This review article looks at the recent books on the British Industrial Revolution by Robert Allen and Joel Mokyr. Both writers seek to explain Britain's primacy. This article offers a critical but sympathetic account of the main arguments of the two authors, considering both the economic logic and the empirical validity of their rival claims. In each case, the ideas are promising but the evidence base seems in need of further support. It may be that eventually these explanations for British economic leadership at the turn of the nineteenth century are recognized as complementary rather than competing.

Since the early 1997 paper by La Porta et al., a growing body of research has argued that ‘legal origins’ have a country-specific, time-invariant effect on property rights and economic development. Following the methodology of La Porta et al., an original database of 51 bankruptcy laws has been built: it ranges over 15 European countries and more than a hundred years (1808–1914), and summarises how the rights and incentives of the parties were defined as the procedures unfolded. The first conclusion is that, over the entire period, all legal traditions strongly protected creditors' rights; only English law comes out prima facie as less protective. Second, evidence suggests that the evolution of these laws was influenced less by their past than by continent-wide trends, arguably linked to capitalist development. An early nineteenth century model thus saw heavy repression of failed debtors and highly regulated judicial procedures. After a transition period from the late 1860s to the late 1880s, prison for debt was abandoned, rehabilitation became easier, and the parties were given much more room to recontract on property rights.

Globalisation was a fact of life in Europe before 1913, but as trade shares increased, so did wage and employment instability. Faced by growing pressure from workers, national authorities established labour compacts – a packet of labour market regulations and social insurance programmes – that defended workers against the risks they faced in and outside the factory. The labour compact provided workers with insurance because it compressed wage structures. We construct an index of labour market regulations and social insurance schemes for seventeen European countries and find that the extent of the labour compact varied with the level of openness. We conclude that the labour compact gave workers reason to support free trade because it protected them from external risk. Contrary to the received view, globalisation before 1913 was compatible with state intervention. Our findings are consistent with Rodrik's and Agell's for the period after 1945.

An eclectic array of quantitative data sketches public and private poor relief in the century before 1880, and invites new interpretations. Church and secular charity was meagre in the eighteenth century, and probably earlier. While richer countries transferred a higher share of national income to the poor than did poorer countries, the trend in this share failed to march upward with income across the nineteenth century. Some explanations are proposed for the differences between countries and the decline in poor relief's share of national income in England-Wales and the Low Countries before 1880. It may be that the newly franchised had stronger reasons to oppose tax-based relief than the elites who had voice at the start of the century. Changes in voice partly explain the movements of English poor relief over time and space. So do movements in the chances that the disenfranchised would exit from cooperating and supplying labour.

The conventional view asserts that sharply falling transport costs practically closed the transatlantic price gap for grain by the end of the nineteenth century. This article challenges that view on the basis of an analysis of a new data set of weekly wheat prices and freight costs from New York to UK markets. Although transport costs fell, the fall was neither sharp nor dramatic. The extent of the decline in real terms is very sensitive to the choice of deflator. It is argued that if you are assessing the trade-inhibiting effect of transport costs, the ‘freight factor’ approach, using the price of the transported good as deflator, is the appropriate one. Port charges, insurance and marketing costs also fell by the same modest rate and since these costs were almost as large as transport costs, the price gap remained substantial. One implication is that we need to look elsewhere for the causes of the dramatic increase in New World grain exports.

By the 1820s, as a result of the protracted struggle with France, the market value of the British Government debt was twice British GDP. It has been argued that this debt represented a huge institutional failure by the government, significantly slowing growth in the Industrial Revolution period by crowding out private investment. This article constructs measures of private rates of return in the years 1725–1839 and shows these imply that neither the government deficits nor the mounting debt are associated with much higher private rates of return on capital. The reason the government could issue so much debt without raising rates of return is unclear. One possibility is that crowding out was occurring, but population growth in 1770–1839 was reducing rental income as a fraction of GDP, creating a demand for other asset income so that we do not observe tightness in capital markets.

This article examines the evolution of energy use and pollution emissions in Sweden over the past two centuries – a much longer period than has been investigated in the large literature on the environmental Kuznets curve. In this article we show that both energy consumption and pollution emissions in Sweden declined relative to GDP over the last two hundred years. In absolute terms both energy use and pollution increased up until 1970, after which date energy consumption stabilised and pollutant emissions declined, leading to less environmental stress. The energy intensity results are decomposed to determine the relative impact of structural changes in the output structure versus within-sector changes. For the period after 1970 another decomposition for pollution emissions is performed to separate out changes in preferences from energy-related changes. The analyses show that technical change in a broad sense has been crucial for explaining the long-term decline in both energy intensity and pollutant intensity, while the transition to the service economy had negligible effects. Changed preferences affected the decline in emissions after 1970.

The evolution of city growth is usually studied for relatively short time periods. The rise and decline of cities is, however, typically a process that takes many decades or even centuries. In this article we study the evolution of Italian cities over the period 1300–1861. Using an existing data set, we perform panel estimations where the development of city size and urban patterns can be explained by various geographical, institutional and other determinants of city size for the period under consideration. Although large shocks such as the plague epidemics are clearly visible in the data, our baseline estimation results show that the main determinants of Italian city growth are physical geography and the predominance of capital cities. With respect to geography, being a seaport or having access to navigable waterways increases city size whereas a city's relative location, measured by its urban potential, is not significant. Being a capital city also increases city size. The estimation results reveal strong century-specific effects on city growth and these effects differ markedly between the North and South of Italy. Additional estimations show that these time effects can be linked to the political and institutional developmental changes over time in Italy. Our findings that the capital city bonus increases and non-capital cities suffer when the political power and the institutions of the state are more centralised corroborate the idea that institutions are a key factor in explaining Italian city growth.

This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe from 1750 to 1913. Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and/or limited regimes were associated with significant improvements in credit risk relative to fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also reveal close relationships between major turning points in yield series and political transformations.

This article studies the importance of demand and supply factors in the Swedish fertility transition using county-level data and panel regressions. Fertility started to decline around 1880 when marital fertility began a continuous decline. A gradual diffusion of parity-specific control was important in this process. The fertility of the oldest age groups declined fastest, even though the decline started in all age groups over 25 at about the same time. This development was connected to broader socioeconomic and demographic processes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as mortality decline, urbanisation, industrialisation and expansion of education.

France presents an unusual case because, unlike several other European countries, there are no estimates of the income distribution for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This is a serious deficiency because it limits the ability to understand how an important dimension of the socio-economic fabric changed during the years preceding and coinciding with the beginning of France's industrial development. In this article we provide estimates that use tax data and the social tables of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While this data does not provide a basis for a perfectly accurate assessment of the income distribution, it does permit an evaluation of the general magnitude of inequality and how it varied in that period. The results suggest that inequality during the eighteenth century was large but decreased during the revolutionary period (1790–1815). Afterwards, and in accordance with Kuznets' hypothesis, when industrialisation began about 1830, inequality increased until sometime in the 1860s when it began its slow decline towards greater equality that characterises the twentieth century.

The purpose of this article is to re-evaluate the military spending dynamics leading to the First World War, namely to explore the impact of the declining military and economic leadership of the UK and the economic emergence of the USA. Individual countries responded to threats from perceived enemies and spillovers from potential allies rationally, yet often going beyond the bounds of traditional alliances. In a sixteen-country system, the military reticence of the UK and USA encouraged higher military spending by other states, which suggests that Germany was not responsible for the arms race alone. Aggregate systemic military spending also incurred higher individual spending levels, whereas alliance impacts were not consistent.

This article presents new estimates of aggregate production in post-unification Italy: the first since the original Istat-Vitali estimates of some forty years ago not to recombine their component series, and to be based entirely on new research. The new 1911-price GDP series incorporates the recent Federico series for agriculture, the author's recent series for industry, and newly derived series for services that extrapolate the recent Zamagni estimates of their value added in 1911. The new time series for the 11 sectors specified by the original estimates often differ widely from their predecessors. The new aggregate yields a long-term growth rate well above that of the original series, but not as high as that of Maddison's revision. The end-of-the-century acceleration that characterised all the earlier aggregates disappears: total production followed in muted form the long swing in industrial production, which in turn reflected a simple investment cycle. The implications of the new series in the context of the ongoing debates in the literature are also briefly discussed.

This paper aims at measuring as precisely as possible the changes in the level of protection in Italy from the 1870s to the 1920s – i.e. during the first phase of the country's industrialisation. It shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, protection was quite low – with the possible exception of a short spell of time in the late 1880s–90s. Therefore the static welfare losses were small, but also the alleged dynamic role of protection in fostering industrialisation seems small as well. In the last section of the paper we speculate on the implications of these findings for other countries. This evidence is not conclusive, but it does cast some doubts on the relevance of protection in 19th century Europe.

Russia's emancipation of the serfs was accompanied by numerous other measures aimed at modernizing the Tsarist economy and society. Among these ‘Great Reforms’ was the creation of a new institution of local government – the zemstvo – which has received comparatively little attention from economic historians. This quasi-democratic form of local government played an important role in expanding the provision of public goods and services in the half-century leading up to the Russian Revolution. This article utilizes archival records and contemporary evidence to outline the zemstvo's role in Russian society and describe its political structure. The article then presents a newly collected panel data set that includes information on the allocation of political rights within the zemstvo, spending and revenue decisions by district zemstva, and a variety of other socio-economic indicators. With these data, I explore whether the electoral structure of the zemstvo allowed the newly emancipated peasantry to voice their preferences over spending levels and tax rates. I find that the district zemstvo with greater political representation from the peasantry shifted taxes away from communal property and spent more per capita, especially on education. However, these effects did not derive from a direct voting mechanism but most likely arose out of the interaction between peasant representation and more liberal elements of the noble class. This study initiates a broader research agenda into the zemstvo's place in Russian economic history and contributes to the literature on the political economy of public good provision in developing societies.

This article explores whether the antebellum decline in heights continued in the second half of the nineteenth century by using a data set of more than 58,000 US Army recruits born between 1847 and 1894. The main finding is that heights continued to decline during the Civil War by about 0.4 in. (1.0 cm) and stagnated for an extended period of time before they began to increase among the birth cohorts of the late 1880s. Recruits from the South remained the tallest despite the Civil War, while those from the Northeast were the shortest. Height was positively correlated with proximity to protein-rich nutrients during childhood and with geographic mobility, and was negatively correlated with urbanization and infant mortality rates.

Between 1660 and 1830, Parliament passed thousands of Acts restructuring rights to real and equitable estates. These estate Acts enabled individuals and families to sell, mortgage, lease, exchange and improve land previously bound by inheritance rules and other legal legacies. The loosening of these legal constraints facilitated the reallocation of land and resources towards higher-value uses. Data reveal correlations between estate Acts, urbanization and economic development during the decades surrounding the Industrial Revolution.

This article looks at the gains from improved market efficiency in long-distance grain trade in the second half of the nineteenth century, when violations of the law of one price were reduced due to improved information transmission. Two markets, a major export centre, Chicago, and a major importer, Liverpool, are analysed. We show that the law of one price equilibrium was an ‘attractor equilibrium’. The implication is that prices converged to that equilibrium in a tâtonnement process. Because of asymmetrically timed information between markets separated by long distances there were periods of excess demand as well as excess supply, which triggered off the tâtonnement process. Over time, adjustments to equilibrium, as measured by the half-life of a shock, became faster and violations of the law of one price become smaller. There were significant gains from improved market efficiency, which took place after the information ‘regime’ shifted from pre-telegraphic communication to a regime with swift transmission of information in an era that saw the development of a sophisticated commercial press and telegraphic communication. This article is the first attempt to actually measure the gains from improved market efficiency and it demonstrates that improved market efficiency probably stimulated trade more than falling transatlantic transport costs. Deadweight losses decline significantly as markets became more efficient. The conventional view that Harberger triangles are almost always insignificant is challenged.

The dating of, and explanation for, the agricultural revolution in Europe remains an elusive research task. When and why did a low-productive pre-industrial agricultural sector turn into a fast-growing, more productive one? Unique data from Sweden, consisting of more than 80,000 observations of farm production output for the period 1700–1860, are used to calculate and explain decisive changes in pre-industrial agricultural production. Our estimations show that crop production more than quadrupled during the period studied, and from the 1780s and onwards production growth by far outstripped population growth. Furthermore, the data allow us to estimate the determinants of change at individual farm level. The results show that enclosures, markets and property rights were of significant importance. Institutional changes, affecting the incentives and the organization of production, made peasants invest in production and productivity. In a general sense this shows the flexibility and awareness of pre-industrial European peasants in exploiting markets and initiating institutional change.

This article addresses the question whether the substantial financial flows received by emigration countries contributed to domestic financial development in peripheral Europe before 1914. We quantify a sizable and significant relation between remittances and measures of financial development that is both larger than the contribution of other international capital flows and the best estimates of the same relation today. Given that financial development is regularly included among the conditions for economic growth and catch-up of developing nations, this article adds to our understanding of the multiple impacts of the mass migration phenomenon on the economies of emigration countries.