Public participation in international environmental decision-making can seek to fulfil different goals. This article explains how these goals can affect the design and appraisal of participatory processes and highlights the under-recognised value of law in determining the objectives of public participation in international environmental forums. A doctrinal analysis finds that substantive goals are most prominent in current international environmental law, but that a normative rationale for public participation could be gaining more formal endorsement through the growing legal recognition of linkages between procedural human rights and environmental protection.

The Western response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has featured remarkable solidarity over diplomatic and sanctioning initiatives. This unity of action, however, has largely not extended to developing or non-Western States. Many such States have, instead, expressed their non-alignment in respect of Western ‘economic warfare’, albeit not infrequently while also condemning Russia's military actions. This article proposes an approach to reconciling the positions of States in different economic, geopolitical and regional/cultural alignments. First, it suggests that current norms on State responsibility do not rule out using collective countermeasures against States accused of erga omnes norm violations, including via sanctions not authorised by the United Nations but rather imposed by coalitions. At the same time, however, it is argued that individual third-party States retain extensive rights to decide whether or not to participate in such initiatives. This autonomous agency can be derived, in part, through the continued applicability of traditional neutrality principles that require all sides to a conflict to respect the status of neutral States. As collective countermeasure initiatives come to be used more frequently in response to global conflicts, the ‘forgotten’ rules of neutrality provide a useful guide for balancing inter-State legal relations.

Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights enshrines the right to liberty, one of the oldest and most fundamental rights in the human rights tradition, and one of the core rights in the Convention. Central to the judicial understanding of Article 5 is the ‘exhaustive justification principle’: unlike with other rights, such as the right to privacy, interferences with liberty can only be justified by one of the specific reasons listed in Article 5 itself. This article shows that this rigidity has posed problems in practice: faced with modern developments unforeseeable at the time of the Convention's writing, such as the use of novel policing techniques and the COVID-19 pandemic, judges have interpreted Article 5 in an unusual and artificial way, sacrificing the exhaustive justification principle in doing so, in order to achieve sensible outcomes. The integrity of Article 5 has been threatened, with serious consequences for the future protection of the right to liberty. This trend is explained, evidenced and evaluated, and some (partial) solutions and concessions are considered.

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, numerous Western States have supplied Ukraine with arms, munitions and war material, in ostensible breach of their obligations as neutral, non-participating States. States have failed to provide any legal explanation for such transfers, leaving the task to scholars and commentators to provide legal argumentation as to the compatibility of arms transfers to victims of aggression with neutral duties. This article analyses and seeks to evaluate these arguments in favour of ‘qualified neutrality’ and assess which of the proposed grounds, if any, are the most compelling.

Courts in a number of jurisdictions have attempted to resolve the relationship between winding-up proceedings and arbitration clauses, but a unified approach is yet to appear. A fundamental disagreement exists between courts which believe that the approach of insolvency law should be applied, and those which prefer to prioritise arbitration law. This article argues that a more principled solution emerges if the problem is understood as one of competing values in which the process of characterisation can offer guidance. This would allow both a more principled approach in individual cases, and a more coherent dialogue between courts which take different approaches to the issue.

Knowing receipt requires the satisfaction of disparate elements under English domestic law. Its characterisation under domestic law is also unsettled. These in turn affect the issues of characterisation and choice of law at the private international law level, as knowing receipt sits at the intersection of the laws of equity, restitution, wrongs and property. This article argues that under the common law knowing receipt ought to be considered as sui generis for choice of law purposes and governed by the law of closest connection to the claim. Where the Rome II Regulation applies, knowing receipt fits better within the tort rather than unjust enrichment category and the escape clause in Article 4(3) of the Regulation ought to apply.

A principle that prohibits States from weakening their domestic levels of environmental protection continues to emerge at varying speeds within international trade, investment and environmental law. This article explores the principle's diverse history, rationale and legal expression in each of these domains and finds that its various articulations in different international treaties suffer the same shortfalls and deficiencies. Non-regression clauses may leave the complexities and nuances of implementing environmental protections unaddressed, including identifying and measuring when a regression has occurred and balancing these environmental protections with other legitimate policy and environmental measures. As these clauses are increasingly subject to investor–State and State–State dispute procedures, States expose themselves to heightened liability for changes to their environmental laws, even where those changes might be legitimate and reasonable. The particular emergence of this principle in environmental law offers treaty-makers an opportunity to clarify the rights of States to derogate from otherwise narrowly drafted clauses that require them to maintain their level of environmental protection strictly.

This article argues that although most Caribbean States have in the last 60 years ascended to statehood, colonialism continues to exist in new and variable forms. It relies upon the concept of ‘coloniality’ as advanced by Schneiderman to contend that the international investment law regime, whose history and evolution is rooted in colonialism, relentlessly pursues the economic interests of foreign investors and capital-exporting countries. It draws important connections between historic colonialism and the contemporary regime for the protection of foreign direct investment by situating the Caribbean's experience in the light of the rationales, tropes and methods arising in the past which endure in investment law's domains, as advanced by Schneiderman in his new book, Investment Law's Alibis, namely (a) profitability and privilege; (b) a discourse of improvement; (c) distrust of local self-rule; and (d) construction of legal enclaves. It is argued that each of these features of colonial rule, from a Caribbean perspective, is inscribed in the discourse and practices of the international investment law regime.

This article explores the concept of consideration in contract law from a comparative perspective, looking at how English law and German law distinguish bargains from gifts. Contrary to the orthodoxy that consideration is unique to Common Law and absent from Civil Law, the bidirectional analysis in this article shows how English law and German law can be understood to fulfil a comparable function and can thus inform and benefit each other. The sophisticated English doctrine can be used to refine the rather imprecise German definition of gifts, whilst the understanding of English authorities can profit from reflecting inversely on the criterion of gratuitousness in German law.

Given recent data regarding fishing vessels switching off their Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) in the Western Indian Ocean, this article assesses the potential illegality of the practice by analysing national and international legislation. It shows that the enforcement of AIS laws is generally poor, and although these are becoming increasingly robust in some jurisdictions, the sanctions are not severe enough to act as deterrents. Furthermore, this article suggests that the insurance industry enables the practice of switching off AIS through weak due diligence practices. Insurers have a role to play in curbing such illegal behaviour, and it is not discretionary.

The European Union (EU) is contemplating the adoption of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which would extend its domestic carbon price to emissions that are produced outside its borders but are embodied into its imports of carbon-intensive commodities. In doing so, the EU is testing the boundaries of permissible unilateral action at the interface of international climate and trade law. However, the question of whether the proposed CBAM is compatible with these two multilateral legal regimes is yet to be addressed in an integrated manner. This article seeks to fill this gap in the scholarship and makes two main arguments. First, the CBAM as presently designed does not respect the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDRRC) and needs to be adjusted through two forms of differential treatment: a full exemption for least-developed countries and Small Island Developing States and the use of CBAM-generated revenue to support decarbonisation efforts in other affected developing countries. Secondly, this CBDRRC-based differentiation should be permissible under WTO law on the grounds that it does not amount to discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail.

Courts and scholars have interpreted open-ended legal norms as imposing due diligence obligations on States and other entities to mitigate climate change. These obligations can be applied in two alternative ways: through holistic decisions, where courts determine the level of mitigation action required of defendants; or through atomistic decisions, where courts identify some of the measures that the defendant must take. This article shows that, whilst most holistic cases fail on jurisdictional grounds, atomistic cases frequently succeed. Overall, it is argued that atomistic litigation strategies provide more realistic and effective ways for plaintiffs to prompt enhanced mitigation action.

This article analyses what is widely known as the police powers exemption found in modern international investment agreements, with a focus on mega-regional trade and investment agreements. It explores its legal nature and requirements, the burden of proof and issues of compensation. In an attempt to curb (indirect) expropriation claims, the exemption carves out non-discriminatory regulatory measures from the scope of indirect expropriation and in such situations no compensation needs to be paid. It follows that, as a rule, foreign investors are not protected against the adverse economic effects of regulatory measures. The key question addressed is whether host States can increase the level of protection given to public welfare objectives through the use of this exemption without having to compensate investors for the measures taken. The article argues that, under the proportionality test embodied in the exemption, States can provide the level of protection that they desire without incurring a risk of liability as regards expropriation claims.

Four years following the entry into force of the EU data protection framework (the GDPR) serious questions remain regarding its enforcement, particularly in transnational contexts. While this transnational under-enforcement is often attributed to the role of key national authorities in the GDPR's procedures, this article identifies more systemic flaws. It examines whether the GDPR procedures are deficient-by-design and, if not, how these flaws might be addressed. The conclusions reached inform our understanding of how to secure effective protection of the EU Charter right to data protection. They are also of significance to EU law enforcement more generally given the increasing prevalence of composite decision-making as the mechanism of choice to administer EU law.

Taking a law-and-governance approach, this article addresses legal certainty in international human rights law as it applies to artificial intelligence (AI). After introducing key issues concerning legal certainty, a comparative analysis of AI law-and-governance initiatives at the international, regional and national levels is undertaken. The article argues that many initiatives contribute to increased legal certainty and can partially compensate for some of the shortcomings of the international human rights law framework, but that further clarification is badly needed. This is especially true for the responsibilities of private businesses which are developing AI and the corpus of human rights beyond privacy and data protection.

The UN Human Rights Committee's finding in Teitiota v New Zealand has garnered widespread global attention for its recognition that the effects of climate change may put people's lives at risk or expose them to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, thus triggering States’ non-refoulement obligations. However, a secondary—and highly problematic—consequence of the decision has been its confusing and misplaced focus on ‘imminence’ of harm. This reflects a concerning, albeit uneven, trend in human rights cases generally (and cases concerning climate change and human rights, in particular) to recognize violations only where rights are immediately threatened. This short article reflects on the assumptions that Teitiota has triggered about the place of imminence in international protection claims, identifies the source of confusion, and suggests a more appropriate framework to guide a category of case that is likely to become the subject of intense litigation in the future.

Pioneered by the US, recent mega-regional trade agreements such as the CPTPP have incorporated ‘regulatory coherence’ provisions—mirroring the US Administrative Procedural Act's core designs—to balance between domestic regulatory autonomy and international cooperation. Building upon existing literature that traces the trajectories of the diffusion of regulatory coherence across jurisdictions, this article analyses how Australia's constitutional tradition could effectively condition the development of regulatory coherence in a Westminster-based model of governance. It is argued that the global entrenchment of regulatory coherence is contingent upon the inherent boundary defined by the political dynamics and constitutional structures within a jurisdiction.

The two-step methodology for the identification of general principles of law deriving from domestic legal systems, consisting of a comparative analysis followed by a transposability test, seems accepted as the undisputed methodology in the current work of the International Law Commission on the topic. This article examines whether this two-step approach finds reflection in the practice of and before the PCIJ/ICJ and in international legal scholarship. The analysis finds that judicial practice does not entirely follow these two steps, but the method is widely upheld in doctrinal writing. The article argues that the decision to codify this two-step methodology can be viewed as progressive development by the Commission, and may signify the crystallization of this method of identification of general principles of law.

States increasingly refer to ‘legal stability’ in connection with maritime zones, amidst concern to preserve their jurisdictional rights in the face of climate-change induced sea-level rise. Yet such a claim for preservation is at odds with the widely-expressed scholarly view that baselines, and their associated maritime zones, ‘ambulate’ with coastal changes. This article interrogates this tension by focussing on the understudied notion of legal stability as it relates to maritime zones, under the international law of the sea. The article examines the development of the term ‘legal stability’ in the discourse of States (what States say) and contends that a claim for the stability of maritime zones should be seen as an expression of the long-standing value placed on legal stability by States in the system of maritime zones. Further, the article presents the results of a global study of States’ implementation of the normal baseline in domestic legislation (what States do). The results show that many States have taken practical measures to secure legal stability for their normal baselines within their domestic frameworks, suggesting that existing international law may accommodate a greater degree of stability than widely appreciated. The article concludes by asserting that these findings matter not only for how we should receive States’ claims for maritime zone preservation on the basis of legal stability, but also prompts reconsideration of our overall understanding of the existing law on baselines and maritime zones.

This article explores how sovereignty fictions have been used to advance different legal, political and economic aims in the articulation of the United Kingdom's future approach to global regulation. By mapping the transformative shifts in sovereignty paradigms, this article highlights the disconnect between the absolutist sovereignty popularised in the UK government's political rhetoric and the concept of regulatory sovereignty that underpins the UK's future trading strategy. To maintain its status as a global leader in regulation and standards-setting, the UK government will need to diffuse power and delegate autonomy through networked orders of public and private actors. These competing sovereignty paradigms are analysed with reference to European Union (EU) law and practice, to highlight the opportunities and challenges for the UK as an independent trade actor. This article concludes by evaluating how sovereignty fictions can disrupt the objectives of the UK's proposed ‘common law’ approach to regulatory governance and discusses the policy interventions that may be required to enable the UK to harness its potential as a regulatory leader.