This article analyzes today's global values crisis as a matter of both personal and institutional failure. Social disintegration constitutes humanity's greatest challenge at the turn of the millennium. A viable future requires a new social project which embodies a new ethos—one which includes both traditional and liberal values and which avoids their vices along with the traps of authoritarian socialism. In order to spell out this new social project, the article describes the essential features of the traditional ethos and the liberal ethos: their economies, the understanding of nature, religion, history, politics, and ethics. This article argues that the needed participatory radical ethos incarnates Christian values for our time.

The ongoing Chrislology of Wolfhart Pannenberg is a rich locus for discerning several major currents in the field of contemporary Christology, for not only does it reflect certain prevalent emphases but it has in fact initiated them. It is the purpose of this article to examine how that is in fact the case.

First it is shown how Christology played a major role in the early Pannenberg's overall theological synthesis, forming the key source of his original perception of the structure of reality and of reality's relationship to God. Next, Christology itself is focused upon. Three aspects of Pannenberg's Jesus— God and Man are highlighted as having been widely influential, viz., the method of proceeding “from below” with the history of Jesus providing the starting point; the emphasis on the resurrection; and the stress on Jesus' dedication to the Father (rather than to the Logos) as the basis for understanding his unity with God. The third section of the article traces Pannenberg's recent development in Christology, particularly as reflected in a series of (untranslated) essays in the last decade. Advances in his understanding of method and the growing role of anthropology and Trinitarian doctrine are noted. The article closes with a look to the future, including Pannenberg's own projection of the direction he will be taking in Christology.

The question of the sources for Christian Ethics has been a perennial problem. In the first part of this study a heuristic continuum is set up in order to examine briefly six ways of relating faith and morality at the level of sources for Christian ethics which some theologians have actually adopted (e.g., Karl Barth and James Gustafson). In the second part, the author's own constructive proposal is offered along with a critical analysis of the previous positions. It is argued that a critical-dialogical relation between faith and morality offers the best possibilities both for preserving the relative autonomy of each and for utilizing the resources of faith and morality in the discipline of Christian ethics.

This article evaluates the adequacy of Orthodox ethics by examining Orthodoxy's response to questions of social justice as they have been raised by the churches of the third world.

The Eastern tradition is skeptical of such phrases as “structures of injustice” because it is improper to speak of sin with regard to structures. This does not mean that Orthodoxy is insensitive to questions of social justice, but rather that such questions can only be properly addressed by a personalist ethic grounded in trinitarian theology. It is trinitarian theology that provides the foundation for an understanding of love, community, and human relationship which demands relationships of mutuality and reciprocity and rejects all forms of human domination. This ethic is arrived at by an examination of the mode of being of the triune God in which all Christians participate, a mode of being that is both personal and communal. Orthodox ethics, while still in need of development with regard to the problems of concrete moral decision-making, offers a rich theological foundation often lacking in the more philosophical-ethical tradition of the West.

If greater intelligibility is to be achieved in the study of religious figures, the work of symbol in the life of individuals should be probed. Method grounded in sociological and psychological theory holds this possibility. Three considerations center this approach to understanding: (a) the religious figure is formed as he intersects with a symbol system, a process of creative resymbolization; (b) the religious figure is differentiated from others and understood within one of many distinct fields of experience, each field having significant psychological effects on spiritual development; (c) the understanding one achieves is contained by the questions brought to the datum. When more personalistic questions are raised of the religious figure within his symbol system, important differences in meaning result. Taken together, these meanings may approach integral understanding.

This essay argues that the reformed epistemologists (William Alston, Alvin Plantinga) have not (yet) sustained claims in religious epistemology significantly more extensive than William James did in the Varieties. It argues that even if reformed epistemologists show that religious belief can have a positive epistemic status, their approach may finally lead to relativism (given that religious traditions generate contradictory religious beliefs) because it offers no method for finding which, if any, concrete religious beliefs might be preferable to hold or in which religious practices one should engage, if any, and because it fails to distinguish between original and derived religious belief. I suggest that more attention must be paid to “social epistemology” if religious epistemology is to go significantly beyond James's accomplishments.

An important critique of a “public” model of theological discourse has appeared in the work of a group of thinkers in the analytic tradition sometimes called “Wittgensteinian Fideists.” This paper explores the model of theology representative of the Wittgensteinian Fideists, particularly that found in the work of D. Z. Phillips and Paul Holmer. Three themes are examined: the relationship between theology and ordinary language, the role of faith in theology, and the justification of theological claims. Each theme is then summarized and critically assessed in an effort to show the limitations in the Wittgensteinian model of theology and some of the ways in which an understanding of theological method can be carried beyond the point where the Wittgensteinian Fideists leave it.

Discussion about women and spirituality can range from romanticized claims of special privilege to insistence that equality means sameness. Some typical questions focus the issues. “What is a women's spirituality?” “How is it different from male spirituality?” “What is spirituality, anyway?” And, “what is a feminist spirituality?” “Is it androgynous?” “Is it a stage on the way to something else?”

Vatican II's announcement of the Catholic Church's acceptance of religious freedom in its Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) ought to have ushered in a period of ecumenical agreement on the topic of religious disestablishment. Instead, forty years after this most controversial document was promulgated, we find that public, academic, and even ecclesial discussions of the role of religion in public life are confused and in fact deeply contentious. The problem, however, is not that Dignitatis Humanae was incoherent or naïve in its understanding of religious freedom, but that we have failed to grasp its nuanced and coherent manner of reconciling a robust religious freedom with a profound view of the political significance of religious beliefs. Careful attention to this Declaration provides a solid foundation for continuing political theology and a public presence of religion without infringing the important value of religious “disestablishment.”