The Sino-Indian conversations that followed the border clashes of late 1959 were undertaken partly for the purpose of examining in detail the historical evidence with which both sides supported their border claims. It is always difficult, however, to use historical evidence to bolster claims to areas which have for centuries been removed from the main stream of human existence. The Aksai Chin, in the extreme north-east of Ladakh, upon which much of the negotiations centred, is such a region; a bleak uninhabited highland which in the past was visited only by the inhabitants of adjacent territories in quest of salt and by occasional hunters. In 1717, however, the Aksai Chin was traversed by the Tsungar invaders of Tibet and 233 years later it was used for the same purpose by the Chinese. The success of this second venture led to the construction of a major road link between Sinkiang and Tibet, the existence of which precipitated the hostilities of 1959 and the discussions of 1960.

Since the founding of The People's Republic of China, research on the world economy has been developed on an unprecedented scale, although not without setbacks. The Cultural Revolution and the activities of the “ gang of four ” seriously affected such research and virtually brought it to a halt for 10 years. However, the removal of the “ gang of four ” has meant that work on the world economy has revived and reached a completely new stage of development.

The following consists of brief notes culled from information obtained on a visit to Liaoning (Shenyang, Anshan and Dalien), Peking and Canton during May and June 1973.

Strictly speaking, recognition is a formal legal act. It involves interchangeable commitments to undertake certain mutual obligations according to international law and custom. In a broader sense, it is a formal declaration of intention to carry on relations with other states in the society of nations.

During the period of the Readjustment China has faced numerous and difficult problems in the sphere of energy. The two greatest difficulties now confronting the Chinese are energy supply and energy transport. Even if we put aside for a moment the long-range aspects of these problems, the immediate issues are complex. At present energy investment is directed towards securing the supply in the long run, but while this is occurring shortages remain acute, and conservation and increased efficiency of utilization are critical.

Some 150 Germans in all served as advisers to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) in the decade between the Guomindang's Northern Expedition against the warlords (1927–28) and the end of the first year of Japan's full-scale invasion. Their importance to a government struggling to survive and modernize in the face of Japanese aggression and the threat of rural-based communism is recognized, and several studies describe the diplomacy and work of the unofficial mission at Nanking. But it is difficult in military as in civil reform to uncover how policies worked in practice. Chinese plans and pronouncements tended to gloss over contemporary realities, of which the most intractable were the persisting habits of warlordism within ex-warlord and even nominally Central armies. A cross-check of German, American, and British assessments with evidence from the Chinese side can indicate how genuine were the reform efforts, how influential the German officers, how intrusive warlord-style habits, and how impressive the results. I shall focus here on the neglected topics of German-directed officer education and troop training, and the much misunderstood German role in Chiang Kai-shek's strategy.

One of the institutional innovations in China's reform and open-door era is the establishment of economic and technological development zones, export processing zones, science and technology parks, and other “zones” or “parks” at geographically diverse regions. This book represents an effort to investigate some of the science and technology industrial parks (STIPs). For the geographer Walcott, such parks are oriented to multinational development, multinational learning, and local innovation learning, based on “the type of activity contained and the type of company profiled” (p. 13). In particular, she shows that multinational corporations (MNCs) have become the growth engines for China's leapfrog into the 21st century with their contributions to China's exports, high tech as well as low tech, and the creation of new jobs. Therefore, in cities like Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Suzhou, MNCs have mainly processed and assembled products using foreign-imported critical parts plus locally-made components with the help of cheap labor and easy access to major ports such as Hong Kong and Shanghai. On the other hand, in Shanghai, the best example of a multinational learning zone capable of providing a wide range of skills, goods and services, MNCs are engaged in manufacturing activities in proximity to Chinese firms, research and development entities, both within and outside designated STIPs. Finally, Beijing, Shenzhen (again), and Xi'an, according to Walcott, have represented another model where the proximity of domestic firms to institutions of learning has facilitated knowledge transfer.