Liberal international trade regimes do not emerge from the policies of one state, even a hegemonic one. Trade liberalization among major trading states is, rather, the product of tariff bargains. Thus, hegemons need followers and must make concessions to obtain agreements. The liberal trade regimes that emerged in both the 19th and the 20th centuries were founded on asymmetric bargains that permitted discrimination, especially against the hegemon. The agreements that lowered tariff barriers led to freer trade not free trade; resulted in subsystemic rather than global orders; and legitimated mercantilistic and protectionist practices of exclusion and discrimination, and thus did not provide a collective good. Moreover, these trade agreements (and trade disputes as well) had inherently international political underpinnings and did not reflect economic interests alone. Trade liberalization also required a certain internal strength on the part of the government. Furthermore, only a complete political rupturing of relations, such as occurs in wartime, can destroy such a regime. A hegemon's decline cannot do so alone. These arguments are developed in a historical reassessment of the evolution of the international trading order since 1820. Eras commonly seen as liberal, such as the 1860s, are shown to have included a good deal of protection, and eras seen as protectionist, such as the 1880s, are shown to have been much more liberal than is usually believed.

Third World economies largely dependent on commodity exports other than oil have been the principal victims of the world recession. Attempts at restructuring international commodities regimes through the creation of the Common Fund have met with little success. Accordingly, the possibility of helping commodity exporters through the provision of compensatory finance has attracted increasing attention. One possible model for a new international compensatory facility is the EEC's STABEX scheme, established as part of the Lome Convention. However, rather than operating automatically and without interfering with market mechanisms, as its proponents suggest, the administration of STABEX has depended on discretionary judgments on the part of the EEC Commission, and the scheme has introduced distortions into trade between the EEC and its partners in the Lome Convention. Transfers under the STABEX scheme have had only a minor impact on the economies of recipient countries, especially on the sectors affected by fluctuations in export earnings. STABEX is an unsatisfactory model for a new compensatory facility: additional finance to compensate LDCs for losses in export earnings might most feasibly be made available through further liberalization of the IMF's Compensatory Financing Facility.

Consensual knowledge can produce widely varying levels of impact on different international negotiations. In the case of negotiations over UNCTAD's Integrated Program for Commodities, consensual knowledge developed among the experts involved. This consensus tended to support the position taken by the developed countries, thus pointing in a direction already taken for other reasons. Consensus in this case facilitated an agreement, but empirical and theoretical analysis both suggest it may prove to be an incorrect or unstable agreement. The outcome of the commodity negotiations implies that the interaction of key variables, such as uncertainty and the degree of acceptance of the knowledge, might yield different results in other cases. Various specific means might be used more effectively to diffuse expert knowledge among policy makers.

The United States insists that the issue of Puerto Rico was removed from the international agenda by a vote of the UN General Assembly in 1953. This insistence has not quieted the international debate. During the last decade, more nations have used more international organizations to pursue the decolonization of Puerto Rico. They have been assisted by moderate Puerto Rican leaders who are looking for a way to induce the United States to change the island's status. As an agenda-taker, the U.S. government has had to expend increasing amounts of energy, prestige, and resources—mostly diplomatic, but occasionally economic and political—each year to try to keep from being condemned as a colonial power. Agenda-setters, particularly Cuba, pay a small price but derive substantial benefits from raising the cost to the United States or increasing the number of turnstiles (actions in other international forums) through which the United States must pass each year. Other countries, whose UN vote is transformed by U.S. concern into hard currency, owe the agenda-setter a debt. Five specific changes in strategy could reduce the costs to the United States of being an agenda-taker in the United Nations