Nigerian conveyancers routinely resort to powers of attorney and agreements to sell (estate contracts) as tools to avoid the prohibitory clauses of the Land Use Act. Judges have shown their sympathy through a strict (but beneficial) construction. Nevertheless, the current system exacerbates the risk of acquiring precarious titles in land transactions. Accordingly, this article suggests that the avoidance objective will be best achieved through the application of the principles of trust and the use of trust instruments such as express written declarations of trust.

This article critically examines the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Commission) on the right to development (RTD). Notwithstanding the controversy over the RTD, it is binding in the African human rights system and has been the focus of a number of cases that have come before the African Commission. After briefly examining the historical and theoretical framework of the RTD, the article focuses on the meaning of the right and its duty bearers at the national and international levels. After analysing several cases decided by the African Commission, the article concludes that the RTD is an important composite right that can provide scope, at both an individual and a collective level, for marginalized groups in society to assert their human rights.

This article inquires critically into the different modes of acquisition of oil rights in Nigeria by international oil companies (IOCs) under contractual joint ventures. These contractual joint ventures are either production sharing or service contracts.

In order to illustrate the operation of the system, I consider various court cases in more detail.2 I begin with two cases involving Kaguru and two other tribal groups which are minorities in Kaguru-land, the Gogo and Kamba. The Gogo are a minority whose lands border the Kaguru to the west. There are some Gogo residing in every court area of Kaguru-land. In many court cases, Gogo are treated in a manner similar to that of any Kaguru so unfortunate as to dwell in an area where he has no kinsmen to support him in difficulties. These cases indicate a basic aspect of Kaguru affairs, that the rights of individuals are respected by those in authority mainly because such individuals can draw support from others whose cooperation and help in turn may one day be essential to the officials over them. Few such checks protect the lone, poor tribal outsider who has come to Ukaguru because of famine or other troubles in his own land. In the distant past, such aliens were sometimes taken as slaves.Some Gogo reside in small colonies nearby Kagaru, but in many other areas they reside alone or in very small groups. Whereas the Gogo constitute no threateningly large minority in any of the Kaguru areas of Kilosa District, the Kamba form a large minority in several Kaguru headmanships.Furthermore, some lone Kamba or small Kamba groups are found in all of the Kaguru court areas.

In this paper, we shall not use the term “equity” in the technical sense it bears in the common law countries, where for historical reasons peculiar to England “equity” has come to denote a special body of rules for which there is no equivalent in Ethiopia. We give “equity” the straightforward meaning of a justice that is “natural”, that is, results from a conscientious judge's discretionary appreciation of what is fair in the circumstances of a case. Since appreciations of what is “fair” vary with the man on the bench, a necessary corollary of equity is incertitude of result.

One of the fundamental principles underlying the Nigerian constitutional process is that of the independence of the judiciary. The concept, in its basic form, embodies the entire philosophy of constitutional democracy especially as emphasised by the preamble to the Constitution which is for “promoting the good government and welfare of all persons … on the principles of Equality, Freedom and Justice”. In a country such as Nigeria which is presently characterised by political and economic underdevelopment, it is generally considered constitutionally desirable that a viable contrivance such as the institutional separation of the judiciary from the other arms of the government is a necessary bulwark against all forms of political and social tyranny, administrative victimisation and oppression. In other words, the freedom of the judicature from any influence, whether exerted by the legislature or the executive, or even from the judiciary itself, which is capable of leading to any form of injustice, abuse, miscarriage of justice, judicial insensitivity or other court-related vices is a condition sine qua non for the establishment of a durable political order based on the rule of law and constitutionalism.

The notion of the independence of the judiciary has its philosophical ancestry in the time-honoured theory of the separation of powers, a doctrine which incidentally features prominently in the allocation of state powers under the Nigerian constitutional scheme.

A heartening impetus has been given in recent years to the study of the “reception” into the dependent and formerly dependent territories of English legal concepts and institutions. One such institution, the “reception” of which appears, so far, to have received little academic attention, is the English jury system.

Constitutions remain a puzzle. They are not conscious falsehoods, yet they are clearly not in any simple sense “true”. Nor are they a matter of self-deception on the part of their drafters, being as much intentionally aspirational or programmatic as regulatory. There is some virtue in Finer's characterization of them as “autobiographical” but even this becomes problematic when we speak of constitutions in the ex-colonial world which are often documents more easily made sense of in the context of other constitutional documents than the realities of the polities they supposedly regulate. All these issues are brought into very sharp focus by the experience of a country such as Mozambique, which in its short history since independence in 1975 has adopted two quite different societal projects in the form (amongst other things) of constitutional documents. The differences between these two projects are obvious and are commented on extensively in what follows. The categories utilized in both, it may be noted, are rooted entirely in European political and intellectual experience and, arguably, what is striking about the liberal and socialist options that they embody is not so much their (highly advertized) differences but what they have in common, including a profound intolerance and a determination to remake the world in their own image. Seen in this way the study of constitutions and constitution-making have interesting things to tell us about the processes of Westernization of our world.

Mozambique's new constitution came into force on 30 November, 1990, replacing the Independence Constitution of 25 June, 1975. It eliminated the leading role of the Frelimo party, introduced multi-party politics, and changed the official name of the country from the People's Republic of Mozambique to the Republic of Mozambique.

The purpose of this article is to examine the sources of the general criminal law of Botswana.2 Prior to the creation of a Protectorate there existed in the country several indigenous systems of law operative within tribal areas which later collectively became known as the customary law. Included in this customary law was an ill-defined body of criminal law which can be termed the customary criminal law. We are not, however, examining the sources of this customary criminal law but rather of the criminal law which was originally introduced by statute on the establishment of the Protectorate and which was administered in a separate system of courts. Botswana is in an almost unique position in this respect3 because after the formal establishment of the Protectorate it received what may be broadly, but inaccurately, called the Roman-Dutch criminal law. Subsequently this was abolished and in its place a Penal Code was introduced which was based mainly on English law. The customary criminal law will be considered in this article but only in the broad context of its present position in the legal system and the effect of the general criminal law on its application.

Customary institutions are used successfully in some Ugandan communities, but not in others. There may be several explanations for this. First, the nature of social institutions clearly changes over time; it is likely that the utility of traditional practices has also changed accordingly. Secondly, the presence of protracted civil conflict in various parts of the country has altered the manner in which people are able to live and deal with conflict. Thirdly, the scope of conflict may have caused traditions to become dislocated or modified beyond any recognizable or useful form, which may have caused traditional mechanisms to become less useful or entirely obsolete. Fourthly, societies in Uganda are stratified very differently; this organization has had a major role to play in whether and how such mechanisms are used. Fifthly, the homogeneity of the population could be a key factor in whether, and whose, “traditions” are used in a given community.

Harmonizing corporate governance systems can potentially level the playing field for businesses, as it would increase financial and economic interconnections, including market integration, between countries. Although harmonization at the regional level such as the EU seems challenging because systems are so diverse, the reverse is the case at the national level. A critical issue in the harmonization effort is whether to adopt the “comply or explain” approach or the mandatory compliance approach. Although mandatory compliance is necessary in certain circumstances, particularly in cases of corporate pseudo-reporting that occasions corporate failures, the predominant approach involves “comply or explain”. Given competing interests in the business community, the inclination for flexibility and the regulatory authority's disposition for an oversight function, this article argues that a hybrid approach should be followed, which will internalize the merits of both the “comply or explain” and mandatory compliance approaches while eschewing their disadvantages.

The transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) has been the subject of some, albeit limited, debate. The role that the promotion and protection of human rights will play in the AU appears, on the face of the various documents, to be an important consideration, yet which organs will have responsibility in ensuring their implementation is still not clear. This article aims to discuss the framework of and relationship between the institutions established under the auspices of the OAU and how these have changed since the transformation to the AU. It argues that insufficient attention has been paid to ensuring a coherent and integrated approach to human rights across the Union. Organs such as the African Commission and the new African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, however, have huge potential to influence the way forward.

Many books and learned articles have been written on African Law within the last two or three decades. Almost every one of them has attempted a definition of law, custom and customary law, as a basis for its particular object. Among these definitions is Elias's adaptation of Goodhart's definition of law; this definition appeals to us as it serves many purposes. That adaptive definition is: “ ‘The law of a given community is the body of rules which are recognised as obligatory…’ This recognition must be in accordance with the principles of their social imperative, because operating in every community is a dynamic of social conduct, an accepted norm of behaviour which the vast majority of its members regard as absolutely necessary for the common weal. This determinant of the ethos of the community is its social imperative.” We would not of course include within the concept of law forms of social conduct which are concerned with the less important aspects of social life, which though well-established, yet pertain only to the sphere of social formalities and when violated, merely excite the displeasure or contempt of society; we are concerned with those norms the violation of which calls for the employment of “sanctions directly affecting the liberty, property, or status of the offender (such as imprisonment, fines or loss of civil rights)”. But we would include also those “concerned with serious business of society, the work that must be accomplished in order to secure and guarantee satisfactory conditions for collective life,” which Edgar Bodenheimer classifies as “customary law”.

The effective resolution of trade disputes related to Sino-African investments will have a major impact on the development of trade and investment between China and African states. Arbitration is considered the best option for the settlement of disputes between China and African states as it offers unique benefits and is both suited to the current environment in African countries and accepted by Chinese and Africans. To make full use of this dispute settlement approach, the Chinese government should take active measures to promote the knowledge of arbitral legal systems in Africa among the Chinese businesses investing or trading locally. Beijing should encourage them to settle disputes with their African counterparts through arbitration. It is also important for Chinese companies to learn about arbitration laws in African states, and choose a favourable arbitral institution and proper arbitration seat.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Charter), adopted over two decades ago, entered into force on 21 October 1986. It made provision for the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission), which was established in 1987. The purpose of the Commission, according to the Charter, is “to protect human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa”. But the Commission has not been able to discharge that office satisfactorily. An important reason for the inability of the Commission to attain its principal objective of protecting human rights in Africa is the fact that it has no power to grant a remedy. It has no jurisdiction to make binding decisions against state parties that have violated the provisions of the Charter. Once the Commission reaches a decision on the merits of a case, its only jurisdiction is to make recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG) of the Organization of African Unity. But the AHSG itself cannot make binding decisions against state parties. It can only decide to permit publication of their violations.

The last decade of the twentieht century was a period that saw a worldwide shift from state command economies and welfare states to market-driven economies. In many countries the telecommunications industry has always been seen as as strategic one and thus wwas in most cases completely in the hands of state-owned corporations. It is there fore inevitable that telecommuncations industries the world over have undergone or are undergoing dramatic transformations as governments give up, wholly or in part, ownership and control of the industry.

In its first judgment the South African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal had to determine whether Zimbabwe's controversial programme of land redistribution for resettlement purposes was compatible with the SADC Treaty. The tribunal provided one of the few avenues of redress for farmers deprived of their property without compensation. It held that the land reform programme breached the treaty on the grounds that the property owners had been denied access to the domestic courts, that the applicants had been victims of racial discrimination, and that the state had failed to pay compensation for the lands compulsorily acquired. While the tribunal appears to have reached the right conclusions, its reasoning could have been more persuasive. Of wider significance is the fact that the tribunal has established itself as a forum that can provide relief for human rights violations. Its finding that human rights are justiciable under the treaty is notable.

The first volume of the Sudan Law Journal and Reports has at last appeared. Its publication marks the culmination of over thirty years of spasmodic agitation for an adequate system of law reporting of cases decided in the Civil Courts2 of a country which has been receiving English law under the guise of “justice, equity and good conscience” since 1900.3 In 1926 a Digest of the Decisions of the Court of Appeal of the Sudan was published, containing notes on a selection of some eighty cases decided between 1915 and 1926. It was intended that the Digest should be brought up to date annually, but in fact this was not done, and the next period covered is from January 1st, 1953, to June 30th, 1954, in a Digest of Cases in the Court of Appeal and High Court, prepared by Mr. Justice Stanley-Baker. In 1954 the first eleven judgments of the Sudan Court of Criminal Appeal, set up in 1949, were reported and published in loose-leaf form, the intention being to report and print each decision immediately after its delivery. This was done with two cases.

Strong criticisms and statements of concern about corruption and governance in Africa are being voiced more and more often. What is highly significant is that increasingly open and fierce criticism is being voiced by commentators in and from Africa itself. It is this fact that emboldens me to offer the following analysis and set of proposals for addressing the issues of good governance and aid in Africa. I shall concentrate principally on Anglophone Africa in which Jim Read did most of his work.