If one views economic development as the purposeful management of resources through time, an action program must perforce concern itself with utilizing natural resources as fully as possible; with improving the quality and effectiveness of the present and the future supply of human resources; and with changing and perfecting the technological processes whereby natural and human resources are combined. The keys that can open the treasures of economic progress are therefore forged in the schoolroom, the laboratory, the inventor's shop, and the research institute. We take this for granted today because the burgeoning teaching and research apparatus is now much more evident in a physical, financial, and workforce sense than in any previous context. But the difference between our era and earlier experiences with economic development is not absolute; in the past as in the present, whenever economic progress quickened it was a consequence of new insights and a new knowledge, of novelty in thought and action, in short, it was the usufruct of an educational awakening.

Any discussion of the United States Congress and imperialism must admit at the outset a basic handicap—neither Congress nor imperialism lends itself to precise definition. As regards Congress, that part of it which between 1861 and 1897 was most influential in foreign affairs—the Senate—has been best defined by two solons who served there several decades apiece—John Sherman of Ohio and John Tyler Morgan of Alabama. They arrived at a bipartisan definition one warm afternoon of 1890, when Morgan was objecting because Sherman, as chairman of a conference committee, declined to divulge conferee secrets. Sherman, indifferent to the needs of future economists and historians, said it would be a “departure” from “gentlemanly propriety” to discuss private conversation indicating “the means by which we got together.” This aggravated Morgan, who tartly reminded Sherman, “Oh, Senators are not in that sense gentlemen in the conference-room. They are Senators.” Sherman insisted, “but they are expected to be gentlemen.”

Antebellum judges played crucial roles in resolving conflicts between slaveowners and common-carrier owners. Because courts could easily quantify the value of a slave's life, they were quicker to compensate slaveowners for slaves injured or killed by a common carrier than to award damages to an injured free person or his estate. Yet judges also had to craft rules governing the behavior of the slave property itself. By the 1860s, Southern courts had established law that encouraged parties with legal standing to act efficiently. Strikingly, tort doctrines developed in slave cases foreshadowed the evolution of law for free accident victims.

This article makes use of nearly one thousand patents to trace the origins and evolution of professional invention in the midwestern harvester industry. These data indicate that professional inventors had become integrated into the industry by the 1870s. This unity of business and invention made firms loci of learning and fostered the rise of a market in technology through which patents and patentees became available.

This study, based on primary sources, shows that the army's role in the wartime mobilization of the industry was fundamental and extensive. It determined aircraft prices and labor exemptions, regulated the industry's supply of credit and raw materials, limited patent rights, and ultimately interfered in management-labor relationships. Its policies resulted in the industry's expansion and concentration and in above average real wages for the industry's labor force. The article concludes that while the mobilization of the aircraft industry was successful, military regulation of the German war economy in World War I was generally inefficient.

Mr. Williamson's comments on my article leave the issue between us ambiguous. I welcome this opportunity further to develop my own views regarding the turbulent period of the 1830's and early 1840's.

First of all, I believe that Williamson has overstated his case in attributing to me disregard of the importance of internal events in the United States. I advanced the hypothesis that the primary disturbing factor in the period 1834–1845 was an increase, and then a decrease, in the flow of funds into the United States, and the problem I wished to examine was the response in the American economy to this initial disturbance. As indicated in my article, the emphasis placed on external factors does not mean that internal events in the United States were negligible.

The power of the church in the medieval town was ever-present and all-pervasive. It operated through the ritual of the sacraments, the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, the charitable foundations of the orders, through the pictorial teaching on church walls and windows, open-air sermons, public inflictions of penance, the celebration of saints' festivals, and in many other ways. There can be no reasonable doubt that the social teachings of the church, along with its other doctrines, were by one means or another impressed upon every townsman, in so far as he was capable of understanding them.

In the summer of 1951 the Bering Sea fishermen's union strike against the Bristol Bay salmon packers signaled the end of old-time industrial labor relations there. The issues of the strike and its conduct offer a case study of deteriorating symbiosis in industrial relations, which is not untypical elsewhere in American industry. This paper concentrates on events in 1951 and 1952 at a remote cannery site on the Nushagak River as a partial microcosm of larger evolutionary consequences in American industry.