the two theorists would be their relations to Silvio Gesell, the stamped-money reformer. Keynes expresses admiration for the fundamentals of Gesell's work, and Gesell in turn avows himself a disciple of Proudhon. Keynes's agreement with Gesell is not confined to matters of technical theory, but extends also to the social premises of the work of that “strange, unduly neglected prophet…whose work contains flashes of deep insight and who only just failed to reach down to the essence of the matter.”He characterizes Gesell's work as “anti-Marxian socialism,” asserting that “the future will learn more from the spirit of Gesell than from that of Marx.” Since Marx made a bitter attack on Proudhon, and since Gesell declares himself a disciple of Proudhon, Keynes's references to the superiority of Gesell over Marx suggest important relations between Proudhon and Keynes.

The notion that an “Atlantic Economy” developed in the nineteenth century does not depend simply on the large movements of capital and labor from Britain to the United States. For there were movements of comparable magnitude to other areas. If the economic relations of Britain and North America are to be regarded as distinctive, it is principally because of the reciprocal movement of investment and growth in the two areas. The argument is that the periods of most rapid growth and intensive use of resources in the two economies were inversely related to each other, and that this alternation was established because there existed a common stock of resources, so that when one area drew rapidly on this stock it was at the expense of the other. At one time, investment in buildings and equipment in the United States was particularly rapid, and there was a heavy movement of migrants to America; in Britain the stream of migrants from the countryside was diverted from the industrial districts, and building and home investment were relatively depressed, but the vigorous demand for exports facilitated the flow of funds abroad. In the next period, the position was reversed; development slackened in the United States, and there was a revival of domestic investment in Britain. This, as Phelps-Brown has said, “is the pattern of the Atlantic Economy, dividing a common fund of incremental energies between its regions in varying proportions from time to time. Whether a house is built in Oldham depends on and is decided by whether a house goes up in Oklahoma.”

Despite the attention given by scholars to the military-industrial complex few studies have attempted to pinpoint and explain its origin. In this paper we argue that the coalescing of business, military, and political interest groups in support of a military build-up in the United States during peacetime occurred in the years between the Civil War and World War I. It was during this period that we observe the roots of institutional arrangements between the military and industry for the purpose of large-scale weapons acquisitions.

Since agricultural history first acquired independent status it has been carried forward without much theoretical direction. So much research has been done in the field, however, that possibly a tentative general theory for further work may now be advanced. To be useful, an historical hypothesis should probably center on some common denominator of human experience. One possible common denominator is that all men are located within, or are a certain definite distance from metropolitan unit. All those who live within a certain given zone around the metropolis have at least one common experience: they are all some specific distance from the metropolis. Furthermore, for any given group of people this one common experience may have shaped many of their ideas and actions. Since human events take place in time and space, a theory based primarily on these dimensions might be at least roughly applicable to most history.

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 imposed a binding minimum wage on the southern seamless hosiery and lumber industries. However, the process of adjusting to the new minimum differed across the two industries. Seamless hosiery firms substituted capital for labor and converted or replaced old machinery. Southern lumber firms employed fewer workers relative to northern and western firms, however, changes in their resource base and war-related government purchases prevented an absolute decrease in employment levels. Numerous southern lumber firms continued to pay less than minimum rates by illegally evading the act or taking advantage of the intra-stage exemption.

International productivity comparisons are often plagued by discrepancies between benchmark estimates and time series extrapolations. Broadberry and Burhop present both types of evidence for the Anglo-German comparison. For their preferred data, they find only a minimal German productivity lead prior to World War I, while use of a revised industrial output series for Germany by Ritschl leads to implausible results. This article presents further time series revisions and substantial corrections to the Broadberry and Burhop benchmark estimate. Results strongly suggest a considerable German productivity lead over Britain prior to World War I, which eroded during and after the war.

The discovery of vast oil fields in Texas after 1901 encouraged competition in an industry previously dominated by Standard Oil of New Jersey. The manner in which the state of Texas enforced its antitrust and corporation laws hastened the growth of several major new oil companies, most notably Gulf Oil and The Texas Company, by constraining the activities of Standard in the new fields. In so doing, these Texas laws shaped the transition from near monopoly to near oligopoly in the oil industry. Such beneficial results of state laws were, however, largely accidental, since weaknesses in the government's capacity to monitor changes in the burgeoning industry undermined its ability to define and implement systematic regulatory policies. Problems of adjustment that accompanied government's early efforts to regulate market structure in oil have continued to hamper subsequent efforts to regulate other aspects of the industry's operations.