A food regime not dominated by one or a few entities, without governmental policies separating national markets, and with free access to information would result in a single, integrated global food market. Such a hypothetical market would contribute more than the current system to efficiency and stability, although it would not necessarily be superior from an equity standpoint. Such a global food market does not exist. This is primarily because government regulation separates individual national markets. Residual international markets, shaped by the domestic and trade policies of major buyers and sellers, exist for major commodities. In the international grain market the United States is preponderant, but American policies in recent years have prevented the US from playing a dominating role. Furthermore, futures trading provides an open reference price. Consequently, the international grain market more nearly approximates “ideal” market features than many other international markets. An expansion of public markets and futures trading, by the United States and other countries, could enhance the effectiveness of international food markets in serving goals of efficiency, stability and security of access.

Three assertions about relations between multinational corporations and host countries in the Third World frequently appear in the dependencia literature: 1) that the host countries receive too few benefits; 2) that foreign investment causes distortions in the local economies; and 3) that foreign investment distorts host countries' political processes. These propositions can be reformulated as testable hypotheses, to which non-dependency studies of oligopolistic competition, bureaucratic politics, and transnational relations are relevant. Identifying critical areas of disagreement between dependency and nondependency approaches may help scholars to design their research in such a way as to enrich the dialogue between dependentistas and non-dependentistas.

Proponents of multilateral aid have generally assumed that such aid is less responsive than bilateral aid to the political characteristics of recipient countries. Many critics of foreign aid have challenged this assumption, arguing that US influence ensures that multilateral programs serve the same interventionist purposes as bilateral. This study of per capita aid allocations to Latin American countries confirms that there are strong similarities in the distribution of aid. However, when the relationships between aid data and data on national attributes are examined, the results do not support the notion that political characteristics account for the similarities. For some multilateral agencies, there is little or no association between aid and recipient political attributes. For others, there are associations with political features, but the associations are not identical with those of US bilateral aid. In short, whatever the determinants behind decisions on the allocation of bilateral and multilateral aid, the same considerations with regard to the politics of potential recipients do not appear to be operating. All of this does not mean that US interests are not being served by multilateral programs. They may be served in a variety of ways, and still be consistent with the results reported here. That important issue is beyond the scope of this very limited study.

Since 1975, the United Nations has undertaken major deliberations to consider institutional reform of the UN system. Such restructuring activities have sprung from widespread dissatisfaction with the United Nations' capacity to deal with problems of economic development and relations between industrialized and developing countries. UN reform efforts have focused on two broad areas: reshaping the deliberative and policy-making operations of central UN institutions in order to reach more coherent global policies on international economic and social affairs; and reorganizing the planning, coordination, and implementation of UN programs to achieve these policy goals more effectively. In 1977, the General Assembly adopted the report of an intergovernmental Ad Hoc Committee, which provided detailed guidelines for prospective UN restructuring, and assigned its recommendations to relevant units within the UN system for the purpose of implementing these reforms. Major themes emphasized in these guidelines include an increased centralization and integration of the UN system in dealing with international economic and social affairs and improved efficiency and coordination of UN operations and activities in these areas. Fundamental to the course of UN restructuring deliberations—and to the extent and significance of eventual institutional reforms—has been the linkage between UN reorganization and the disposition of substantive North-South issues, as the restructuring exercise remains tied to the pace and direction of negotiations concerning “a new international economic order.”

In the metalworking and chemical industries of Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, the ownership structure of firms, their product sector, and propensity to obtain technology through licensing are closely associated. Foreign firms cluster in industrial sectors with complex and volatile technologies, in which their technological advantages permit the exaction of monopoly rents. Ownership structure and product sector, as well as firm size, are related to the firm's decision to obtain technology by licensing rather than by generating it autonomously or obtaining it through other means. Ownership structure, product sector, and licensing appear to interact with choice of machinery imports and research and development activities in such a way as to produce a “technological dependence syndrome” in which opportunities for “learning by doing” are consistently missed.

Chronic hunger is rooted in poverty and radically unequal distributions of income and assets, within and across countries. In market or quasi-market systems, the distribution of income and assets structures both food consumption patterns and food production systems. Radical inequality leads to structures which make it difficult to eliminate hunger, both because they increase the quantity of food needed to do so and because they support production structures in which the poor are “marginalized.” The effect of radical inequality is to severely limit the usefulness of “market mechanisms” as efficient instruments for reducing hunger. Marginal adjustments of existing food markets are unlikely to make any real progress in ending chronic hunger. Broadly based development and/or changes in the structuring mechanisms supported by market economies are necessary.

International economic organizations once identified as Western have evolved in some cases to the extent that their survival depends importantly on forging symbiotic links with Third and Fourth World clients. Such national governments often derive net gains from membership in those organizations, for example, the World Bank. These gains may be as much political as economic. Thus the Government of India, influential in World Bank policy generally, has used Bank agricultural projects to overcome states' resistance to central priorities. Mobilizing domestic political resources is an important dimension of membership in the international economy. Where this occurs, it argues for a view of the governments of poor countries as active, rather than passive, and as agents of domestic social transformation.

Staffing the Commission civil service with nationals from all nine European Community member states is necessary for pragmatic and political reasons, but multinational staffing also creates serious problems for the organization. Requirements for nationality balance in the Commission civil service have negative repercussions for personnel policy as well as the civil servants' career prospects and morale; nationality-based informal organization often interferes with organizational performance; multinational staffing results in a multilingual civil service and thus creates language and communication problems; the interaction of persons from nine member states creates a potential for nationality-related friction; and civil servants may have divided loyalties to the Commission on the one hand and to their member states on the other. National representation in the ranks is taken most seriously in those Commission units that have important policy concerns. Hence expanding the Commission's powers will increase the saliency of the nationality issue in that organization.

In the literature which focuses on the participation of individuals in an international organization, two hypotheses are stated. The first rs that the longer a person serves an organization, the more favorable his attitude toward the organization becomes. It is hypothesized that the duration of the diplomatic assignment constitutes a factor influencing the evaluation of the organization.

Bargaining relationships in formal international conferences and negotiations may involve structural asymmetries. A comprehensive analysis of these asymmetries in bargaining may be found in a synthesis of literature from formal game theory, structural-manipulative approaches to bargaining, social psychology, and the study of political influence. Propositions based on this literature focus on two factors which are likely to contribute to asymmetrical outcomes in negotiations: unequal costs to the negotiators from the failure to agree, and unequal resources available to employ in bargaining or influence attempts. An analysis of bargaining in the section of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) dealing with the issues of European security gave qualified support to these propositions. Influence over the final text in the CSCE agreement is related to a rough index of losses which would have resulted for individual nations from the failure to reach agreement in the CSCE. In addition, influence over the final text is related to each nation's resources, especially military resources. More significantly, the two superpowers exerted considerable asymmetrical influence over what was not included in the CSCE agreement, thus exercising a substantial veto. Thus, the asymmetrical outcomes within the CSCE negotiations were reflective of both differences in “threat potential,” that is, in the losses which actors would receive if no agreement had ensued, as well as differences in resources.

Food is a factor in international diplomacy as a direct instrument of policy and as a condition underlying policy. Grain trade is particularly important. For most of the postwar period, principal grain exporting countries pursued policies designed to support domestic prices, using foreign agricultural policy to dispose of accumulated surpluses and to pursue broader non-food (political and economic) objectives. Grain importing countries came to rely on cheap food supplies in international markets, neglecting incentives to stimulate domestic production. Worldwide food shortages in 1973–74 made clear the need to consider international as well as domestic food requirements. Food considerations acquired a foreign policy dimension, while foreign policy considerations sparked a debate about the use of food for power. A return to surplus conditions in world food markets reduces the opportunities for the exercise of food power, while creating the conditions to meet historically unattainable food goals. To accomplish this, a system of international coordination and review of separate national food policies may be needed. Such a system would ensure greater accountability of private groups to governments and governments to one another without relying excessively on either automatic market forces or a centralized world food authority.

The roots of malnutrition are found in economics, education, agriculture, and health. This multiple etiology requires that approaches to the problem engage many different institutions. These organizations can be viewed as constituting an International Nutrition Institutional Network. The functions of this system are collection and dissemination of information, provision of goods and services, financing, and coordination. Significant problems, however, have been identified in the performance of these functions. These are organizational: poor coordination, vague responsibility delineation, inadequate evaluation, people limitations, and internationalnational relationships. They are also political: policy vacuum, knowledge gaps, and priority conflicts. Unless these are rectified, the Network's effectiveness will remain severely limited.

For nearly a quarter of a century, European television audiences have enjoyed international coverage of news, sports, and entertainment programs from abroad because of EUROVISION, one of the most successful efforts at technical and cultural cooperation on that continent. The EUROVISION network is an activity of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) currently linking some twenty-five national TV broadcasting services in Western Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East through a permanent network of microwave relays supplemented by satellite hookups to the more remote members. Participation is on a voluntary basis, which means that the international network is more or less a noncommercial clearing house for bi- and multi-lateral program exchanges plus joint telecasts of Olympic games or overseas events. Although EUROVISION programming accounts for only a small share of the total TV broadcast hours in Europe and is hampered by cultural and linguistic barriers, it has proven effective.

Current attempts to understand and remedy the underdevelopment and peripheral international roles of Third World states derive from three competing paradigms: conventional social science, Marxism, and dependency theory. Each paradigm claims to explain past history and to make relevant policy recommendations for Third World leaders. Yet, none of these approaches has so far been formulated as complex, well specified, causal models. One can build theory relevant to data by specifying competing three-variable models relating economic dependency to economic performance and development potential. An empirical evaluation can then be made of the dependency theory proposition that economic dependency inhibits positive economic performance (growth and development). Partial correlation and regression analyses of economic data from thirty tropical African states in the middle and late 1960s provide little support for two dependency-based models and evidence in favor of conventional and Marxist models. These findings have implications for theory, further research, and policy.

World food institutions include the whole range of policies and programs that affect the production and distribution of food, including national programs as well as those of an international nature. Trade liberalization, both international and intranational, can contribute significantly to the expansion of food production. Unfortunately, recent suggestions, such as the Integrated Programme for Commodities, will result in increased trade barriers, a reduction in specialization of production and increased price instability. If there are appropriate policies—adequate incentives for farmers, increased support for research and available supplies of modern farm inputs—food production in the developing economies can be increased more rapidly than population. Food security in the developing countries could be increased significantly by a grain insurance program that supplied grain to meet all production shortfalls below trend level production. Such a program should be the major source of food aid to the developing countries in order to avoid disincentives to local farmers.

The relationship between foreign control and national development is a central concern of the Latin American “dependency school” of analysis, which focuses on the impact of investment by multinational corporations (MNCs) in the Third World. In the MNC-dominated steroid hormone industry in Mexico, foreign control has led to two major consequences which characterize it as “dependent”: first, there has been an unequal distribution of benefits from its growth, favoring the central capitalist economies and the MNCs more than Mexico; and secondly, at the level of domestic policy formulation, there has been a restriction of choice among local development options, since these conflicted with “global” priorities implied by the dependent situation. As an alternative to MNCs, national firms in Mexico would very likely have performed better in terms of Mexican national welfare (defined as local industry growth) and global consumer welfare (defined as identical products at lower prices). The attempt made by the Mexican State during the last two years of the Echeverria administration (1975–1976) to increase its autonomy vis-à-vis the MNCs by restructuring the industry with a new state-owned firm met with only limited success. Reasons for this include Mexico's declining prominence in the world industry due to the availability of substitutes for its raw material, and the ability of the MNCs to build a strong defense using local political allies. Yet despite the difficulties, Third World countries will need to develop strong states which can deal effectively with multinational corporations if they are to successfully establish their own development priorities.