Leland H. Jenks and Thomas C. Cochran have suggested that the actions and motivations of modern businessmen be studied through the examination of “sanctions,” the latter defining “social sanction” as “a label for certain types of opinion or attitudes” involving judgments on what is worthy of praise and blame and of social penalties and rewards. When speaking of sanctions, we deal, he says, with a “general concept that stresses the stabilizing function of adages, admonitions, social ceremonies, traditional practices, and other such devices for protecting society from unpredictable behavior.” I believe this concept is a good tool for comparing two cultures of the same period or the same culture at two different periods, for showing the possibilities of, say, the Point Four Program, or for explaining otherwise inexplicable differences in the rate of capitalistic development. But considerable theoretical deliberation and many empirical studies are needed before it can be forged into a tool that can be widely used for research in entrepreneurship. This discussion is concerned with some considerations in connection with the application of the concept to the study of American businessmen and the freedom of enterprise in the nineteenth century.

Recent studies into technological change in the American economy have stressed the importance of economic conditions that operate through the market mechanism on both the direction of the inventive activity which has generally provided the basis for this change and on the rate at which newly developed techniques are commercially adopted. Schmookler has argued the former point persuasively in several articles, while North, for the latter, has asserted that “productivity changes stemming from technological innovations are, in part at least, a nearly automatic response to successful expansion of industries in an acquisitive society under competitive market conditions.” With respect to American agriculture in the nineteenth century, our knowledge of the level of investment which incorporated new production techniques, and of the effects these techniques had on productivity and output has been greatly enhanced by the recent work of Kendrick, Gallman, and Towne and Rasmussen. Our account of inventive activity in agriculture, however, is still limited to mentioning and tracing through the effects of some of the more famous inventions in this field and to fragmentary patent citations. Accessibility to patent statistics since 1837 now makes possible a fuller treatment of agricultural inventions. In Part II of this paper I present a description of the level and composition of agricultural inventions between 1837–1890. In Part III, I attempt to test the importance of certain market conditions as determinants of this inventive activity.

The Archives du Rhone at Lyon contain a unique collection of eighteenth-century business records—partnership agreements, merchandise inventories, financial statements, and depositions concerning a variety of commercial houses. Working in these papers, one begins to acquire a clear and detailed idea of the character of French business enterprise, of how business was organized and carried on and commercial capital mobilized at the end of the old regime.

The spring-wheat region, stretching from central Minnesota across the X Dakotas and into Montana, has been the seat of much unrest owing to its unbalanced development from 1870 to 1920. It was colonized by seekers of the proverbial “free home” and fabulous profits to be had by raising wheat. As a result many farmers assumed burdensome economic ties and fell victims to over-optimism. Their difficulties were due to a variety of complex factors, some within and others outside their control; yet, one trend stood out noticeably: the grain growers persisted in a ruinous, anarchistic form competition, whereas among the merchants and their powerful allies competition was closely regulated.

Examination of approximately a score of U.S. economic history texts indicates that the hypothesis of a change in the structure of consumer preferences in favor of durable goods in the twentieth century, and thereby in the product structure of consumption, has strongly influenced economic historians. By implication, the alleged structural change is unique to the twentieth century. This impression relies upon the treatment of durables expenditures by almost all of that minority of textbook writers who address themselves to the general topic of consumption.

The work of converting the undeveloped forest resources of the Lake States into usable forms absorbed the energies of thousands of individual entrepreneurs. Their combined activity was scarcely able to meet the insatiable demand from the growing number of settlements that dotted the Midwestern prairies and from villages throughout the nation that were growing into towns or mushrooming into major cities. A universal building material was indispensable during a time of rapid economic expansion. Moreover, in the prevailing Age of Wood, white pine lumber, of the finest quality and incredibly low in price, was fortuitously available in abundance.

The major contrast between preindustrial and modern economies is that the latter enjoy regular and rapid growth, whereas income per capita tends to stagnate in the former. Analysis of the organization of exchange in early Christian Ireland shows that the exchange and therefore the production of material wealth was so thoroughly integrated into securing and exercising power, as well as into establishing and maintaining family and social ties, that any improvements in technology which might have led to economic growth would inevitably have generated prohibitive social costs.

Isaac bronson was a highly successful financier of the Jacksonian era who was also one of the period's most original and influential banking theorists. Bronson accumulated his very considerable fortune in New York primarily by judicious personal money-lending operations on long-term bonds and mortgages at a cautious 7 per cent annual return, supplemented by successful ventures in land speculation. In addition to wealth, he had by the 1830's acquired a weighty reputation for sober financial conservatism and was regarded as an authoritative exponent of sound banking principles. Prominent in the financial community, he had long thrown his weight as a sound banking theorist against the “wild-cat” practices of the then rampant state banks. As controlling stockholder of the Bridgeport Bank for almost thirty years, and as president for much of that time, he prided himself on its successful weathering of the financial storms of the period.”

Most historical generalizations must be approached with a wary eye; Kliuchevskii's dictum that “the history of Russia is the history of a country in the process of colonization” is no exception. Taken unjudiciously this dictum grievously compresses time, focuses attention on only a single historical dynamic, lends to the historical process a pre-ordained character which is indeed usually absent. The historian's critical apparatus is dulled, and the delicate nuance and important variant are neglected. Moscow, it has been argued, was a chosen town to lead the southward and eastward expansion of the Great Russian people because of her physical location on the edge of the Valdai hills giving her control of the crucial waterways of European Russia. (Why not, for the same reasons, Vladimir or Rostov, Suzdal or even Uglich?) Muscovite expansion forms the central thread of Russian history, determining the economic and political structure of the state. It was the expansion which fixed and defined the necessity of the “service state,” which in turn subjugated all classes and groups to the all powerful tsardom. (Why not the reverse—the “service state” defining the expansion—and why did not an independent merchant class come to control the expansion, and the towns and politics of Muscovy?) To pursue the argument to a logical conclusion, die modern audioritarian state in Russia (bodi Soviet and Tsarist) is essentially a continuation of old Muscovy. As the latter expanded and colonized, so must the former. (The role of the Party and the Marxist dialectic, by this line of argument, has no fundamental historical significance.)

A persistent argument in condemning foreign economic intrusion in China (1840–1937) is that the “traditional” or the “indigenous” sector of the economy was “hampered,” “disrupted,” or even “ruined.” It is maintained that the handicrafts, small mines, native banks, junks, and coolie carriers were all helplessly depressed because of competition from their counterparts in the modern sector of the economy, which was an outgrowth of external trade and foreign investment in China. Some have argued that the supposed decline in the traditional sector was a net loss to China, since the limited development in the modern sector was not large enough to offset losses in the traditional sector, or that gains in the modern sector were primarily reaped by countries which traded with or invested in China. Others have taken a more moderate view: that the net effect of foreign economic penetration in China cannot be ascertained, because gains and losses in the two sectors cannot be compared quantitatively. But in either case there is the assertion that there was a decline in the traditional sector.

This study estimates agency’s impact on sugar plantation productivity using a unique early nineteenth-century panel data set from St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Results of fixed effects models, combined with a qualitative and quantitative analysis of potential endogeneity of the agency variable, provide no evidence that estates managed by agents were less productive than those managed by their owners. We discuss the results in the context of the historical and recent, revisionary, interpretations of agency, and the emergence of managerial hierarchies in the Atlantic economy.

This article examines the relationship between collective action and the size of worker and employer groups in the United States. It proposes and tests a theory of union formation and strikes. Using a new county-by-industry level dataset containing the location of unions, the location of strikes, average establishment size, and the number of establishments around the turn of the twentieth century, I find that unions were more likely to form and strikes were more likely to occur in counties with intermediate-sized worker groups and large employer groups.

I was asked to illustrate the effects of the economic leadership of adAvanced nations by an example drawn from English economic history in the Middle Ages. I have accordingly chosen the subject of Italian contribution to the economic development of medieval England. What prompted this choice was not only the contribution that the Italians in fact made but also the contribution that they are reputed to have made. Indeed their reputation for economic leadership interests me as much as their achievement. For if their reputation and their achievement are collated, something more interesting than a mere illustration of economic leadership may emerge. The illustration may well turn into a cautionary example. I hope I shall not appear immodest or perverse if I suggest that the Italian example may help to circumscribe the historical and the logical validity of the entire concept of economic leadership. For the concept that appears to mean something in historical accounts of economic forms is apt to dissolve as soon as we reach out to the fundamental forces and processes of economic growth.

In the 1770s Philadelphia had a well developed indentured servant market which served the city and the surrounding region. This market had many attributes of rational labor and physical capital markets and provided a means for financing migration and education. This study is of indenture records which include prices, term lengths, employer-provided amenities, and servant attributes to test hypotheses based on a rational buyer model. Results indicate that in response to the riskiness of a servant, the buyer used indexes of servant productivity and reliability; that the servant paid for amenities offered by the master, such as general education; and that there was a seasonal pattern of prices corresponding to seasonal activities of agriculture.

The early commercial relations between the United States and South America in the years preceding the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine have until quite recently received but scant attention. This neglect may in part be attributed to the historian's concern with the political implications of the revolutionary movements in Spanish. America and their bearing upon our foreign policies. In part, also, it may be ascribed to the paucity of materials (either published or in manuscript); information on commercial affairs transmitted by American special agents and consuls in the ports of Latin America was generally fragmentary and incomplete. Yet even a tardy examination of our trade relations with Chile in the years 1817-1820 may be of value, especially since the materials available for this study present a picture of the volume, the variety, and the difficulties of our trade that is unique in the annals of our early relations with South America.