In the case of Anns v. Merton London Borough Council,1 Lord Wilberforce, in considering the negligence liability of a local authority arising out of the exercise of its statutory powers to inspect buildings under construction, drew a distinction between the “policy” and “operational” aspects of the authority's functions and suggested that liability would more readily arise in respect of the latter. Since that time it has become common to consider the liability of public authorities generally in the tort of negligence by reference to this “policy/operational” dichotomy.

It has been suggested in this article that every shareholder does have a right to have all the provisions of the company contract enforced, but that this right is not an absolute one, and cannot be considered in isolation. For a more complete appreciation of the picture this right must be viewed in a context where the company contract constitutes the framework of a long-term relationship between the contracting parties. Thus we need to take into account the equally valid rights of the other shareholders to enforce conflicting provisions of this contract, to change those provisions, and to condone or regularise breaches of those provisions relating, inter alia, to the rules of internal procedure. We need also to consider the machinery provided by company law for the resolution of disputes concerning these conflicting rights, machinery which includes reference of the dispute to the decision of the majority, where it is appropriate to do so. Finally, it must be borne in mind that one of the aims of providing such machinery is the preservation of the long-term relationship between the participants in the company. It is only be considering such factors as these that the relative, rather than absolute, nature of any one shareholder's right to enforce the company contract can be truly understood.

Explicit rights and freedoms such as those of thought, assembly, life, liberty and security of person occur in constitutional charters because they are activities and states which are necessary for any successful action. It is through the protection of its necessary conditions that freedom of action is itself protected. Moreover, without the inference that freedom of action is the basic value being protected we cannot justify the above rights and freedoms. If we accept this hypothesis about the justificatory structure of constitutions it provides us with a test of the completeness of the list of explicit rights and freedoms. We argue that no charter could justifiably include the usual explicit rights and freedoms and not include the right of the individual to property since the latter is no less a condition of free action than are the former.

Two “landmark” decisions on the recovery of damages for negligently caused nervous shock have now been delivered in two years by the highest courts in Britain and Australia—McLoughlin v. O'Brian by the House of Lords in 1983 and Jaensch v. Coffey by the High Court of Australia in 1984. Despite these decisions, it is difficult to say that the principles of law to be applied in such a case can be stated with absolute clarity and one tends rather to sympathise with the view of Comyn J. in Whitmore v. Euroways Express Coaches Ltd. that “no absolutely clear picture emerges and many of the judgments speak with different voices.” Nevertheless, certain principles in this area are clear and others are becoming clearer, and a statement of these principles now might be of assistance in allowing an absolutely clear picture to emerge.

In Majewski the House of Lords handed down a decision which was intended to determine, authoritatively, the position of the defendant who pleads not guilty to a criminal offence on the basis that he was so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing. Their Lordships unanimously accepted the existence of a rule of law to the effect that in crimes of “basic intent,” such as the assaults with which Majewski was charged, intoxication, where it was self-induced, could provide no defence; only where the crime involved required a “specific intent” could self-induced intoxication ground a plea of not guilty based on a lack of the necessary mens rea.

The Decision of the House of Lords in Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority raises fundamental questions concerning the nature of the legal relationship between parents and children and the role of the State in regulating decision-making within the family. Public attention has been focused on the issue of the provision of contraceptives to girls under the age of sixteen years, yet the decision has implications which go well beyond this specific matter. First, the decision invites a re-examination of the approach of English law to the concept of parental rights. Secondly, Lord Scarman's reference to “the child's right to make his own decisions” suggests that it may not be long before a coherent concept of children's rights is incorporated into the law. This would constitute a significant development since although the welfare of children is considered paramount in legal disputes concerning their custody or upbringing, references to the “rights” of children either in statute or case law are comparatively rare. On the occasions when the judiciary recognise that children have rights it is considered a matter of some note.

A decade ago the conflict between George Ward, proprietor of Grunwick Processing, and the Association of Professional, Executive Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX) provided a platform for an extended debate about the role of the law in industrial relations, the right of employers to refuse to recognise trade unions for collective bargaining purposes and, in particular, the efficacy of legislation as a means of promoting such recognition. In 1986 the decision to move the printing of various newspapers within the News International Group (the chairman of which is Mr. Rupert Murdoch) from Fleet Street to a new purpose-built printing plant at Wapping in London's docklands occasioned another set-piece battle between labour and a strong-minded employer. The issues and the climate of industrial relations in which the dispute took place are very different but, like Grunwick, the Wapping dispute provides rich material for all interested in how the law can be used as part of the strategy of industrial conflict.

The recent patriation of the Canadian Constitution has been a fascinating process for constitutional lawyers. The role of the Canadian Supreme Court, in adjudicating on the legality and the constitutional propriety of the proceedings, has raised issues of great interest and importance. In accepting jurisdiction to pronounce on the existence of convention, the court removed a traditional barrier between law and convention: the former being applied and articulated in the courts, the latter being a matter of political practice, without authoritative definition. The majority judgments nevertheless place great weight on the orthodox distinction between law and convention, and the separation of legal and political principle which that distinction assumes. My purpose here is to question the court's reasoning as regards both law and convention. I shall argue that recent developments in public law cast doubt, even if only indirectly, on the utility of the orthodox distinction. The view that courts do not “enforce” conventions, though adequate for some purposes, may frustrate constructive thought. In any particular case in which convention is pleaded in aid of law, there are more useful and important questions to ask.