The legal profession, and legal education (which is the subject of an earlier article), in operational terms form one continuum. On the earlier occasion we depicted legal education as, in essence, referring to “experiences and training which help different kinds of people to understand and use law in society”. In more specific terms, legal education is concerned with the formal or approved stages of education and training, in preparation for service in such legal roles as: representing parties in judicial or related proceedings; giving legal advice and preparing legal documents or instruments in non-contentious matters; presiding over or participating in tribunals of a legal or quasi-legal character; representing the state in matters of a legal or quasi-legal nature; etc.

The often large body of professionals, who are the product of such a system of education, invariably necessitates the establishment of governing bodies; the enactment of regulatory legislation; the adoption of controlling practices; the fostering of certain norms and mores of professional culture; etc.

This paper examines what topics are dealt with in matrimonial cases before the local courts in Zambia and, to some extent, what topics in customary law relating to marriage are not dealt with in such cases. It does not explore the conceptual limits of a definition of customary law, nor does it imply that the adjudications of local courts are the only source from which to establish customary law relating to marriage. The scope of matrimonial cases is here taken to include the formation, duration and termination of marriage, but to exclude succession after the death of a spouse. Quantified data are derived from all cases heard in the local courts of Zambia during the year 1968, or from samples drawn from them. Approximately 32,000 matrimonial cases as here defined were heard by these local courts in 1968. Local courts are the courts established under the Local Courts Act of 1966, which replaced the former native courts.

The division of state inhabitants into communities living under different laws opens up possibilities of conflicts problems on an unprecedented scale. These problems may arise not only when members of different communities enter into legal relationships, but also when the parties, whether members of the same community or not, choose to regulate their legal relations in accordance with another personal law. The occurrence of either of these circumstances poses some problems for which the law is difficult or uncertain. This study attempts to examine with particular reference to the Sudan the problem of choice of law to be administered.

In examining the problem of choice of law I shall attempt to show and compare how different systems of personal laws (i.e., where personal laws are administered in their respective courts of nationality, religion or ethnic community and courts which administer two or more personal laws) try to solve choice of law problems. It is apparent that the existence of the lex fori in the former and its absence in the latter should affect the approach to the problem of choice of law. The contrast between the two approaches is striking. The contention here is that systems of personal laws always apply their lex fori and treat questions of choice of law as mere questions of competence.

The new Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria came into force with effect from 29 May, 1999, the date of the military handover to a democratically elected civilian regime. The document is based on the 1979 presidential constitution with some amendments and provides that Nigeria shall be a Federation made up of 36 States and a federal Capital Territory.

The trend of some Nigerian decisions where the defence of honest claim of right is raised is disturbing and shows a lack of proper appreciation of its scope. The defence is contained in section 23 of the Criminal Code which provides as follows:

“A person is not criminally responsible, as for an offence relating to property, for an act done or omitted to be done by him with respect to any property in the exercise of an honest claim of right and without intention to defraud”.

This defence applies to all offences relating to property: stealing, robbery, demanding property with menaces, malicious damage to property etc. But it features more in theft offences than in other offences relating to property.

The purpose of this article is to review the application of the English law of defamation in the East African countries (Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania) and to assess the possible contribution of the Kenya Defamation Act, 1970.

Far from heralding a comprehensive and long-overdue reform of the law relating to marriage and inheritance in Zimbabwe, this White Paper is a modest document, only seven pages long, which largely restricts itself to considering the extent to which the law of intestate succession applicable to a person’s estate should depend on the type of marriage into which the deceased had entered. Even so, the issues raised are controversial and the government clearly wishes to stimulate public debate and to receive suggestions from all quarters before formulating its policy. It appears that the paper has succeeded in generating interest as well as some harsh criticism.

The Banjul Protocol on Marks Within the Framework of the African Regional Industrial Property Organisation was adopted by the Administrative Council of ARIPO at its Seventeenth Session held at Banjul, The Gambia in November 1993 and the Regulations by the Administrative Council at its Nineteenth Session held at Kariba, Zimbabwe in November 1995. Parties to the Protocol, which came into force on 6 March, 1997, are Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

This article explores why Botswana's environmental protection regulatory framework is failing to stem environmental deterioration. Based on the observation that such deterioration persists despite the fact that there is a framework in place, the discussion draws from experience with successful environmental protection regulatory frameworks around the world. The discussion establishes that successful environmental protection regulatory frameworks incorporate numerical quality and ecological standards, a command and control approach (with context-sensitive alternatives to account for the approach's limitations), and credible enforcement mechanisms. This article measures the extent to which Botswana's environmental protection regulatory framework incorporates these elements; it identifies that the reason why the framework has failed to stem environmental deterioration is that it does not adequately incorporate these qualities and proposes how this could be addressed going forward.

In 1961 Tony Allott, then a rather young elder statesman of African law, helped to foster my interest in that subject, and my subsequent work in Ethiopia. He and several other distinguished colleagues in London also encouraged other American initiatives to assist the development of legal education and research in Africa, efforts which began in 1962, burgeoned during the ensuing decade, and then withered rapidly.

The activities of the early 60s helped to generate an extraordinary number of different kinds of projects: the temporary placement of over 150 Americans in law teaching positions in African institutions; a large and wide variety of research and writing; the founding of law reporters, law journals and university institutes of African law, both within Africa and elsewhere; the flow of a substantial number of Africans to graduate legal studies in U.S. and U.K. universities; new kinds of interactions between African, British and American scholars. These activities also contributed to the emergence (notably in North America) of that amorphous, contentious field of scholarship which came to be called “law and development”, and, then, in the latter 70s, to acrimonious critiques and agonising reappraisals of much of all this effort.

Tony Allott participated in, or observed, much of this history, as anyone familiar with his career and bibliography will know. I hope that this brief account of some of these past activities may be of some interest to him, and to others interested in law and social change in Africa.

A theme which has not gained much of the attention of scholars of African law is the historical development of European law and legal institutions in Africa. There is a tendency to take their “reception” for granted, as if to say that it is redundant to know how they came to be established on the African soil. By historical development is not meant simply the chronological order of events, treating law almost as a self-contained system in no way related to the environment in which it operates. A more useful approach, it is submitted, would be to evaluate the role of European law and legal institutions in the total context of African social, economic and political development. From our appreciation of the role law has played in the past in the moulding of African societies, we are likely to be more conscious than ever of the importance of law in African development. Furthermore, historical analysis of European law and legal institutions in Africa may yield some insight into the nature of African legal institutions as they are today. This paper, a plea for the historical dimension in African legal studies, discusses the role of a class of men in the English-type courts in Lagos before the legal profession, as we know it, established itself.

The two main sources of the statutory rules that regulate the business of banking in Ghana are the Bank of Ghana Act, 1963,2 as amended by the Bank of Ghana (Amendment) Act, 1965,3 and the Banking Act, 1970.4 Other legislation laying down rules relevant to the business of banking are the Companies Code, 1963,5 the Building Societies Ordinance, 1955,8 as amended,7 the Moneylenders Ordinance,8 the Incorporated Private Partnerships Act, 1962,9 and the Bills of Exchange Act, 1961.10

A substantial part of the rules governing land tenure and its conveyance has had the prevention of fraud and double-dealing as its object. Rapacious vendors have perfected the skill of selling the same piece of land successively to more than one purchaser. Trespassers have brazenly taken possession of land in which they have no vestige of interest, challenging the owner and asserting limited or absolute rights to it. Some of these frauds are perpetrated because land transactions are not publicised. It is no surprise therefore that the elimination of secrecy in such dealings was appreciated early in man's history.

The oldest recorded land transaction, which took place almost 4,000 years ago in 1881 BCE in the Middle East, was concluded in the presence of witnesses, “before the eyes of the sons of Heth among all those entering the gate of his city”. Witnesses give the transaction publicity and they are also people who could testify to it. But the testimony, useful as it is, has its shortcomings and cannot always be relied on to determine either whether the transaction took place or the nature of the rights and obligations it conferred on the parties. With the passing of time the frail memory of the witnesses fails; on their death any evidence given becomes hearsay with the attendant possibility that subsequent persons may alter what they were told.

It is a happy coincidence indeed that in the 40th year of publication, the Editors of this Journal have had the privilege of publishing a liber amicorum for Professor James Read. In 1996 he retired from 40 years of teaching in the University of London, since 1974 as Professor of Comparative Public Law with special reference to Africa, a Chair which he retains in an Emeritus capacity. It has been a formidable task to attempt to do justice to the work of this “able, patient, effective and thoughtful scholar” (to adopt the words of two of our contributors) to African legal studies. However, this volume contains essays by colleagues and erstwhile students upon subjects which will at least in part reflect the richness and diversity of James Read’s interests.