This is not about the symbolic manipulation of functions so popular these days. Rather it is about the more abstract, but infinitely less practical, problem of the primitive. Simply stated:

Given a derivative f: ℝ → ℝ, how can we recover its primitive?

The roots of this problem go back to the beginnings of calculus and it is even sometimes called “Newton's problem”. Historically, it has played a major role in the development of the theory of the integral. For example, it was Lebesgue's primary motivation behind his theory of measure and integration. Indeed, the Lebesgue integral solves the primitive problem for the important special case when f(x) is bounded. Yet, as Lebesgue noted with apparent regret, there are very simple derivatives (e.g., the derivative of F(0) = 0, F(x)= x2 sin(1/x2)for x ≠ 0) which cannot be inverted using his integral.

The general problem of the primitive was finally solved in 1912 by A. Denjoy. But his integration process was more complicated than that of Lebesgue. Denjoy's basic idea was to first calculate the definite integral f(x) dx over as many intervals (a,b) as possible, using Lebesgue integration. Then, he showed that by using these results, the definite integral could be found over even more intervals, either by using the standard improper integral technique of Cauchy, or an extension technique developed by Lebesgue (see appendix for details).

Two thoughts about the concept of number are incompatible: that any zero or more things have a (cardinal) number, and that any zero or more things have a number (if and) only if they are the members of some one set. It is Russell's paradox that shows the thoughts incompatible: the sets that are not members of themselves cannot be the members of any one set. The thought that any (zero or more) things have a number is Frege's; the thought that things have a number only if they are the members of a set may be Cantor's and is in any case a commonplace of the usual contemporary presentations of the set theory that originated with Cantor and has become ZFC.

In recent years a number of authors have examined Frege's accounts of arithmetic with a view to extracting an interesting subtheory from Frege's formal system, whose inconsistency, as is well known, was demonstrated by Russell. These accounts are contained in Frege's formal treatise Grundgesetze der Arithmetik and his earlier exoteric book Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. We may describe the two central results of the recent re-evaluation of his work in the following way: Let Frege arithmetic be the result of adjoining to full axiomatic second-order logic a suitable formalization of the statement that the Fs and the Gs have the same number if and only if the F sand the Gs are equinumerous.

The degrees of unsolvability were introduced in the ground-breaking papers of Post [20] and Kleene and Post [7] as an attempt to measure the information content of sets of natural numbers. Kleene and Post were interested in the relative complexity of decision problems arising naturally in mathematics; in particular, they wished to know when a solution to one decision problem contained the information necessary to solve a second decision problem. As decision problems can be coded by sets of natural numbers, this question is equivalent to: Given a computer with access to an oracle which will answer membership questions about a set A, can a program (allowing questions to the oracle) be written which will correctly compute the answers to all membership questions about a set B? If the answer is yes, then we say that B is Turing reducible to A and write B ≤TA. We say that B ≡TA if B ≤TA and A ≤TB. ≡T is an equivalence relation, and ≤T induces a partial ordering on the corresponding equivalence classes; the poset obtained in this way is called the degrees of unsolvability, and elements of this poset are called degrees.

Post was particularly interested in computability from sets which are partially generated by a computer, namely, those for which the elements of the set can be enumerated by a computer.

It was questions about points on the real line that initiated the study of set theory. Points paved the way to point sets and these to ever more abstract sets. And there was more: Reflection on structural properties of point sets not only initiated the study of ordinary sets; it also supplied blueprints for defining extra-ordinary, “large” sets, transcending those provided by standard set theory. In return, the existence of such large sets turned out critical to settling open conjectures about point sets.

How to explain such action at a distance between the very large and the rather small? Rather than having an air of magic, could these results rest on deep structural similarities between the two superficially distant species of sets?

In this essay I dissect one group of such two-way results. Their linchpin is the notion of measure.

§1. Vitali's impossibility result. Our starting point is a problem in measure theory regarding the notion of “Lebesgue measure.” Before presenting the problem, I would like to review the notion of Lebesgue measure. Rather than listing its main properties, I would like to show how Lebesgue measure is born out of an attempt to generalize the notion of the length of an interval to arbitrary sets of reals. One tries to approximate arbitrary sets of reals by intervals, in the hope that the lengths of the intervals will induce a measure on these sets.

Dedicated to Dana Scott on his sixtieth birthday.

It is common knowledge that for a short while Hermann Weyl joined Brouwer in his pursuit of a revision of mathematics according to intuitionistic principles. There is, however, little in the literature that sheds light on Weyl's role and in particular on Brouwer's reaction to Weyl's allegiance to the cause of intuitionism. This short episode certainly raises a number of questions: what made Weyl give up his own program, spelled out in “Das Kontinuum”, how did Weyl come to be so well-informed about Brouwer's new intuitionism, in what respect did Weyl's intuitionism differ from Brouwer's intuitionism, what did Brouwer think of Weyl's views,…? To some of these questions at least partial answers can be put forward on the basis of some of the available correspondence and notes. The present paper will concentrate mostly on the historical issues of the intuitionistic episode in Weyl's career.

Weyl entered the foundational controversy with a bang in 1920 with his sensational paper “On the new foundational crisis in mathematics”. He had already made a name for himself in the foundations of mathematics in 1918 with his monograph “The Continuum” [18]; this contained in addition to a technical logical-mathematical construction of the continuum, a fairly extensive discussion of the shortcomings of the traditional construction of the continuum on the basis of arbitrary—and hence also impredicative—Dedekind cuts.