In 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted, human rights and humanitarian law were treated as separate fields. Since the 1968 Tehran International Conference on Human Rights, the situation has changed dramatically and the two subjects are now considered as different branches of the same discipline. A number of factors have contributed to this merger, including the growing significance of international criminal law and the criminalization of serious violations of human rights. This is the theme of the present comment.

Many aid agencies and commentators suggest that humanitarian principles are of little value to the humanitarian crises of today. However, through profiling the experience of the Lebanese Red Cross, this article highlights the enduring value and impact of the application of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Fundamental Principles as effective operational tools for acceptance, access and safety. Having suffered a series of security incidents during the civil war and subsequent disturbances and tensions, this National Society deliberately sought to increase its acceptance amongst different groups. One of the approaches used was the systematic operational application of the Fundamental Principles. Today, the Lebanese Red Cross is the only public service and Lebanese humanitarian actor with access throughout the country. This article seeks to address the relative absence of attention to how humanitarian organisations apply humanitarian principles in practice – and their responsibility and accountability to do so – by describing the systematic approach of the Lebanese Red Cross.

The request by the United Nations General Assembly, in resolution 49/75 K (1994), that the International Court give an advisory opinion on the question “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?” gave the Court an unusual opportunity to consider the principles of international humanitarian law. It is an opportunity which the Court might well have preferred to do without. The question was not well framed and the reasons for asking it were wholly unsatisfactory. In particular, the necessarily abstract nature of the question placed the Court in an exceptionally difficult position, because it could not possibly consider all the combinations of circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used or their use threatened. Yet unless one takes the position that the use of nuclear weapons is always lawful (which is obvious nonsense), falls wholly outside the law (which no State suggested) or is always unlawful (a view which has had some supporters but which the majority of the Court quite rightly rejected), then the answer to the General Assembly's question would have to depend upon a careful examination of those circumstances.

Contemporary political analyses and studies concerning Islam often bear the mark of ethical values and judgements that obtain in the cultural context of the authors.

In this respect, two main tendencies can be discerned. The first, which we might call “Western-centred”, is to be found in the works of specialists in Oriental or Islamic studies who have been trained in the West and are thence impregnated with its culture. When analysing Islam, they judge it on the basis of the moral or political norms pertaining in the West. The second, which could be characterised as “apologetic”, generally finds its reflection in the writings of Moslem thinkers who, reacting against the first school's attacks on Islam, try to glorify it and, in particular, set out to identify in Islam all the cultural notions and inventions of the modern world, in other words, the Western world. According to this second school, Islam is, for example, the inventor and disseminator of democratic government, socialism, the separation of powers, human rights and humanitarian law.

On 10 October 1980, the “United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects” ended with the adoption by consensus of the following instruments:

– Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons,

– Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I),

– Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II),

– Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III).

Have the various profound changes that have affected the world, and particularly its geostrategic dimensions, since the end of the Cold War radically altered the nature of conflicts? Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and ten years after the destruction of the twin towers in New York, there is an apparent degree of continuity in the resilience of former centres of unresolved conflicts and of armed groups involved in them. Nonetheless, whereas most armed conflicts can today be classified as ‘intra-state’, the general context has changed to the extent that reference is now made to the phenomenon of ‘new wars’. Increasingly inacceptable economic and political imbalances along with globalization, environmental damage and its consequences or the emergence of large-scale conflicts triggered by organized crime are some of the perils already affecting the nature of today's conflicts or potentially defining those of the future. As the period dominated by jihadist groups with a universalist vocation possibly draws to an end, the current trend seems to be towards a new generation of guerrilla fighters who stand to benefit, in particular, from the erosion of the nation-state and from geopolitical convulsions arising from the post-colonial legacy as the starting point for intensely zealous and violent long-term ventures. The impact of globalization could cause a flare-up of some existing conflicts that are currently limited in scope while the international community struggles to redefine other rules and to adapt them to the new dialectic of war and peace.

Au cours des années 90, l'intérêt de la recherche et de la pratique sʼest tourné vers la prévention de conflits, cʼest-à-dire toute activité tendant à gérer ou à résoudre des situations conflictuelles avant quʼelles ne dégénèrent en affrontement ouvert et violent. Cet article examine les possibilités et les chances de succès d'actions de prévention entreprises, soit par un État, soit dans un contexte multilatéral. L'expérience des dernières années démontre clairement que les États ne souhaitent pas sʼexposer dans un conflit qui ne les concerne pas directement. Les conflits d'aujour d'hui en appellent done à des stratégies plus complexes, et seule une approche multilatérale a une chance d'aboutir à des résultats satisfaisants. Il existe aujourd'hui un grand nombre d'organisations gouvernementales et non gouvernementales — universelles et régionales, grandes et petites —, chacune avec un mode d'action bien distinct, ce qui permet l'engagement de l'une ou de l'autre, selon les données de la situation.

This article examines the different types of mechanisms which can contribute to addressing the issue of the missing, including providing answers on the fate and whereabouts of missing persons. It looks in detail at one approach that the authors have observed in the field. It argues that an approach based on humanitarian objectives which does not look into who is responsible for the disappearance, with proper management of confidential information, could be a powerful instrument for searching for and collecting relevant information on the missing in certain contexts. The article also proposes avenues for further research, with a view to enhancing the global capacity to provide meaningful answers for the missing and their families.

This article looks at the issue of enforced disappearances of migrants during their migratory journey or once they have reached their destination, a subject yet to be addressed in the literature. It examines how the legal and analytical framework provided by international human rights law and migration law applies to enforced disappearances of migrants. It then reviews the factors that contribute to this phenomenon in different contexts, including the disappearance of migrants for political reasons, those that take place in detention and deportation processes and those that take place within the context of migrant smuggling and trafficking.

Funding agreements for humanitarian action frequently include restrictions and requirements in their grants that aim to ensure that recipients of the funding comply with counterterrorism measures and sanctions adopted by the donor. These measures can be problematic if they prevent humanitarian actors from operating in accordance with humanitarian principles or are incompatible with international humanitarian law. While attention has focused primarily on requirements in grants for humanitarian action, increasingly donors to development work have also started including sanctions- and counterterrorism-related restrictions in their grants. The present article focuses on one such measure that is currently a live concern: requirements to screen and, thus, potentially exclude final beneficiaries. It explains why these requirements go over and above what sanctions and counterterrorism measures require, and why they are inconsistent with humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law. The article also explores the position in relation to development interventions.

This article investigates the effects that attacks during armed conflict which damage water and wastewater services have on the outbreak and transmission of infectious disease. It employs a lens of uncertainty to assess the level of knowledge about the reverberations along this consequential chain and to discuss the relevance to military planning and targeting processes, and to the laws of armed conflict. It draws on data in policy reports and research from a wide variety of contexts, and evidence from protracted armed conflicts in Iraq, Yemen and Gaza. The review finds a strong base of evidence of the impact of attacks on water and wastewater services, and a high level of confidence in information about the transmission of infectious disease. One clear risk identified is when people are exposed to water supplies which are contaminated by untreated wastewater. Obtaining a similar level of confidence about the cause and effect along the full consequential chain is challenged by numerous compounding variables, though there are a number of patterns related to the duration of the armed conflict within which the attacks occur. As the conflict protracts, both the risk of the spread of infectious disease and the evidence base for gauging the reverberating effects becomes stronger, for example. The article concludes that the reverberating effects of damage from an attack can be foreseen in some contexts and can be expected to become more foreseeable over time. The analysis suggests that the most pragmatic path for military institutions and those involved in targeting operations to take this knowledge into account is through a “precautionary approach” which assumes the existence of the reverberating effects, and works them in to the standard information-gathering and planning processes.

Members of independent humanitarian organizations have less protection, legally speaking, than most of them probably think. Two key features of their work – their neutrality and independence – as well as practical steps they take to implement these principles, actually place them outside much of the protection afforded to either civilians or authorized medical staff. This article examines the international legal protection currently available to independent humanitarian organizations, and considers whether there is scope for improvement of both the content of this framework and respect for the same.

Since the 1991 war between Iraq and the coalition powers there has been much interest in the question of how to limit the environmental damage of warfare. In addressing that question, it is necessary to look at the events of the war itself, and to draw some conclusions from that experience as well as from other experience and from more normative approaches.

The title of my talk may appear more than a little ambitious or the subject too extensive. What I intend to do, in fact, is to give here, in no particular order, some of the thoughts and experiences of one engaged in humanitarian law who had the great good fortune to be associated with this fascinating work from the beginning of his career.

The article describes the context of the ICRC's operations in Iraq, where the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, the Gulf War in 1990–1 and the effects of sanctions preceded the 2003 conflict and the spread of sectarian violence. The many serious attacks, including the bombing of the ICRC delegation in Baghdad in 2003 and continuing threats to the ICRC delegates, led to a low-visibility presence and required a new modus operandi in which a real presence on the ground was backed up by remote-control mechanisms for assistance activities in the most insecure areas. Projects to cover essential needs by ensuring water supplies and sewage disposal and supporting health facilities exemplify this new ICRC operational framework. Whereas remote control and support operations enabled programmes of increasing scope and size to be implemented, they could not replace a direct physical presence on the ground, and acceptance-building had to be reinforced through networking and communicational aspects. The authors argue, however, that there is still room for independent, neutral and impartial humanitarian action in Iraq – despite inherent security risks.

Since their publication in the 1950s and 1980s respectively, the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 have become a major reference for the application and interpretation of those treaties. The International Committee of the Red Cross, together with a team of renowned experts, is currently updating these Commentaries in order to document developments and provide up-to-date interpretations of the treaty texts. This article highlights key points of interest covered in the updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention. It explains the fundamentals of the Convention: the historical background, the personal scope of application of the Convention and the fundamental protections that apply to all prisoners of war (PoWs). It then looks at the timing under which certain obligations are triggered, those prior to holding PoWs, those triggered by the taking of PoWs and during their captivity, and those at the end of a PoW's captivity. Finally, the article summarizes key substantive protections provided in the Third Convention.

The return of foreign fighters and their families to the European Union has mostly been considered a security threat by member States, which consequently adopt repressive measures aimed at providing an immediate, short-term response to this perceived threat. In addition to this strong-arm approach, reintegration strategies have also been used to prevent returnees from falling back into terrorism and to break down barriers of hostility between citizens in the long term. Amidst these different strategies, this paper seeks to identify which methods are most desirable for handling returnees.