After the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, one commonly observes trials of the agents of the former regime and efforts to compensate its victims. In our century, waves of transitional justice have occured in German-occupied countries after 1941, in South- Eastern Europe in the 1970s, in Latin-American countries in the 1980s, and in post-Communist countries after 1989. The article proposes a framework for the behavioral study of these phenomena. The dependent variables are political decisions to pursue retroactive justice after the transition. Independent variables include the constraints of the actors, their motivations and beliefs, as well as the mechanisms by which individual policy preferences are aggregated into binding collective decisions.

Les sociologues mettent-ils toujours un sens sous le mot structure lorsqu'ils parlent de « structure sociale » (1) ? Il faut pourtant se demander si et dans quelle mesure les parties constitutives d'une société stratifiée, classes ou groupes de statut, forment une structure, c'est-à-dire, pour s'en tenir provisoirement à une définition minimale, si et dans quelle mesure elles entretiennent des relations autres que de simple juxtaposition et, en conséquence, manifestent des propriétés qui résultent de leur appartenance à la totalité ou, plus précisément, de leur position dans le système complet des relations qui commande le sens de chaque relation particulière.

The article discusses three liberal arguments about freedom of movement: immigration as a remedy for global injustice in the distribution of opportunities, freedom of movement as an integral aspect of individual autonomy, and immigration control as implied in democratic self-determination and citizenship. The article shows how these apparently irreconcilable stances can be reconstructed as partially overlapping once we realize that liberal citizenship provides not only reasons for closure but entails a bundle of mobility rights and is open for access by migrant stakeholders.

This paper considers the meaning conveyed by the term “dignity” in human rights discourse. It considers various ambiguities associated with the term (e.g. Does it describe the content or the ground of certain rights?) as well as alternative accounts of the kind of meaning that “dignity” has (descriptive or evaluative, technical or ordinary language). The second part of the paper argues that the distinctive contribution that “dignity” makes to human rights discourse is associated, paradoxically, with the idea of rank: once associated with hierarchical differentiations of rank and status, “dignity” now conveys the idea that all human persons belong to the same rank and that, that rank is a very high one indeed, in many ways as high as what were formerly regarded as ranks of nobility.

Each of the main sectors of society—the state, the market and the voluntary non-profit sector—is characterized by a distinctive accountability regime, focusing on a different subject of accountability (actions, results and intentions, respectively) and a different mechanism of accountability (hierarchy, competition and cooperative networking, respectively). Those different regimes can complement one another, enhancing the democratic accountability of the system overall. They can also undercut one another, if their differences are not respected. Bringing the Third Sector under a market-style accountability regime, through “public-private partnerships” based on competitive tendering, undermines the distinctive contribution that the Third Sector might make.

Intergenerational mobility—the association between parents’ and adult children’s economic wellbeing—is an important sociological concept because it provides information about inequality of opportunity in society, and it has gained relevance in the recent past due to the increase economic inequality in most of the affluent world. This article provides an overview of the different measures of mobility used by sociologists and economists, as well as main empirical findings about mobility. I then move to topics that push mobility analysis beyond its bivariate focus: The association between intergenerational mobility and economic inequality, the mechanisms for mobility, and the validity of mobility as a measure of inequality of opportunity. I suggest that the association between mobility and inequality is likely spurious, driven by varying institutional arrangements across countries, and that mobility analysis is most useful when focused on describing the bivariate intergenerational association across countries and over time.

Drawing on Williams’ distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts, I argue that current moral neuroscience and psychology unwarrantedly restrict their researches to thin morality only. Experiments typically investigate subjects’ judgments about rightness, appropriateness, or permissibility, that is, thin concepts. The nature and workings of thick concepts – e.g., dignity, integrity, humanness, cruelty, pettiness, exploitation, or fanaticism – have not been empirically investigated; hence, they are absent from recent theories about morality. This may seem like a minor oversight, which some additional research can redress. I argue that the fix is not that simple: thick concepts challenge one of the theoretical backbones of much moral psychology and neuroscience; they challenge the conception of a hardwired and universal moral capacity in a way that thin concepts do not. In the conclusion I argue that the burgeoning science of morality should include both thin and thick, and that it should include the contributions of psychologists and neuroscientists as well as those of anthropologists, historians, and sociologists.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the meaning of giftgiving and reciprocity in modern society and thereby following the pointers left by Marcel Mauss. A critique will be made of the dichotomy of self-interest and normatively orientated action that forms the basis of sociology. For this conceptual dichotomization has caused forms of social interaction that cannot be localized either on the side of self-interest or on that of morality. It is the logic of the gift and the reciprocity thus evoked that in our view accompanies and structures all forms of interaction, from the social micro to the macrolevel. It is shown that in modern societies gifts and reciprocities form their own orders of interaction, and not only on a microsocial level. The principle of reciprocity even accompanies as a rule transfers owing to (state) compulsion as well as economic, selective exchange. As a basic principle of processes of sociation it is, fundamentally, present everywhere and in some areas it is explicitly and openly in effect (for example in welfare state transfers). Sociology has for too long overlooked the fact that this principle cannot be traced back either to normativist or to utilitarian explanations and nevertheless represents a principle of construction of modern societies.

This study reviews international comparative studies investigating people’s views on inequality. These studies are classified using a framework consisting of three types of conceptions of inequality and two dimensions of inequality. Four perspectives are discussed explaining cross-national differences in views on inequality: the modernist, the culturalist, the micro and the macro perspective. The findings of studies comparing views on inequalities in post-communist and Western states provide more support for the modernist than for the culturalist perspective. Few comparative studies appear to investigate views on inequalities as independent variables impacting on other social attitudes and behaviours. It is argued that the social relevance of the field will be enhanced if more studies can show that views on inequality have an effect on social outcomes complementary to that of objective inequalities.

Based on the ‘Minorities at risk’ data set, which codes the status and conflicts of 268 politically active groups in 148 different countries, this paper finds: 1) the greater the language difference between the language of the minority and that of the dominant group, the lower the probability of minority rebellion against the state; 2) language grievances held by the minority are weakly but negatively related to rebellion; 3) language grievances are strongly associated with increased levels of political protest, suggesting that the remedy for these grievances is more likely to be sought in the political realm rather than in guerrilla action; 4) language grievances when compounded by religious grievances (which are a reasonable predictor of rebellion) strongly and significantly reduce the magnitude of rebellion. The mechanisms supporting these results are elucidated in a formalized official language game. The equilibrium path of this game is illustrated in case studies of India and Sri Lanka.

In the search for social cohesion there is a consistent tendency for some sociologists, both classical and contemporary, to become prophets manqués. They regularly affirm that there has been some fall from grace and that the morality of their times is confused and impoverished. The golden age of traditional morality is, typically, not very precisely described and nor, for that matter, are the future consequences for society of its ‘relinquished common morality’ (Wilson 1983: 332) specified very clearly. I do not want to spend much time in documenting this tendency but a few examples may illustrate well enough the position I have in mind.

Non-democratic regimes vary in the degree to which domestic groups threaten their rule and the extent to which they need the cooperation of these groups. To both neutralize threats to their rule and solicit cooperation, some dictators coopt potential domestic opposition by providing rents and policy concessions within nominally-democratic institutions, such as legislatures and political parties. These institutions, designed as instruments of cooptation, facilitate cooperation between the regime and outside groups which promotes economic growth.

Several anthropologists have recently linked diagnoses of the diffuse impact of the Christian religion on the history of their discipline to programmatic calls for a consolidation of the “anthropology of Christianity”. This review article suggests that complaints of long-term neglect of Christianity in the anthropological literature are exaggerated. The contributions of recent decades have reflected general epistemological trends and continued the Anglophone discipline's traditional bias towards the study of missionary encounters and syncretism in the colonies. Mainstream Christianity in its Eurasian homelands remains understudied, especially the many eastern variants, and this distortion vitiates some of the new theoretical agendas. Finally the article questions the utility of delimiting Christianity as a distinct subfield and suggests instead combining a problemfocused approach with a wider comparative range.

In the discussion on the causes of the financial crisis three main lines of argument can be distinguished: The „regulatory failure“ argument, the theory of the cyclical instability of financial markets, and analyses of „financialization“. From a sociological point of view, the latter analyses deserve particular interest, as they consider the crisis in the context of the larger structural changes of mature capitalist societies that have developed since the last decades of the 20th century. The paper first provides an overview of the financialization literature, focussing of the interplay between the changes on the macro-, meso- and micro levels of society that led to the present dominance of the financial services sector over the economy. Moreover, the historical analyses of Arrighi and Silver are considered. The second part of the paper offers a theoretical reconceptualization of the empirical findings in the framework of a multilevel model of capitalist dynamics. The model shows how a prosperous capitalist economy like the Western one in the second half of the 20th century can be transformed into a financialized economy due to its own internal dynamics. From a sociological perspective, financialization can thus be understood as a hegemonial regime of financial investors over entrepreneurs.

Nous cherchons l'homme qui a pu prononcer publiquement cette phrase, nous voulons retrouver un Max Weber qui n'est pas seulement le spécialiste de problèmes sociologiques ou économiques, mais qui est en même temps aussi le penseur et le guide de la jeunesse intellectuelle. La recherche minutieuse qui s'impose ici n'a été faite que d'une manière tres incomplète (1), sans doute parce que les différentes filiations, affinités, fréquentations intellectuelles qui pourraient aider à définir la pensée wébérienne apparaissent sous un jour encore plus déconcertant que les recherches concretes du grand sociologue: le caractère encyclopédique de son savoir, la aussi, l'emportait vers un nombre invraisemblable de doctrines et de systèmes. Ce sont ces fils qu'il nous faut dégager à grand-peine des courants de pensée de la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle, où ses convictions fondamentales situent Weber. On accordera volontiers que cette richesse, ce foisonnement intellectuel — en contraste avec la richesse de sa sociologie proprement dite — ne pouvait guère conduire Weber qu'à une sorte d'éclectisme philosophique. Mais le lecteur ainsi averti se souviendra sans doute que le «désenchantement» idéologique ne diminue en rien l'importance de la riche contribution qu'apportait Weber a la science, à la sociologie.

Many familiar political projects—among them, demands for participation, for citizenship and for free movement and open borders—have been recently subsumed within a larger crusade against ‘social exclusion’. But each of these political projects seems better understood, and better pursued, in its own original terms. Furthermore, inclusionist appeals logically backfire: explicitly they are expansionist, urging the stretching of boundaries of membership so as to include those who were previously excluded; but every inclusion implies an exclusion (there can be no ‘inside’ without an ‘outside’); so indusionist appeals are implicitly consenting to a closed community, albeit one with a rather broader catchment. We ought to be striving instead for different kinds of communities, ones less internally inclusive and less externally exclusive. This amounts to a call for multiple overlapping jurisdictions, with many places where one can seek social support and many places where one might lodge a demand or file an appeal.

The paper analyses the new architecture of global governance which is characterised by unaccountable international institutions and scattered sovereignties. It examines the dilemmas of civil society actors (social movements and NGOs) involved in protecting the rights of local communities through strategic issue-based alliances with the state or the World Bank, whose legitimacy they question in other contexts. The cunning state remains a central actor in selectively transposing neoliberal policies to the national terrain and capitalises on its perceived weakness in order to render itself unaccountable to its citizens. The argument draws on empirical material from India around conflicts over the patenting of genetic resources, biodiversity conservation, forced displacement and privatisation of common property resources.

Sociologists have shown little interest in friendship. The rather fragmentary empirical work which does exist on friendship in modern society paradoxically tends to confirm the impression that the subject is of marginal importance; for friendship emerges from much research as a relationship which provides emotional support and small services but little else. Admittedly, there is also evidence indicating links with more classical sociological themes—such as access to jobs. But this evidence is often seen as representing ‘exceptional’ circumstances. Thus, among an immigrant group, friendship ties may be seen as particular to the culture from which immigrants come; among an elite group, the importance of friendship ties may be seen as peculiar to that elite circle. We can talk of a genuine ‘paradigm’ of modern society as being based on relatively impersonal relations. The paper maintains that if friendship is approached differently, it emerges as of more central and ‘structural’ interest. What is required is a shift on both theoretical and methodological levels. Sociology needs to shift its theoretical perspective and recognize that people articulate their values, enact their strategies, develop their language in face-to-face groups, not as isolated individuals. In terms of empirical research, what is needed are methods capable of tracing these groupings. This is difficult at present because most sociological methods rely heavily on data collected on individuals and their attributes.

Over the course of the past decade, “radicalization” has become prevalent as an analytical paradigm to interpret and explain phenomena of political violence, notably in research on jihadist terrorism and Western “foreign fighters” in Syria and Iraq. Thereby, while to some extent opening up new avenues of investigation, the concept also significantly re-shaped the way in which phenomena of political violence were analyzed and explained, focusing analytical attention on processes of cognitive and ideological transformation, mainly at the individual level. The purpose of this article is to examine some of the main strands of development in recent research on radicalization, with reference to and within the context of broader sociological research on political violence as well as reviewing critical debates and recently emerging sub-fields of investigation.