Future developments in the criminal laws of many African countries present a number of problems. The influence of English criminal law throughout the English-speaking areas has been universal: even in southern Africa where the legal systems are founded upon Roman-Dutch law, criminal law is to a great extent English in character.2 It will be seen, however, that English principles when applied south of the Zambezi may undergo metamorphosis as a result of reinterpretation according to fundamental notions of the Roman-Dutch system.

This is an examination of the circumstances in which, according to legal authorities, land may become family land in the customary law of Ghana.3 There may occasionally be difficulty in discovering whether the acquisition was by a wider family or by a branch (or segment) of it, since each such smaller group constitutes a “family” for different purposes. Normally, however, the circumstances give a clear answer, and difficulties on this point rarely reach the courts. If, for example, the narrower family lived in a different part of the country, or acted in the transaction through its own head rather than the overall head, or was already regarded by members of the other branches as a separate entity conducting its own affairs, the acquisition will accrue to this smaller family. The only serious difficulties in this respect have occurred when the acquisition was by intestate succession, a means which will not be discussed in detail. Therefore the distinction drawn by Sarbah4 between “ancestral property” and “family property” will not be followed here.

The year 1962 saw an important step towards further integration of the judicial system of Tanganyika.

Before describing what has taken place in recent months, it would perhaps be appropriate to sketch briefly the historical background of the Local Courts appeal system.

The German administration, whilst tacitly recognizing the existence of a system of customary law and procedure, in fact administered justice at District level through an officer similar to the British District Commissioner, who heard cases himself, though he was sometimes required to recognize a specific customary law. Sometimes he delegated his authority on his own initiative and in an ad hoc manner, either to leading persons such as the pre-existing Liwalis and Kadhis, or to Akidas who had been appointed by the Germans themselves. However, the actual responsibility for the administration of justice was not generally delegated nor were native courts defined or established until the advent of British administration.

The use of assessors in criminal trials in the Commonwealth of Nations originated in India and the first judicial attempt to examine its history and origin appears to have been made by Bhashyam Ayyanyar, J., in 1901 in the case of King Emperor v. Tribunal Reddi reported in I.L.R. 24 Madras 523, at page 543. The learned judge pointed out in that case that “the earliest legislation which authorized European functionaries presiding in Courts of Sessions to constitute two or more respectable natives to assist them as assessors … [was] Regulation VI of 1832 which was applicable only to Bengal”.

In 1959 a Fundamental Rights Chapter was included, for reasons which are wjdely known,1 in the Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria.2 While the number of reported decisions directly involving that Chapter of the Constitution is as yet relatively small, it seems desirable to discover the approach which the courts have taken in such cases. It appears that little thought is being given in Nigeria to the manner in which the courts do, or should, treat fundamental rights cases. Many persons, in the tradition of Ivor Jennings, discount altogether the value of having fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution. Further battle with such persons is useless, for the provisions are in the Constitution; the question is no longer whether they should be there, but is rather what use should be made of them. This latter problem is not one for judges alone, though they bear the immediate brunt of meeting it. It is a problem for lawyers, law teachers and students, political scientists, indeed for society as a whole; and it must be given some more or less satisfactory answers if the courts are to play the part which the Constitution obviously intends they should play.

This is partly a comment on Professor David's views as expressed in “A Civil Code for Ethiopia: Considerations on the Codification of the Civil Law in African Countries”, in the Tulane Law Review of February 1963. Such comment will develop this writer's views as set forth in the Journal of Ethiopian Studies, No. 1 (1963) s.v. “A New Legislative Approach to Custom: the ‘Repeals’ Provision of the Ethiopian Civil Code of 1960”.