While this comment primarily addresses the article by Anat Horovitz and Thomas Weigend on human dignity and victims' rights in the German and Israeli criminal process, it begins with a consideration of the role of the victim in other component parts of the criminal justice system, and in particular the substantive criminal law—a topic addressed in other articles included in this issue. There follows a review of the comparative analysis of the victim's role in Germany and Israel put forward by Horovitz and Weigend and a critique of the issues they raise, particularly as to the salience of the victim's procedural role. It is argued here that the victim should have a somewhat more meaningful role than that envisaged by these authors. The comment concludes with a brief consideration of the potential for the advancement of alternative remedies currently neglected by both systems, such as restorative justice.

This article examines the separation of boys and girls in religious schools in Israel and the current Israeli policy that aims to balance the right of equality with the right of denominational education in state-funded, religious schools. It draws on the legacy of the case of United States v Virginia and the subsequent regulations published by the United States Department of Education in 2006 in order to determine when single-sex education may be compatible with equality. It then examines both the relevance and the application of the criteria developed in the United States to religious schools in Israel.

The article reviews and examines the two main justifications for single-sex education: cultural/religious and feminist. The right to establish single-sex educational institutions is perceived to be part of a minority group's right to culture. In conservative cultures, separation between men and women is often justified as a means of preserving modesty and as a necessity in order to educate and train men and women towards their respective social roles. More often than not, their justifications are incompatible with liberal notions of gender equality and dignity.

Separation of men and women in the area of education is often also justified, however, from a feminist standpoint, which is rooted in pedagogical theories. Proponents of single-sex education argue that women-only educational institutions circumvent the inherent bias against women prevalent in coeducational schools, relying on research that indicates that girls perform better in girl-only schools, and attributing this both to the method of study and the educational environment of girl-only schools. They argue that, while separation in other areas of life may be humiliating, in education it has the potential of being empowering.

The goal of this article is to examine how the two types of justification come into play in single-sex religious education in Israel. The article claims that where separation between boys and girls is justified by cultural and religious arguments, it must withstand the tests developed in the case law for the legality of practices that are incompatible with equality. It also argues that even where separation is permissible, the manner in which it is carried out should be regulated and supervised to ensure the minimum violation of equality.

Discussions and depictions of lawyers in Canada largely ignore a significant segment of the legal population: government lawyers. Canada is a modern liberal democratic state with a significant public sector employing a large number of lawyers in many public sector settings. Lawyers who work directly for the executive branch – government lawyers – are a special subset of public lawyers. These government lawyers are ‘unique’ in many respects. They do not have paying clients as do private sector lawyers. Their client is ‘the Crown’ – an abstract emanation of the state. This article explains the unique role of government lawyers in Canada as derived from the historic and legislative responsibilities of the Attorney General. It then addresses questions that arise for government lawyers in Canada in public law litigation.

The reactions to the reports of Osama bin Laden's death were many: shock, relief, joy, wariness, elation, reservation. Not surprisingly, an intense debate soon emerged over the legality of killing Osama bin Laden. Critics – including the authors of the article, ‘Has “Justice Been Done”? The Legality of Bin Laden's Killing under International Law’, Kai Ambos and Josef Alkatout – raise many interesting and thought-provoking questions. The purpose of this submission is to respond to the arguments of Ambos and Alkatout. This response article argues that the killing of Osama bin Laden was lawful under international humanitarian law. More specifically, a careful legal analysis demonstrates that a non-international armed conflict exists between the United States and Al Qaeda. The evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Al Qaeda is an organised armed group under international humanitarian law. Osama bin Laden most accurately could be thought of as a strategic level commander of Al Qaeda. He has been actively involved in planning and co-ordinating armed attacks against military and civilian targets for years, including the most recent planning of attacks commemorating the tenth anniversary of September 11. As such, he is clearly targetable under international law. Finally, the United States was well within its rights under international law to launch an attack into Pakistan against bin Laden.

I. Historical and Comparative Backround: (1) Early medieval times. (2) The Ottoman Empire and successor States. (3) Personal laws in the colonies. (4) State and Church law as personal laws.

II. The Personal Laws as Autonomous Legal Systems: (1) Notion of legal system. (2) Personal legal systems. (3) Relationships between personal legal systems and between such systems and the State. (4) The dominant position of the State. (5) The personal laws as autonomous legal systems.

III. The Conflict of Personal Laws and the Interpretation of its Rules: (1) State legislation relating to personal laws. (2) The problem of qualification. (3) The renvoi problem. (4) Public policy.

IV. Connecting Principles: (1) Membership of an ethnic or religious group. (2) Influence of the will of the parties. (3) Other connecting principles.

V. Nature and Historical Function of the Conflict of Personal Laws: (1) The legal nature of the Conflict of Personal Laws. (2) The historical function of the conflict of Personal Laws.

The origin of the comparative study of Talmudic law lies in the Talmud itself, where we find instances in which the Sages formulated their halakhot in comparative terms, or took cognizance of non-Jewish legal positions.

There are two aspects to comparative legal studies in modern Talmudic research: first, that of pinpointing the influence of one system upon another; and second, that of obtaining a clearer and deeper understanding of each system by emphasizing the common and the unique elements in each. The first aspect is very much a matter of chance, and even when it is applicable, the results often constitute details which are not capable of being formulated in general terms. The second aspect—that of mutual clarification—is, however, generally applicable, and may be employed with profit in numerous instances.

Because of the diminutive size and relatively intense urbanization of the country, noise has always constituted one of the more serious environmental problems with which the Israeli legislature and courts must contend. Indeed, in a recent survey conducted by the Israeli Environmental Protection Service, (E.P.S.) 52.5% of Israelis questioned indicated that the major deficiency of their environment was the prevalence of noise, as opposed to only 3.7% who complained of unpleasant air or odours. Regulations have been enacted specifying the manner in which noise is to be measured and providing standards for the existence of nuisances. Recently, the court has been faced on several occasions with the question of whether violation of such regulations is necessary for an action seeking to establish a given noise as a nuisance. Although no definitive rule has been established, the Supreme Court, in confirming a lower court decision in Israel Electric Co. Ltd. v. Farsht, began what we hope will be a continuing process in determining a clear and optimal judicial policy regarding the measuring of noise and the use of these calculations in nuisance cases.

Modern equality as derived from the Enlightenment has always had problems with difference. Whereas feudalism set inequality as the baseline, modern society sets equality as the baseline, but allows for unequal treatment based on differences. Thus, differences among the sexes have been invoked to treat women as inferiors and racial differences to deprive racial minorities of equal treatment. Liberalism has countered these moves by promoting a conception of equality as identity according to which race or gender-based differences are irrelevant for purposes of political participation or employment. More recent claims for equality based on identity politics which call for a type of equality that accounts for differences pose vexing problems for liberalism. How should liberalism handle this? By creating exceptions to generally applicable laws? By promoting group-based autonomy and self-government at the risk ofbalkanizing the polity? Or, on the contrary, by rejecting demands for recognition of differences and reinforcing equality as identity? After analyzing the dialectic of equality, this Article argues that, based on commitment to the premise that all human beings share an equal status for possessing the same capacity for moral choice, pluralism offers a better framework than liberalism for the best possible reconciliation of identity and difference. This implies a departure from the monolithic nation-state toward multi-layered interconnected centers of collective autonomy and self-government.

Since the conclusion of the two Camp David Frameworks (reproduced in this issue), much has been said about a possible relation between them, namely, whether there is any “linkage” between the Framework which deals with the bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel, and the Framework for Peace in the Middle East (the Comprehensive Framework), in particular its provisions concerning Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. After the conclusion of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, a similar question was raised with regard to a possible link between it and the Comprehensive Framework. This question has in fact been dealt with by several provisions of the Peace Treaty and related documents, i.e., the Preamble and Article VI paragraph 2 of the Treaty, and the Agreed Minutes, all reproduced in this issue.

I am very happy and very honoured to have been invited to give the inaugural lecture in the series under the Sir Hersch Lauterpacht Chair of Public International Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. It is a great honour to be connected with the name of Hersch Lauterpacht who was one of the truly great minds in the field of international law in our epoch, great as a scholar, great as an idealist, an innovator and a prophet; and it is a source of happiness to me to bear witness to the fact that he was also a great human being whose wisdom was illuminated with kindness and warmth. His friends and pupils remember him with love and gratitude.

For the purpose of this paper I invite you to accept with me the proposition that we live in an ecological crisis. The extent of the dangers confronting us is in dispute. The degree of urgency is debated. There are still serious gaps in our knowledge. The task of the scientists is enormous. Still, no one can ignore the existence of this crisis.

“The two worlds of man, the biosphere of his inheritance, the technosphere of his creation—are out of balance, indeed potentially in deep conflict. And man is in the middle. This is the hinge of history at which we stand, the door of the future opening on to a crisis more sudden, more global, more inescapable and more bewildering than any ever encountered by the human species and one which will take decisive shape within the life span of children who are already born.”

In 1941, the Banking Ordinance enacted by the High Commissioner of Palestine defined “banking business” as the “business of receiving from the public on current account money which is to be repayable on demand by check, and of making advances to customers”. The most recently enacted Israeli Banking Law (Licensing), 1981 contains a very extensive definition of banking business which includes no less than thirteen types of transactions.

This certainly reflects a new legal approach towards the economic reality of banking which in and of itself has not changed drastically. Moreover, the peculiar dynamics of the banking business also inspired the legal rule that the Governor of the Bank of Israel should have the right to enlarge the legal definition by recognizing the banking character of other transactions.