The increasing mobility of athletes prompts a reconsideration of the presumed connection between allegiance, identity and nationality. Olympic citizenship challenges traditional understandings of community membership by calling into question the privileged status of birthright citizenship and by bringing forth a different, more fluid and changeable notion of belonging. By juxtaposing the ‘old’ world of nations competing via ‘their’ athletes, as momentary representatives of the nation, for glory, medals, dominance and prestige, to the increasing mobility of sportspersons engaging in the pursuit of athletic excellence and creative self-expression, we argue that neither the enactment of tighter rules to prevent ‘citizenship shopping’ nor the transformation of the Olympic Games into athletes' Olympics are desirable reforms. Instead, we propose a participatory growth model which would allow athletes to choose the country they intend to represent following their enmeshment into a localised web of socio-economic interactions and a flexible framework of citizenship. This cannot but have wider implications for the Olympic Charter and for politics in general.

Despite the fact that the Millennium Development Goals promised to achieve gender equality and maternal health by 2015, equality remains elusive for too many women. Indeed, austerity, the rise of fundamentalism and the continuing gendered division of labour, especially when it comes to socially necessary but unremunerated care work, have contributed to the increase in gendered inequalities in many areas of social life and in most regions of the world. There is a plenitude of international, transnational and national equality instruments and strategies at the same time as gendered inequality is increasing both within and between nations. These equality instruments and strategies have also had an uneven impact: some women benefit more than others. Moreover, if interpreted in a formal manner, equality can be achieved as much through levelling down men's employment opportunities as by elevating women's life chances.

It was a hot afternoon on 10 April 1950, in the town of Chapra in the eastern Indian province of Bihar. As most people had retired indoors to avoid the heat, the women's clothing store run by Kedar Nath had suddenly become a hive of activity. His munib (accountant) had gone home early on receiving news of the sudden illness of his son, and his shop had been visited by the local Magistrate and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the leading figures in the district administration. The Magistrate, Mr S. K Ghatak, ordered Kedar Nath to open up his stores and make his registers available, and in this process discovered that Nath had twenty-five more saris than were accounted for in the stock register. Kedar Nath's relation protested that the saris had been bought that very morning, and that his munib's unexpected absence had resulted in the stocks not being updated immediately. The district officials were not convinced and Kedar Nath was arrested for not having proper accounts of the clothes in his stock. The district court convicted Kedar Nath for violating the terms of Bihar Cotton, Cloth and Yarn (Control Order) 1948, and the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 (ESA), and sentenced him to a fine and a month of rigorous imprisonment.

This paper examines the criminalisation of symbols of the past. It considers the 2011 judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. In this compact and well-ordered decision, the Tribunal, with reference to key European examples, assessed critically the constitutionality of criminal law provisions that prohibit the dissemination and public use of symbols of the past pertaining to fascist, Communist or other totalitarian content. Its ruling, which found amendments to the law in Poland that tightened up restrictions on the use of totalitarian symbols to be unconstitutional, is considered within three important contexts: first, the broad European context, where the concept of totalitarian crimes has become subject to EU human rights legislation relating to the freedom of expression; second, the context of post-dictatorial Europe, where specific states have addressed the use of totalitarian symbols in their respective criminal laws; and finally, the context of transitional justice, where criminalising symbols of the past has become a central and permanent feature in European narratives about justice. Significantly, these cases reveal the temporal element of transitional justice. The paper discusses the two case-studies most relevant to Poland, namely those in Germany and Hungary. Reference is also made to the Baltic States, which, together with Poland, have made a concerted effort to bring the notion of totalitarian crimes and histories to the attention of Europe. The paper concurs with the contention that cases concerning the use of symbols provide an excellent illustration of where memory and law intersect. Using historical, comparative and contextual methodologies the paper demonstrates the legal and philosophical complexities of criminal uses of symbolism, the political realities, and the key dimension of transitional justice and its relationship to expression, law and memory.

This paper pushes against the successful rhetoric of formal equality by which same-sex couples are the same as different-sex couples and opening existing regimes of marriage to them best recognises their equal moral worth. Drawing on social science research that indicates differences in the economic organisation of same-sex couples, the paper explores the possibility that a different marriage regime for the spouses' reciprocal duties might combine recognition of their equal moral worth with sensitivity to their needs. The study sharpens the understanding of contemporary investments in marriage law for everyone and offers a better justification for formal equality: same-sex couples may be treated identically to different-sex couples not because they are the same, but despite their differences.

Due to the distinct nature of international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity originating out of and contributing to the pervasive collective character of mass atrocity, the appropriate mens rea for individual commission of these crimes is difficult to pin down. The mens rea for these international crimes has been deliberated, disputed and inconsistently applied, leaving what it means for individuals to intend to commit crimes of mass atrocity mired in confusion. This paper explores the meaning of intentional commission of collective crime, and demonstrates that from both philosophical and legal perspectives, acting intentionally in the context of mass atrocity can be interpreted in different ways, resulting in a condition of international criminal law which is at risk of unpredictability and expressive uncertainty. The paper endorses purpose-based, rather than knowledge-based, intent as the appropriate standard in the context of international crimes by arguing that mere knowledge of outcomes is insufficient.

The 2008 global financial meltdown, commonly called the ‘Great Recession’, was the most serious crisis in capitalism since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and a fundamental repudiation of neoliberal governing assumptions. This paper focuses on the contexts that informed two governmental responses to this economic crisis — restoration and retrenchment through public austerity. It explains that these responses were contingent, experimental, inequitable and, in the end, unsuccessful. Restoration and retrenchment, however, were entirely consistent with previous neoliberal crisis-responses and the abiding ambitions of this governing project. As the economic crisis crawled into the second half of a decade, the idea of inequality was increasingly identified as an underlying cause of crisis and its amelioration as a necessary part of rebuilding economies and communities in a post-crisis era. The paper tracks the case for the revival of equality politics and policies in the early twenty-first century.

The idea of ‘human dignity’ is, notoriously, as ambiguous as it is compelling. Notwithstanding the absence of any clear or settled definition of human dignity, either in the abstract or in terms of what it means in practice, it is an idea which takes pride of place in international legal documents, in judicial reasoning, and in scholarship across a range of disciplines, where it seems, particularly in recent years, to have become the focus for an explosion of academic interest and an accompanying proliferation of literature. Much of the existing literature attempts to uncover the meaning, or multiple meanings, of ‘human dignity’, focusing on the uncertainty surrounding the substance or content of the idea and trying to compose a catalogue of use-types. In this paper, my primary aim will be to address another type of uncertainty, namely uncertainty about the role, function or status within legal frameworks of the ‘dignity norm’ – the norm requiring respect for human dignity. I want to explore several possibilities: first, that the dignity norm is simply a proxy for respect for autonomy; second, that it is a right in the sense that we can speak of a specific ‘right to have dignity respected’; and third, that it is a legal principle. Having problematised each of these in turn, I will contend that the function of the dignity norm is best captured by describing it as the ‘substantive basic norm’ of the legal systems wherein it appears.

Since the spark of the Egyptian revolution in January 2011, issues of political party law reform, constitutional declarations, and the institution of free and fair elections have taken the lead in mainstream politics, and at times, relegated the role of organised labour to mere economistic agitation and disruption of an already ‘disrupted’ life, in the eyes of the Egyptian public. In contrast to mainstream depiction of the labour movement as a ‘single issue’ movement, this paper shows the decisive political role of labour struggles that took place both inside and outside the judicial and legal systems, in the years leading up to the events of 25 January. This paper identifies the diversity of tactics used by the labour movement, and its unique approach to legality – a defensive legality approach, where legality and illegality are both taken seriously as legitimate tactics of resistance. The defensive legality approach recognises the violence and coerciveness of the legal form, as well as the tactical potential of recourse to the legal system to defend the labour movement. The experience of Egyptian workers in the wake of the 25 January revolution reveals the politics and the limits of law, as well as the significance of tactically and defensively using the law.

The attempt to secure maternity rights has been a major focus of decades of campaigning for women's equality. However, it is of concern that maternity rights might reinforce women's responsibility for childcare. This paper considers how we bring men back into the frame, through a critical assessment of the contrasting approaches in Europe and the US to claims by fathers for parenting rights. It is argued that the goal of equal participation of women in the workplace needs to be matched by equal participation of men in the home. This is only possible if the conception of equality is shaped by a conscious and explicit commitment to the social value of parenthood. Substantive equality can only be genuinely furthered if pregnancy and parenthood are appropriately distinguished. Whereas pregnancy is unique and should be treated as such, a true application of substantive equality requires a ‘levelling up’ option, extending women's parenting rights to fathers.

For some time now, there has been a perceived need to prepare law students to handle legal issues beyond national borders. Much has been written on how globalisation should shape legal education, but no clear direction has emerged. There is also a contrary impulse to retain a focus on domestic law in order to prepare students for practice in their home jurisdiction. One way of addressing these apparently contrary impulses is to take a skills approach that articulates the analytical processes distinctively active in a more global context. Some of these skills could then be integrated into a variety of courses. However, skills in the global context should not merely replicate domestic conceptions of skills. This paper proposes that students develop abilities in comparative thinking and heuristic question framing, and reviews the advantages and disadvantages of a course in Comparative Advocacy designed to accomplish these goals.

The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the viability and potential of conceptual analysis as a methodological tool. It is argued that conceptual analysis represents a flexible and open method for connecting public law with analyses that are different, and even incommensurable with its own epistemology. The particular area that this paper seeks to connect public law with is that of feminist critiques. It is a journey that does not occur without some difficulty. Conceptual analysis is unknown within public law and therefore the notion requires defining and explaining. Public law has also been particularly resistant to the inclusion of feminist critiques and therefore the task of identifying suitable concepts is not straightforward. The outcome is, however, not only the identification of a new methodological tool for public lawyers but the capacity to broaden the range of material that can be incorporated within their analyses.

The international right to social security has been given limited attention as a vehicle for addressing women's poverty. This paper highlights some of the issues shaping women's poverty globally that require a more responsive right to social security. It discusses the nature and purpose of social security and examines the international law relating to this right, arguing that recent interpretations lack an adequate framework for ensuring women's interests are fully accommodated. The paper challenges the relationship between the right to social security and traditional conceptions of work that exclude women's labour. It also argues that the right must have application at the transnational level if it is to address the changing nature of women's work. Drawing on ideas of substantive equality, it proposes an approach to the development of the right from a gender perspective including a set of principles to be followed in applying the right.

This paper shows how international law scholarship might adopt a constructivist interdisciplinary research design to better engage with the political and social context of legal rules and institutions. In 2005 the Asia-Pacific Partnership was launched by the United States and Australia as a climate change institution outside the UN climate process. Controversially, the Member States claimed the Asia-Pacific Partnership was complementary to the UN climate process. This paper investigates the veracity of this claim by analysing the normative compatibility of the Partnership and the UN climate process. The paper adopts Dryzek's discourse theory to analyse the shared ideas and assumptions underlying both institutions. This analysis indicates that the Asia-Pacific Partnership embodied a deep market-liberal discourse that is in significant tension with the more interventionist and equity-based principles underpinning the UN climate process. This market-liberal discourse is important for understanding recent developments in global climate governance.

This paper critically examines the ways in which the European Court of Human Rights represents applicants' religious and cultural practices in its legal discourse. Borrowing tools from critical discourse analysis and incorporating insights from the anti-essentialist critique, the paper suggests that the Court has most problematically depicted the practices of Muslim women, Sikhs and Roma Gypsies. The analysis reveals that, by means of a reifying language, the Court oftentimes equates these groups' practices with negative stereotypes or posits them as the group's ‘paradigmatic’ practice / way of life. The thrust of the argument is that these sorts of representation are problematic because of the exclusionary and inegalitarian dangers they carry both for the applicants and for their groups. In negatively stereotyping applicants' practices and in privileging certain group practices over others, these types of assessment underestimate what is at stake for the applicants and potentially exclude them from protection. Moreover, these types of reasoning risk sustaining hierarchies across and within groups. The paper concludes by sketching out an approach capable of mitigating stereotyping and essentialising risks.

A woman's freedom to develop her personality or identity as she sees fit is supposed to be legally protected in twenty-first century Europe. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides a right to respect for one's private life in Article 8 which has been judicially interpreted to provide a right to identity or personality development. Additionally, Article 14 provides for non-discrimination and Articles 9 and 10 for freedom of expression, including that which is religious. Arguments are examined of some different interpretations of the overall purpose of human rights law − to respect human dignity and human freedom. These are examined by reference to the recent criminalisation of wearing face coverings in public places in certain European countries where the intention is to prevent the wearing of the Islamic full-face veil.1 It is argued that each woman's identity is legally recognised when the concepts of human dignity and human freedom are interpreted as empowering and self-determining rather than constraining and paternalistic. Legally banning full-face veils, in liberal democracies in situations where an adult woman says she has freely chosen to wear such a garment, misrecognises her and disrespects her identity or personality: as a human being, as a member of a religious or cultural group and as an individual person capable of subjectively interpreting her own identity or personality as she sees fit.

Despite international and national human rights norms and standards, gender equality remains a goal in most countries. The recent discourse on substantive equality as a strategy for addressing the gender discrimination, disadvantage and deep-rooted social biases has reinforced the importance of working towards indivisible human rights for girls and women under CRC and CEDAW. This paper uses international and comparative national experiences on law and policy to argue that the failure to adopt an indivisibility of rights approach in relation to girl children has made it more difficult to achieve a norm of substantive equality for women. It is argued that the adoption of an intergenerational and rights-based, rather than a social welfare approach, is a necessary step to achieving substantive equality for women.

Using an approach derived from sociological functionalism, this paper proposes a distinctive reconstruction both of the history of constitutionalism and of the changing form of constitutional law in global society. It argues that constitutional norms form adaptive principles for stabilising the inclusionary legal and political functions of society. Classical patterns of legal/political inclusion tended to rely on democratic forms of will formation (constituent power). Contemporary patterns of legal/political inclusion rely, in contrast, on rights. The shift in emphasis from constituent power to rights forms the constitutional foundation for the emerging global political system.

The protection of Geographical Indications (GIs) is often conceived as a way to preserve cultural creativity embedded in a specific place. But can GIs be understood as a mode of cultural creativity in their own right? This paper tries to answer this question through a case-study which compares three specific GIs for wines in three different countries (Australia, Italy and Canada). By using an interpretative analysis based on narratives, the paper highlights how GIs are the protagonist of legal narratives in terms of cultural creativity and, at one and the same time, something extrinsic and intrinsic to a given social and productive environment, contributing to defining that same notion of place.