The question of legal optimism presupposes the development of a normative stance regarding the law’s evolution. Only with a sense of where the law should be going can one be optimistic—or pessimistic for that matter—regarding its development. Thus, the possibility of legal optimism depends on disclosing the normative stance toward the law’s evolution suggested by the law’s moral creativity. What we need is a legal theory for civil society analogous to our legal theory of the market.

In her recent article, “The One Necessary Condition for a Business Ethics Course: The Teacher Must be a Philosopher,” Ellen Klein argues that philosophers are best qualified to teach business ethics by virtue of their expertise in ethical theory. Klein likens her claim to that of Plato’s “philosopher-king,” who claimed that the philosopher is best suited to be “king,” because he possesses a theoretical understanding of justice. In response to Klein, I point to Aristotle’s objection to Plato, which shows that theoretical knowledge of ethics is not sufficient for making a person ethical, because ethics requires both theoretical and practical knowledge. Ultimately, I argue that in order to have a successful business ethics class, one must address both the issues unique to ethical theory, and the particular structures and contexts that are unique to making an ethical decision within the business environment.

This essay responds to Hasnas’s recent article “The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed” in Business Ethics Quarterly. Hasnas claims that the stockholder theory is more plausible than commonly supposed and that the stakeholder theory is prone to significant difficulties. I argue that Hasnas’s reasons for favoring the stockholder over the stakeholder theory are not as strong as he suggests. Following Hasnas, I examine both theories in light of two sets of normative considerations: utilitarian and deontological. First, I show that utilitarian considerations clearly favor the stakeholder theory. I then argue that though Hasnas rightly accents the basic deontological constraint at the core of the stockholder theory, he is wrong to think that acknowledging such a constraint necessarily counts against the stakeholder theory. Here, I develop Ross’s notion of prima facie obligations to show how a viable stakeholder theory might be developed within a deontological framework.