Public food safety authorities in Europe and elsewhere have recently developed forms of coordination and collaboration with private compliance systems in the monitoring and enforcement of public food safety laws. Such policies bring with them the risk of regulatory capture, loss of transparency and fuzzy accountability relationships. In this paper we analyse how the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) assesses and monitors the functioning of private food safety control systems so it can use these private systems in its own enforcement activities. We do so by discussing two national private systems that have been formally accepted by the NVWA and are as such subject to its meta-control. The article examines the safeguards that the public enforcement agency uses while coordinating its own activities with private food safety controls, the advantages and risks involved in this strategy, and the extent to which this policy can be improved. From this we draw lessons for public agencies elsewhere willing to engage with private compliance mechanisms. The study is based on the analysis of policy documents, public and private regulation and open-ended interviews with representatives of the public and private sector in the Netherlands.

How can one not applaud the renewed better regulation agenda launched by the First Vice President Timmermans? Finally this fuzzy reform field is in the hands of a strong executive politician with the authority to make substantial progress on an agenda that always appeared good on paper, but somehow did not deliver against the expectations it defined for itself. ‘Better regulation for better results’ not only promises tangible results, but it combines this with the ambition of ‘changing how we work at the European level’. This ambition should provide us – as citizens, stakeholders and scholars – with an opportunity to essentially present a scorecard concerning these results in the near future. And, indeed, experts and other stakeholders in the better regulation game do welcome the initiative.

My view on this agenda is that the promise of ‘better results’ will be hard to deliver, whereas the ambition of ‘changing how we work’ is more likely to materialize in one way or another.

This article focuses on the information requirements of public and private stakeholders engaged in critical infrastructure protection (CIP).With its emphasis on information management rather than information sharing, the article builds on existing research suggesting that the notion of information sharing inadvertently renders cooperation more difficult as it evokes impressions of information “dominance” rather than joint information ownership. The article proposes a joint public-private information management agenda based on core issues providing actionable information to tackle immediate threats and crosscutting issues looking at the long-term issues that are relevant to understand the overall context in which critical infrastructure development occurs.

This article engages with two themes of contemporary EU governance: the role of evaluations within an effective and coherent policy–making process and the EU's constitutionalised commitment to promoting gender equality in all its activities (Article 8 TFEU). It focuses on the interface between ex ante and ex post evaluation and the contribution of evaluations to policy learning, with particular attention to the promotion of gender equality. A case study approach is followed, with EU research policy as the object of analysis.

The environmental consequences of the increasing global seafood production and consumption are substantial and drive a search for providing more adequate governance responses. In recent years, market-based approaches to sustainable seafood governance have gained considerable traction. Born in part out of perceived failures of state-based regulations, a range of civil society-led governance approaches have emerged. Private seafood governance arrangements interact with public seafood regulations and this may lead to competition, collaboration or hybridity. This interaction should however not be assessed in general but more closely related to the different stages in the regulatory cycle: agenda setting/negotiation, implementation and monitoring/enforcement. Collaboration between public and private global seafood governance arrangements occurs primarily in the first phase of the regulatory cycle but gets much less prominent in later phases where competition or even separation prevails. Harmonization between public and private sustainable seafood governance arrangements in the near future is therefore unlikely.

At first sight, the new “better regulation package” probably appears as one of the most ambitious and comprehensive set of measures on the quality of EU regulation developed in recent years. It introduces relevant innovations as far as both better regulation tools(impact assessment-IA, ex post evaluation, consultation) and governance (the Regulatory Scrutiny Board-RSB, the REFIT Platform and the proposal on the new Inter-institutional agreement on Better Lawmaking-IIA)are concerned. Moreover, the package is a clear demonstration of the Commission's political commitment towards the relaunch of the smart regulation agenda, already proved by its inclusion within the scope of the mandate of the First Vice President, Mr. Timmermans.

Nonetheless, ambition and wideness are not the only relevant criteria to judge the package. It could indeed be assessed also from a different perspective, i.e. by analysing the possible effects it could produce and the incentives it could provide for some key players: EU institutions, Member States (MS) and stakeholders.

This contribution seeks to overcome the isolation of evaluation studies fromthe broader field of public policy analysis. Using as a case study the hybrid regulatory tool of cross compliance under the Common Agricultural Policy, the article charts the ongoing incorporation of ex ante and ex post evaluation processes over a ten year period, during which three major legislative reforms were undertaken. Anchoring its approach in the public policy work of Kingdon, the article emphasises the significance of the plurality of actors involved in the evaluation processes, the importance of timing, as well as the challenge to models of policy processes based on assumptions of rational linearity. In particular, the article demonstrates how the dis–ordering which may be observed in the stages of the policy process may equally be seen in the stages of policy appraisal. A particular focus is placed on the way in which objectives and indicators are defined and re–defined over time. The case study demonstrates that through policy appraisal, policy makers may learn what is, and what is not capable of being measured, which feeds back into the re–setting of objectives.

Most European countries’ constitutional obligations guarantee and protect public security and fundamental rights. One aspect and often a prerequisite for the protection of public security and individual rights is the protection of critical infrastructure (CIP). CIP is of great importance in Switzerland, which is inevitable in an economically and technologically sophisticated and densely populated country.

Private liability can potentially play a crucial role in protecting critical infrastructure. Traditional liability rules will especially play their deterrent and therefore preventive effect in the case of so-called man-made “technological” disasters. By using a strict liability role and by providing solvency guarantees potential tort-feasors can be provided with incentives to take optimal preventivemeasures.However, the case of nuclear accidents, addressed inmore detail, makes clear that in practice those efficient liability rules that would be needed to generate this preventive effect are often not implemented at the legislative level. The legislator rather imposes financial limits on liability and provides for public funding, thus effectively granting a subsidy to operators. Those type of inefficient rules laid down in international conventions are obviously often the result of interest group politics.

As far as natural disasters are concerned liability rules can play less of a role given the fact that those are considered an “act of God”. One could then only consider public authority liability.However, this is not often accepted in practice and there may also be theoretical reasons to be careful with the imposition of public authority liability. Public authorities are multitask agents which need a substantial amount of discretion. That explains that many legal systems award (partial) immunity from liability to public authorities. This leads generally to the conclusion that although liability rules can play a role in the protection of critical infrastructure those rules may have important limits as well. As a result the primary instrument to protect critical infrastructure will in practice often be safety regulation rather than liability rules.

Due to the astounding revolution sparked off by genetic engineering, the artificial modification of the genome through targeted alterations of DNA and RNA is now competing with the traditional phenotype use of living organisms (selective plant and animal breeding, consumption, manufacturing of products, energy production, etc.). Although until recently these were insurmountable obstacles, interspecies barriers to reproduction are fading away, and it is now possible to transfer genes from one species to the genome of another. In short, the artificial genetic engineering is replacing selective breeding. Furthermore, a new age is dawning – that of synthetic biology – in which man will no longer content himself with modifying existing organisms but, thanks to the radical modification of the genome, will be able to create new cells and new organisms.

On the face of it, ‘better regulation’ sounds like a concept that no one could object to. But in contrast to past attempts to cut red tape for business and thus reduce unnecessary bureaucracy, the objective of the Juncker Commission's Better Regulation Agenda is to reduce “regulatory burden”.

The package, adopted on May 9th 2015, foresees the establishment of an impressive apparatus and toolbox for implementing the Agenda. Existing structures and procedures, such as the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and the Impact Assessment Guidelines, are being modified, and new elements such as the two REFIT Platforms, one for stakeholders and one for Member States, and the new Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making, will be introduced.

The Agenda raises many questions and concerns From the perspective of a public interest organisation such as The European Consumer Organisation (BEUC). Several aspects of this new institutional and procedural architecture suggest that it is not designed to provide society–wide benefits by generating better regulation for all. Rhetoric about the need to reduce costs is the dominant theme throughout the entire package, framed by the ‘jobs and growth’ narrative.

The year 2013 has witnessed a new entry in the EU “better regulation” toolbox: the Cumulated Cost Assessment (CCA). The CCA is set to answer an apparently simple question: what is the cumulative cost imposed by a selection of EU rules and policies on a given economic sector? In this contribution we present the CCA methodology and its building blocks, as well as the results of the first two empirical applications of this tool. More importantly, we elaborate on two key features that make the CCA a valuable addition to the better regulation toolbox: it creates a methodological bridge between the policy and competitiveness assessment instruments, and it clarifies empirically how a wide array of policies interact with one another when and after they are actually implemented, an element that is often a weak link in policy–appraisal. We conclude with some remarks on how the CCA opens the avenue for a set of challenging and interesting methodological and policy considerations.

The recently enacted Directive 2015/412 is a long waited piece of legislation. This legislation introduces a new provision in Directive 2001/18, Art. 26 b, which gives Member States the regulatory freedom to decide whether genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”) should be cultivated or not in their territory. One month after the publication of this act in the Official Journal of the EU, the Commission issued a Communication in which it illustrates further legislative changes to the legislation on genetically modified food and feed (“GM food and feed”). On the same day, the Commission has tabled a proposal for a Regulation, amending Regulation 1829/2003 (the “proposed reform of GM food and feed”) that envisages the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the use of GM food and feed on their territory. The proposed act is described as a complement to Directive 2015/412 and is inspired by the same principles.

The Commission's new Better Regulation package represents a step forward in the European Union’s decade–long journey to bringing coherence and rationality to its legislative and regulatory process. But as the Communication on the package itself suggests, the journey is far from over.

The Communication consistently emphasizes the key aspects of good regulation: quality over quantity; taking time to get proposals right; evidence–based decision making; open and continuous consultation to gather evidence from all stakeholders; rigorous impact assessments and cost–benefit analysis; applying these tools to regulatory measures as well as legislation; and implementing a robust ex–post evaluation program. It is important as well that the Secretariat General published unified and detailed guidance for Commission officials on how each step of the regulatory process should work, with a “tool–box” to elaborate further on these steps.

All of this is good. Yet in some areas, the Commission misses opportunities to go farther down the good governance road, and in others the guidance needs to be made much more explicit.

Critical Infrastructure (CI) provision is characterized by privatization of CI providers, transnational risks and a changing role of the state. We describe two paradigmatic systems of state liability with a view to CI liability, namely Germany as a fault system and Switzerland as a strict liability system. Both are unsatisfactory and not well adapted to the modern realities and exigencies of allocation of risks and liability in CI and show flaws from a functional, incentive-based perspective. Therefore, we make suggestions how those systems may be ameliorated, suggesting organizational, design and supervisory liability reforms.

In the last twenty years, the European Court of Auditors has placed increasing importance on the production of “special reports” examining the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of EU spending (the three “E”s). This institutional focus on performance audit, alongside traditional financial and compliance audit, has occurred at a time when the European Union is increasingly evaluating its own policies and programmes, under political pressure to demonstrate their added value. With performance audit, the EU's external auditors make value judgements on what was achieved through the EU budget, arguably bringing a greater political dimension to the Court as it works to deliver conclusions and recommendations meant to assist the legislature (European Parliament) in carrying out its scrutiny role and the executive (European Commission) in shaping better future policy. This raises questions about how financial accountability is interpreted, and whether it depends on the quality of audit reports or on the forums to which they are delivered, and subsequently, how they act upon them. This article analyses the factors that explain the increased use of special reports by the Court, questioning if they resemble evaluation studies. It examines their focus and impact, as well as the institutional challenges implicit in performance audit.

In May of 2015, the European Commission released a package outlining the vision for its Better Regulation initiative, a program aimed at improving outcomes of European Union (EU) regulation. The move represents a step forward for regulatory reform in the EU, and signals a potential shift in world leadership roles among countries promoting evidence-based policy. The United States (US), once at the forefront of regulatory science and analysis, may now be lagging behind. If Better Regulation is implemented as its ambitious designers envision, this could signal a new role for the EU in advancing 21st century policymaking.

Better Regulation seeks to improve the EU regulatory process in several ways. The initiative allows for more meaningful citizen and stakeholder participation at all stages of the policymaking process; it seeks to institutionalize the use of economic analysis throughout the lifecycle of a policy; and it sets up a process for reviewing the existing stock of regulations to ensure old rules do not become excessively burdensome or obsolete. All this is done in a manner intended to inform legislators as they periodically review funding levels for new and existing programs.

This article is a critical reflection on the manifoldness of the notion of “partnership” in Critical Infrastructure Protection. It is argued that the partnership arrangement can be a promising political approach to CIP if the details of public-private cooperation – that is: the participants, the duration, the responsibilities and duties, as well as possible financial compensation – are formalized. Illusionary ideas of a “partner-like” relationship between the public and the private, such as those laid down in the German “National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection”, are, however, doomed to fail. State authorities have to actively offer binding regulatory arrangements to private CI firms in order to establish which companies genuinely agree to cooperate – and which do not. Due to the state's constitutional obligation to guarantee national security and protect the life and health of its citizens, introducing legal requirements is the only possible reaction to a company's refusal to cooperate. In order to avoid overly intrusive market intervention, the state's offer to private firms or their industry associations to conclude binding regulatory contracts on CIP matters may serve as a promising compromise between a laissez-faire approach and regulation.

The infringement process contained in Article 258 TFEU requires the Commission, as guardian of the treaties, to monitor the performance of member states in relation to the implementation and application of EU norms. As the Commission carries out this duty it amasses enormous amounts of data on the realisation of policy objectives through its discovery of (non) implementation of EU norms and the administrative operation of its ‘compliance promoting tools’. This article explores the Commission's duty as guardian of the treaties through the lens of smart regulation and examines the potential for infringement data, and the infringement process more widely, to play a contributory role in executing meaningful evaluation in the policy cycle. The article will explore the extent to which the Commission has included infringement data as part of its policy cycle and in particular the evaluation process. It considers the multiple dimensions of accountability and institutional learning associated with evaluations and how these might be supported by the infringement mechanism. It argues that the infringement process and evaluations can be considered symbiotic with each process contributing to the accountability and institutional learning of the other.

On 22 April 2015 the European Commission published a review of the current GMO legislation (the GM Review) and tabled a proposal for its amendment (the GM Proposal). The GM Proposal aims to allow to the member states to ban on their territory the use of GMOs authorised under the EU legislation. This is very similar to the possibility for opting out from cultivation of authorised GMOs which was finally adopted earlier this year. While this may look like a new trend, all the more interesting in the context of possible Brexit, Grexit and Danish opt-out from the provisions on Justice and Home Affairs, the present article will focus only on the GM Review, which essentially admits that the existing GMO regime is a failure.