A police force, domestic or international, must meet two requirements: it must be reliable, and it must be effective. While obviously it cannot be effective if it is not reliable, it can be reliable without being effective, and it is for this reason that the two prerequisites must be distinguished. A police force, in order to be reliable, must be loyal to the political authorities and share their conceptions of law and justice. A police force, in order to be effective, must stand in a certain relation of power to that fraction of the population which is likely to call forth police action by breaking the law.

The General Assembly held its seventeenth session, comprising the II22nd–I202nd plenary meetings, at UN Headquarters from September 18 through December 20, 1962, during which time it took action on 95 items. The Assembly decided to convene a special session prior to June 30, 1963, for the purpose of considering the financial situation of the Organization. Six countries were admitted to membership during the session: at the II22nd meeting, Rwanda, Burundi, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago; at the II46th meeting, Algeria; and at the II58th meeting, Uganda. The membership of the UN was thereby brought to IIO.

Before considering evolving relations between the United States and the Atlantic Community, it is useful to examine briefly the meaning of the words “Atlantic Community,” a term that means different things to different people. It has no agreed definition because it is still a concept and not yet an institution. It purports to be geographically descriptive. However, when one considers the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is generally regarded as the most important institutional reflection of a community of interests between the European and North American countries bordering the Atlantic basin, one finds Italy, Greece, and Turkey are members while Spain and Eire, both Atlantic countries, are absent. Similarly, if one looks at the membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is another institution generally regarded as reflecting common interests of the “Atlantic Community,” one finds that all the NATO members belong as well as Eire, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Spain. Although there are political reasons to account for all this confusion, at the present time the term “Atlantic Community” connotes neither an agreed geographic area nor a specific group of countries.

The Security Council took up this item at its 1040th–1049th meetings, July 22–31, 1963. At the invitation of the President, the representatives of Tunisia, Liberia, Portugal, Sierra Leone, and Madagascar took places at the Council table. The item was being considered at the request of 32 African governments, which had sent a letter to the President of the Security Council asking the Council to consider “the situation in the territories under Portuguese domination.” According to this letter, which was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum setting forth the decisions of the heads of African states on this matter at the Addis Ababa Conference of May 22–25, 1963 the state of war prevailing in some of these territories following the persistent refusal of Portugal to comply with certain General Assembly and Security Council resolutions constituted a definite breach of peace and security in the African continent as well as a threat to international peace and security.

The 35th session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), comprising the 1242nd–1263rd meetings, was held in New York from April 2 through April 18, 1963. At the 1242nd meeting Mr. Alfonso Patiño (Colombia) was elected President of the Council; Mr. Walker (Australia) was elected First Vice-President; and Mr. Hajek (Czechoslovakia) was elected Second Vice-President. The Council adopted its agenda without discussion.

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.

The Atlantic Community regards itself as the core of the free world and, at least in aspiration, as the leader of all the peoples which have not fallen under the communist spell. The major barriers to the successful assertion of that leadership are the suspicion and hostility generated by the era of Western imperial overlordship of most of the world and the radical divergence in view as to what constitutes the major problem of our times. Although there are marked differences of emphasis within it, the Atlantic Community arms and guards against the threat of communist imperialism, while much of Asia and Africa still see the colonialism of the West as the gravest and most immediate menace to their own freedom and the peace of the world. For the most part they want to abstain from what seems to them the sterile and unrewarding task of holding back communism in order to be able to concentrate on their own immense problems of stabilization, integration, and development. Aware of their pressing needs, and of what the West has to offer, they look to the Atlantic Community for economic and other assistance, even though they may also be ready to accept assistance from the communist states as well. It is probable that most of those in responsible positions in the Atlantic Community have a greater degree of understanding and sympathetic appreciation of the position of the underdeveloped countries than the leaders of the latter have of the West's concern with communism.

The predictive power of the social sciences is poor. That of the science of international relations is particularly mediocre, since it deals with a type of social action—the conduct of foreign policy—that is pervaded by uncertainty and in which even the most carefully calculated actions partake of gambling. Therefore, to try to forecast the chances of “international military force” in general during the years to come would be an exercise in futility. There are, however, two tasks which a political scientist can begin to perform. One consists of making the necessary distinctions; they may appear tiresome to the general reader and trifling to the impatient reformer, but both those gentlemen ought to remember that the opposite of distinctions is confusion. The second task consists of examining what kinds of international forces appear to be compatible with the international system in which we live.

In discussing the process of integration in western Europe, communist writings invariably put the word in quotation marks, and often preface it with “so-called,” to drive home the central point that, while technological progress does create a tendency toward international economic activity, the capitalist system is inherently incapable of an effective response to this necessity. What is involved is not so much the broad, undefined movement toward an Atlantic Community, which Soviet strategists tend to discount, as the specific and practical development of the European Common Market. With or without quotation marks, the movement toward European integration has become a major factor in the evolution of Soviet ideology and policy. Despite its ups and downs, the Common Market has resulted in profound modifications in Soviet ideas concerning contemporary capitalism and the present configuration of power; it has led to a radical revision of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistant (COMECON)—the Soviet counterpart organization for eastern Europe; and it has greatly complicated Moscow's leadership of the world communist movement. Over the long run, if the non-communist nations are able to sustain a movement toward growth and integration, this development gives promise of leading to fundamental transformations in Soviet policies and in the Soviet system itself.

The 34th session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), comprising the 1209th–1236th meetings, was held in Geneva from July 3 to August 3, 1962, under the presidency of Mr. Jerzy Michalowski (Poland).

The World Bank announced on March 14, 1963, that it had made a loan equivalent to $13,250,000 to help finance a program to rehabilitate and modernize the two principal railway systems in Peru. The railways were an important element in Peru's transportation system, particularly for the movement of minerals, petroleum, and bulk merchandise, and their efficient operation was essential to the country's economic growth. Under the program, diesel locomotives would be put into use, carrying capacity increased, and tracks improved, thereby enabling the railways to reduce transportation costs and to provide more efficient service. The loan was made to the Peruvian Corporation Limited, a private company which owned and operated the railways, and was guaranteed by the Peruvian government. The total cost of the program, which was scheduled for completion in 1965, was estimated at the equivalent of $21.3 million, of which $19.5 million was in foreign exchange and would be covered in part by the Bank loan. The loan was for a term of sixteen years, and amortization was to begin in December 1967.

This essay attempts to envisage potential conflicts of loyalty in the minds of soldiers of a future international peace force and to review some of the means and steps by which such conflicts might be eased or prevented. For it is a fundamental of co'llective action that for any group to be effective in pursuing its object its members must be reasonably free from crises of loyalty.

General disarmament plans, like weapons of mass destruction, supply excessive solutions to problems, and, like those weapons, they tend to leave unanswered many highly pertinent questions about lesser conflicts, low-level disorders, ambiguous enemies, and local policing jobs. By and large, strategic planners have come to recognize this weakness in military doctrines, but it is not certain that the planners of general and complete disarmament (GCD) yet recognize that a blueprint geared to the deliberate violation, the great war, the two super-states in hostile confrontation, may turn out to be quite irrelevant to the real problems of a disarmed or even semidisarmed world. At best such a blueprint is bound to be deficient until it comes to grips with disorders other than classic open encounters of two states—that is, with the painfully familiar gamut ranging from civil war fomented in a great state by outside agents to the purely internal breakdown of law and order in a small state.

Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroun v. United Kingdom): By an order of November 27, 1962, the International Court of Justice extended to March 1, 1963, the time limit for the filing of the observations and submissions of Cameroun on the preliminary objection raised by the United Kingdom in the Northern Cameroons case. By an order of January 11, 1963, the President of the Court extended to July 1, 1963, the time limit for the filing by the government of Cameroun of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objection raised by the United Kingdom in the Northern Cameroons case. The extensions were at the request of the government of Cameroun with the agreement of the United Kingdom government.

The existence of an Atlantic Community with important economic aspects is revealed in the past and present relations among the countries of western Europe and North America. This Community is something less than the fusion of the nations of the Atlantic area advocated by some; it is something more comprehensive and more pervasive than the organizational alternative to “partnership” that others mean by the word. The Atlantic Community dealt with in this article is a state of affairs more than a concept; it does not have to be precisely delineated so long as we can discern its solid central mass. This Atlantic Community—such as it is, and whatever exactly it is—is the child of history and policy. Both genealogies are clearly established and well-known; to recall them helps pose the major questions of the present and future

During the period March 22, 1963–June 12, 1963, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made agreements with the governments of five countries establishing the initial par values of their currencies. The agreements were as follows: 1) one Liberian dollar per United States dollar; 2) 0.347543 Nigerian pounds per United States dollar; 3) one Somali shilling equivalent to 0.14 United States dollars; and 4) 45 Afghanistan afghanis per United States dollar.

When I reported to a colleague that I was writing a chapter on the relationship between the Atlantic Community and the United Nations, the response was immediate, emphatic, and somewhat disconcerting. “What do you propose to say?” he snorted. “Actually the two things are quite separate and distinct. There really is no relationship between them at all.”

The relation of an international military authority to the industrial (once nuclear) powers in a disarmed world is an intriguing one. We should not expect much success in finding an ideal strategy for it. It is hard enough to find one for the United States, Britain, or the Soviet Union in the familiar world of competitive military force.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) held its twelfth General Conference in Paris from November 9 to December 12, 1962, under the presidency of Mr. Paulo de Berrêdo Carneiro (Brazil). One of the Conference's first actions was to elect for a six-year term as Director-General Mr. René Maheu (France), who had served as Acting Director-General since the resignation of Dr. Vittorino Veronese (Italy) in 1961.

The eleventh session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAQ) was held in Rome on November 4–24, 1961, under the chairmanship of Mr. Georges Hraoui (Lebanon). The Conference had before it the Director-General's report, The State of Food and Agriculture 1961. The Conference endorsed the general analysis of the situation and outlook presented in this document. There was general agreement as to the importance of raising the level of international assistance for the economic development of less developed countries, and it was felt that increased use of available food surpluses should be made for that purpose. There was also general recognition of the desirability of establishing a multilateral approach both for emergency relief and for the use of food surpluses for economic development on an initial experimental scale. Due to high productivity and low expansion of demand in developed countries, substantial and possibly even increasing supplies of food would be generated for these purposes.