Singapore's immigration discourse is deeply influenced by its need to “right-size” its population. As a society that has and remains in need of immigration, contemporary immigration and globalization have rigorously challenged the conventional thinking and understanding of citizenship, as well as notions of who belongs and who does not. Nevertheless, international marriages and pervasive in-and out-migration for purposes of employment, study, and family, conspire to make more pronounced the decoupling of citizenship and residence in Singapore. This transnational dimension sits uncomfortably with the policy makers' desire for, and the imperatives of, state sovereignty, control, and jurisdiction.

Although one quarter of people living in Singapore are foreigners, concerns of human rights and justice are largely peripheral, if not absent from the immigration discourse. This is seen most clearly in employment issues pertaining to foreign female domestic workers (FDWs), most of who come from other parts of Southeast Asia. ‘Rights talk’ is largely absent even as activists seek to engage the key stakeholders through the subtle promotion of rights for such workers.

The government, however, has resisted framing the FDW issues as one of rights but instead has focused on promotional efforts that seek to enhance the regulatory framework. This dovetails with the reality that immigration law also functions as quasi-family law in which the freedom of FDWs and other foreign menial workers to marry Singapore citizens and permanent residents are severely restricted. As such, the immigration regime's selectivity functions as a draconian gatekeeper. Justice and human rights are but tangential concerns.

Article 15(1)(b) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights protects the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications (REBSPA). While the interpretation of this provision has not really been a focus of attention in the past, this is changing. A danger lies in construing this provision as entitling states to comprehensively regulate the field of science, at the expense of scientific and academic freedom. Scientific or academic freedom, rather than state regulation, guarantees creativity and innovation in the field of science for the benefit of society at large. This article raises four caveats to guide all those tasked with interpreting Article 15(1)(b) – specifically, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, right now preparing a General Comment on Article 15(1)(b). Firstly, it is crucial to have conceptual clarity of, and understand the differences between, the REBSPA, freedom of science, academic freedom, freedom of expression, and the right to education. Secondly, science, by its very nature, is not susceptible to being managed. An ‘adequate’ framework for science should limit state intervention and empower the scientific fraternity. Thirdly, regulation has lately often entailed the adoption of a corporatist approach to science in universities and research institutions. This damages science. Fourthly and finally, UNESCO's recent Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers of 2017 constitutes only an imperfect blueprint to guide interpretation of the REBSPA. It fails to address various threats (impact agenda science, peer review, ethical regulation, entrepreneurialisation, accountability excess, absence of rights of participation in governance, and so on) to scientific and academic freedom. Relying throughout on the notion that a science system must be ‘adequate for science’, the article concludes with a set of 22 recommendations on how the REBSPA should be construed so as to duly respect scientific and academic freedom. The current science regime needs to be fundamentally rethought in the light of such freedom. Otherwise – and many experts concur – we shall soon witness the fatal collapse and disintegration of modern science. Freedom as a pillar of science, and of the REBSPA, is in danger of being lost.

This article responds to the two articles published in this journal that criticise the approach taken by the International Group of Experts (IGE) who prepared the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Their authors took issue with the approach of the majority of the IGE over the question of whether data qualifies as an ‘object’ under international humanitarian law such that, for instance, cyber operations that target civilian data violate the prohibition on attacking civilian objects. The majority of the experts took the position that the law had not advanced that far and that pre-existing law could not be definitively interpreted to encompass data within the meaning of ‘objects’. In this article, the Director of the Tallinn Manual Project responds to the authors' criticism of the majority view by explaining and clarifying its reasoning.

In a recent paper, I argue that the “new constitutionalism” — the transformation in the relations between courts and representative institutions that has swept the world and that is now sweeping Israel too — can best be understood as one of those “changes of everything so that everything would remain the same”. The promotion of courts and the demotion of legislatures through the judicial enforcement of “rigid” Charters and Bills of Rights has “legalized politics,” changing its nature as well as its locus. Contrary to those who regard this as an essentially democratic development, I argue that it is, to paraphrase Reuben Hasson, a weapon in the hands of democracy's enemies. I argue that the new constitutionalism was intended to operate and does operate as an antidote to democracy, that it was meant to preserve the oligarchy of private property from the mortal danger posed by representative institutions elected by people without property, the original Greek “demos” from whence the term.

Traditional legal doctrine pictures land ownership in the form of a cone down to the center of the earth. This article suggests that it is desirable for the law to enable subsurface subdivision into separate, three-dimensional property units, constituting separate subjects for title and transactions. Thus the law would contribute to the public interest in recognizing the subsurface space as a separate property unit from both the functional and the planning aspects.

Before three-dimensional registration can begin, it is necessary to create an infrastructure of professional standards for three-dimensional survey for registration purposes. The creation of such standards constitutes one of the main goals of the world survey profession.

It may be assumed that there is a downward limit below which the subsurface has no effect on the surface space and vice versa. In this case, the traditional doctrine may be seriously contested by the argument that those deep levels of the earth should be defined as a collective property. However, it is not practical to establish a fixed downward limit upon ownership of subsurface space. When expropriating the subsurface, it is necessary to compensate the landowner for the consequential damage, as well as for the direct damage incurred. There is some doubt whether compensation should be paid for subsurface area that the landowner could not reasonably and practically exploit. As soon as the axiomatic impediment to three-dimensional subdivision is removed, the importance of long-term planning for subsurface use will increase.

The connection between law and contemporary social science emerged as a consequence of the quest for social reform. As law became more instrumental, it also became more empirical, more concerned with policy. For this process, it turned to social science. Social science complied and has become an adjunct to law in the quest for solving social problems. As this partnership has developed, the relationship between law and social science has matured. Not only has social science sought to educate and influence law, it has also incorporated law into its own disciplinary concerns. Furthermore, the field of socio-legal studies may be on the verge of establishing itself as a separate and distinct discipline, independent of the practical concerns of law.

The scholarly intersection of law and social science — or socio-legal studies, as I shall call it — now speaks with at least three voices addressed to at least three audiences. It speaks as policy analysis, a handmaiden to law. It also speaks in the traditional language of the social sciences. Thirdly, it may be gaining a voice of its own, reflecting a belief that law is a distinct form of ordering that merits its own position among the scholarly disciplines, separate from both scholarly fields and the professional concerns of law. At their core, each of these enterprises entails a distinct voice, a distinct audience, and a distinct agenda.

Of the sixty-thousand books said to have been written on the life of Jesus in the last century alone, only a very few were enquiries by lawyers or legal historians into the nature and circumstances of the trial, in which his life culminated and which led to his death. This is surprising, considering that no trial in the history of mankind was of such momentous consequences, that none has ever given rise to such widespread, authoritative and persistent assertions that a grave miscarriage of justice had occurred and that none has had repercussions which have retained their impact and actuality even after the lapse of 1,936 years; It is true that, in their researches, great historians and theologians have made ample use of the legal background material they have painstakingly and (mostly) conscientiously collected from Jewish and Roman sources, and every lawyer approaching the subject today owes them a great debt of gratitude for their preparatory work. But both their approach and their purpose were historical or theological, whereas we as lawyers are not concerned with the historical or theological truth of any statement or description contained in the Gospels. Our purpose is to try and find, within the framework of the prevailing legal institutions and conceptions, some plausible interpretation of the events as to the occurrence of which there is general consensus.

The present article analyzes the expected implications of the recent Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal status of East Jerusalem in accordance with international law. The Court stated that East Jerusalem is occupied territory and Israel is the occupying power in this territory. Generally, the Opinion lends support to the Palestinians' arguments and is likely to enhance their bargaining position in the future negotiations regarding the regime to be applied to East Jerusalem. Unlike the differential approach undertaken by the parties during the recent stage of negotiations (that suggested applying different legal regimes to the city's different areas), the Court's Opinion did not make distinction between the different parts of East Jerusalem. Analysis of these distinct approaches indicates that the differential approach (adopted during the recent negotiations)is more likely to enhance the prospects of attaining an agreed solution to the dispute over East Jerusalem. The Court's emphasis on the interests of third parties as well as the role of the UN tends to multilateralize the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians regarding the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The impacts of possible multilateralization of the dispute over East Jerusalem on the prospects of achieving an agreed solution are not clear. In contrast to the Court's multilateral approach with regard to the general Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the analysis of Israel's obligation regarding access to the holy places is essentially premised on two bilateral treaties (the 1949 General Armistice Agreement and the 1994 Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan). In light of the major importance of numerous holy places in other parts of the globe, a preferable legal analysis could have been founded on a reasonable interpretation of general international human rights instruments, particularly the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

A.Brief Factual Background: It is not proposed here to unfold the entire history of the Arab-Israel conflict. Our purpose is rather to outline briefly the major, and by and large undisputed, events preceding the outburst of all-out hostilities on the morning of June 5, 1967.

In the aftermath of the first Arab-Israel war, in 1949, Israel and the surrounding Arab countries signed armistice agreements, according to which all hostile military activities between the signing parties were to cease. However, throughout the years following the signing of the agreements, innumerable border incidents, military or semi-military raids and reprisals, sabotage and mining operations, and other belligerent actions occurred, each side charging the other with aggression. In May 1948, Egypt closed the Suez Canal to passage by Israeli shipping and, at the end of 1949, installed guns at Sharm-el-Sheikh, overlooking the Straits of Tiran, thus blockading the Israeli port of Eilat. To justify her actions, Egypt persistently asserted the existence of a “state of war” or “state of belligerency” between Israel and herself, irrespective of the armistice agreement and her obligations under the United Nations Charter. In October 1956, the second Arab-Israel war, known as the Suez (or Sinai) Campaign, broke out. But even this violent confrontation and the arrangements which followed, including the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh, did not bring about stability and peace. Tension continued to mount in the area.

This article applies comparative law tools to portray eight significant aspects of the constitutional right to human dignity in Germany and Israel. The elements considered are: the constitutional status of human dignity; the nature of the right; its effect on other constitutional rights; its scope and definition; waiver of human dignity; human dignity after death; negative and positive aspects of the right; and the right to asylum. The textual foundations of the respective constitutional guarantees are as different as human dignity's core meaning. In Germany, such guarantees are held to be absolute, immune to restriction, and therefore quite narrow in scope. In Israel, the scope of the right is much broader, but it is subject to limitations when placed against the public interest. Still, based on the findings of our comprehensive comparison, similar dynamics can be identified in Germany and Israel The constitutional coverage of both absolute and relative principles is broad, as are the constitutional lacunas, which are those dimensions of constitutional law neglected by the written constitution.

‘Force protection’ is a primary concern of every military commander. Undoubtedly, it is an important and legitimate factor in the planning of every attack. However, when it comes to the humanitarian proportionality principle there is considerable controversy over the question to what extent ‘force protection’ can be factored into the humanitarian proportionality calculus as a relevant military advantage to be weighed against expected civilian casualties, injuries and damage. This question is pursued in this article.

The paper describes the origins and implications of the principle of culpability in Germany and Israel. The comparison shows that the principle of culpability is more closely related to human dignity in German law and that it carries more weight there than in Israeli law. However, the adoption of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the new General Part of the Israeli Criminal Code in the 1990's have increased the role and impact of the principle of culpability in Israeli law.

At the end of the Ottoman rule the legal system in Israel was ripe for change. The British conquest was welcomed, at least by the Jewish population, and under the circumstances there was no objection to absorbing the legal system of the new conqueror.

British conquest in 1917 brought military rule but by 1920 a civil administration headed by High Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel had already been installed. On July 24, 1922 the League of Nations bestowed upon Britain the Mandate over Palestine, and less than a month thereafter, on August 10, 1922, the Palestine Order-in-Council was enacted. This legislation was designed to serve as a “Constitution” for Mandatory Palestine. It established institutions of the Government—the executive authority, the legislative branch, the judiciary—and defined their powers. In particular, the sources of law to be applied by the civil courts were enumerated in Art. 46, while matters of personal status jurisdiction remained vested in the courts of the various religious communities.

Crime seriousness research indicates that respondents from varying social and cultural groups rank the perceived seriousness of offenses similarly, with violent offenses as the most serious, followed by property, economic, and victimless offenses. It has also consistently been found, however, that the specific ratings of offenses by respondents from different social groups often differ. Because Israel is considered a deeply divided society, this article focuses on the comparison of public perceptions of the seriousness of varied criminal offenses between respondents belonging to varying central social groups in the countiy. As expected, the findings show similar, albeit not identical, rankings of offenses and important differences in the rating of specific offenses across groups. These findings are interpreted in the context of the Israeli society.

Religious education in Israel is inextricably linked with the more general aspects of the complex role of religion in Israel, which in turn cannot be understood without a basic understanding of Israel as a Jewish state, as well as that of the traditional status of religious-ethnic-national groups in the Middle East.

A comprehensive discussion of these complex issues would take us well beyond the confines of this paper. Thus, we will discuss them only briefly herein, thereby necessarily dealing in generalizations which may, at times, be overly simplistic.

This article considers how arguments relating to the principle of joint applicability of international human rights law (IHR) and international humanitarian law (IHL) are playing out in the United Kingdom's courts. The core of the article is a case study of the decisions of the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence. The central issues of the case concerned the application of the UK's European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) obligations in the context of its activities in Iraq, and the extraterritorial application of the Human Rights Act, 1998. This case study of the domestic application of the principle is particularly useful for considering (i) its practical implications on the specific facts of particular cases; (ii) the argumentation used by the UK government and judges; (iii) the difficulties of national courts in analyzing the IHR and IHL rights jurisprudence; and (iv) the significant differences between IHR and IHL in terms of positive obligations and domestic remedies.

This Article discusses the competences and powers of the UN Security Council in securing compliance with international humanitarian law, in particular through the adoption of the measures provided in Chapter VII of the Charter: The competence of the Council in this field can be founded on several legal grounds: on a broad interpretation of the notion of “threat to the peace” (Article 39 of the Charter), on Article 94(2) with regard to the International Court of Justice's judgments establishing violations of the jus in bello and also on the customary duty to ensure respect for international humanitarian law as reflected in Article 1 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of the Victims of War. In particular, such customary provision empowers the Security Council to react to any violation of international humanitarian law regardless of a nexus with concerns of international stability. Although the Council has adopted a variety of measures in relation to violations of the laws of war, the most incisive ones are those provided in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII, which however are not without problems. The role the Security Council has played in the enforcement of international humanitarian law has been criticized because of its selective and opportunistic approach, which is due to the political nature of the organ. Also, in several instances the Council, far from securing compliance with the jus in bello, has instead interfered with its application. However selective and imperfect the Council's approach might be, though, its power to adopt decisions binding on UN members and its competence to take or authorize coercive measures involving the use of force make it potentially a formidable instrument against serious violations of international humanitarian law, partly remedying the lack of enforcing mechanisms in the treaties on the laws of war.