In his imposing work, Symbol and Sacrament, Louis-Marie Chauvet creatively explores the implications of symbolic mediation for the whole of Christian theology. Central to Chauvet's “fundamental theology of sacramentality” is the assertion that there is an inescapable absence within any mediation of presence. With this critical principle, he attempts to counter ecclesial triumphalism. Despite this critical concern, Chauvet's impressive project suffers from a naive optimism concerning symbolic mediation. Religious symbols are misused not only by those who assume direct, unmediated presence but also by those who coopt them to ideological ends. Chauvet's theology provides no principle of discernment concerning the possibility of the corruption of the Christian symbol tradition. His use of the notion of Gelassenheit to describe the proper posture toward religious symbols stifles critical reception. This article offers suggestions for correcting these shortcomings in Chauvet's worthwhile project using the thought of Levinas, Habermas, and Ricoeur.

The present essay distinguishes two ways to “settle” the problem of evil, “defense” and “theodicy,” as practiced in contemporary Christian philosophical theology. It argues that Christian theology can defend Christian belief from the charge of inconsistency, but that when it attempts to explain why and how God permits or wills evil in his world, it stumbles over denying the reality of evil or the goodness of God. The essay concludes by arguing that the Christian theologian cannot and should not attempt to make Christianity plausible by constructing theodicies but should concentrate on other methods of demonstrating the plausibility of Christianity.

The major reason why ethics seeks to determine the rightness or wrongness of human acts is that it is principally concerned with the question of our identity as human beings, an identity that we shape for ourselves by our willingness to choose to do specific kinds of deeds or acts. Questions of morality, in other words, are at root questions of human identity. We make or break our lives as human beings by the deeds we choose to do.

With this underlying theme the essay seeks to assess the adequacy of diverse moral methodologies insofar as these have been employed in an effort to confront the challenges posed by the new biology. Three types of approaches are examined: the consequentialist type exemplified by Joseph Fletcher, the “mediating” approach discernible in many contemporary writers and given its most systematic articulation by Richard McCormick, and the deontological type so ably presented by Paul Ramsey and Germain Grisez. The author argues that the Ramsey-Grisez type of approach is the most adequate, contending that the other two types of approaches are more concerned with what our deeds get done than they are with what our deeds have to tell us about the meaning of our existence as moral beings.

The article argues that the motivations for Phillips' construal of all theory-making as necessarily foundationalist go beyond the epistemological debate about foundationalism vs. nonfoundationalism and that his construal is rooted in the anthropological assumption that the subjectivity of human persons is inevitably violated by analyses in terms of objective categories that are not derived from the self-understanding of the subjects under study. The article uses the distinction between etics and emics in linguistics and cultural anthropology and a psychoanalytic understanding of the inevitability of transference and countertransference in order to argue that an appreciation of human finitude and contingency should lead Phillips and others to anthropological views in which the inevitability of theory, transference, and the experience of the otherness of oneself and others is construed as not only inevitable but as pleasurable, i.e., as part of the goodness of created human nature.

This essay is divided into two sections. Part I analyzes and compares in detail the arguments of Schubert Ogden and Hans Küng for the existence of God. Essentially, both Küng and Ogden argue that certain characteristic human activities (especially moral choices) presuppose a confidence (Ogden) or a basic trust (Küng) that our lives and reality of which our lives are a part are meaningful. They continue to argue that this confidence or this basic trust are only justifiable on the condition of belief in God. Hence, they conclude that a belief in God is presupposed by our moral choices. Part II critically evaluates the above argument by drawing on distinctions made by analytic philosophers (Baier, Nielsen, Ayer) in their discussions of what conditions are necessary and sufficient to make a life (or life) meaningful. The discussion with analytic philosophy is important because neither Küng nor Ogden take any notice of the arguments raised there.

The undergraduate course described introduces the academic study of religion. It summarizes basic Christian teaching on God, Salvation, Jesus Christ, Trinity, Church and Sacraments, Eschatology; promotes objective intellectual reflection on basic Christian teachings and on the religious experience that inspired them; introduces the student to academic religious literature, promotes informed dialogue among students of various religious traditions.

That the Commedia of Dante can be a stimulating initiation for undergraduates into the rich and exciting world of Medieval Theology is the conclusion of an experiment at Marquette University. The distinct advantages and some of the hazards encountered by the teacher of this course are shared in this article. Students in this experiment had the opportunity not only of becoming acquainted with the theological insights of the medieval world but were also able to enter into the discipline of Dante that integrated the tasks of poet and theologian.

I must be honest from the start and confess the summary of my six years of teaching undergrads and five years of graduate students: being a “creative teacher” of spirituality in a system of education that is destructive both of spirituality and creativity is impossible. Education, like religion itself, cannot afford to succumb to privatization as if a “loneranger” teacher in spirituality could endure or carry on without a structure and a program that is based in sound theory and practice that itself sustains creativity and spirituality.

A recent graduate of our Institute in Creation-Centered Spirituality is now pursuing doctoral studies in theology, and his comment after his first semester at a renowned university was: “There is no spirituality in upper academia.” What he was experiencing was the absence of sensitivity to both right and left brains as sources for learning; the absence of sensitivity to making connections and therefore to the artist in self and society; the absence of synthesis or interdependence on the part of curriculum or faculty. What he was also undergoing was a deep experience of the malaise that education finds itself in today in the West—a crisis that, if attended to, also reveals an opportunity of staggering dimensions.

The growth of the Internet in recent years has been truly remarkable. The World Wide Web and electronic mail have changed the way the world does business, but does it have any impact on the way theologians teach? This article argues that electronic discussion groups (lists) can enhance theology classes by increasing the possibilities for student interaction with course material and with each other. An electronic discussion can be particularly helpful in theology courses that emphasize personal reflection. Free from the pressures associated with the classroom, students often find the electronic medium more conducive to thoughtful participation.

John Henry Newman's thoughts about education extend far beyond that philosophy of university education which is developed in his famous Idea of a University. He was acutely aware that the relationship between teachers and learners is fundamentally a social relationship, and one that can take various social forms. What he most admired was a highly personal and deeply sympathetic relationship, and what he most feared was its replacement by impersonal institutional structures. His convictions in this regard have deep roots in his personal experience, as well as in his interpretation of history and theology. To examine those roots both enlarges one's appreciation of Newman's educational wisdom and sharpens one's insight into his complex personality.