Criminal violence differs from other conflicts because illegal cartels primarily use violence to eliminate rivals rather than overthrow the state. However, politicians’ ability to influence cartel behavior remains unclear. This article argues that politicians alter the use of violence by setting their jurisdiction’s police enforcement levels, but that cartels can bribe politicians to look the other way. Because cartels are uncertain about politicians’ corruptibility, not every bribe is successful. Following an election, cartels must invest resources into learning politicians’ level of corruption. Cartels only increase their level of violence after successfully bribing political leaders, which implies that local violence levels should increase the longer parties remain in office. The study formalizes this argument and tests its implications using data on homicides and political tenure from Mexico. The results link incumbency to violence and suggest Mexico experiences an additional 948 homicides for each year of increased political tenure after holding an election.

Theorists have identified a wide range of reasons why individual and collective actors have a moral responsibility to help alleviate global poverty. There is now widespread agreement that several of these reasons are valid. From the perspective of the poverty opponent, it might seem that the more reasons there are to alleviate poverty, the better. The difficulty is that different reasons for alleviating poverty point to different poverty-alleviating activities. This situation generates questions about both how actors should set priorities among different poverty-alleviating activities (‘actor-centred’ questions) and who should have primary responsibility for alleviating particular cases of poverty (‘case-centred’ questions). This article explains why actor-centred and case-centred questions are worth asking and sketches a promising way of responding to them.

Uniquely among leading generalist journals in political science, the BJPolS is independent of any professional association. Although organizational sponsorship confers great advantages, the BJPolS has thrived during its first forty years because able editors exploited their independence to adopt policies that were less feasible for official journals subject to membership pressures – a distinctive focus on contemporary theory, receptivity to overseas contributors, flexibility about longer articles and dual submissions, and active editorial discretion. These practices should continue to serve the journal well despite challenges posed by technological change. In responding to specialized competitors, the BJPolS should maintain its aspiration to publish papers that address ‘problems of general significance to students of politics’ by connecting analytical models to empirical evidence and enduring normative goals.

I want to clarify the scientific status of contemporary political science. To do this, it is necessary to go into the question of what science means. I take it for granted that the samiliar charcterization of science as explanation is cssentially correct. But what does explanation mean?

Do novelists have something to say about politics? By raising the question in such a starkly rhetorical way it is tempting to respond, ‘Yes, of course, novelists (at least some of them) do have something to say on a wide variety of subjects which traditionally fall under the rubric of political thought’. One could quickly give examples: Tolstoy's devastating critique of military leadership in War and Peace, George Orwell's penetrating analysis of the reality of totalitarianism in 1984 and Jean Paul Sartre's portrait of a whole society in a state of imminent collapse in Le Sursis. With a little time for reflection it would surely not be difficult to expand this list to several hundred titles. But if the novelist is credited with having political thoughts or ideas it is rather odd to find so little systematic analysis and interpretation of those ideas by political scientists.² Why is this the case? For some political scientists perhaps the reason lies in their explicit acceptance of models of explanation which approximate those of the physical sciences. They wish to constrict their range of inquiry into politics in the interest of developing better models for explaining and predicting political phenomena. There is no need to quarrel with this perfectly sound approach, except where it leads its proponents into a dogmatic rejection of other modes of inquiry.

From Ebenezer Howard's turn-of-the-century concept of garden cities ‘new towns’ have evolved. The growth of new towns is not a fad. The first British new town, founded by Howard and planned by architects Raymond Unwin and Barry Parker in 1903, was Letchworth. There has been a steady increase in the establishment of new towns in several countries since, and proposals for many more in the future. In Britain, twenty-nine towns were designated between November 1946 and July 1973. The final projected populations of the New Towns range from 13,000 in Mid-Wales to 420,000 in Central Lancashire New Town. Most have final projected populations in the 60,000–120,000 range. In the United States, the National Commission on Urban Growth, composed of U.S. Senators, Representatives, Governors, Mayors and County Commissioners, proposed that at least 110 new American cities be developed, with the aid of federal funding. And at a recent meeting of the International Association of Housing Science representatives of the Association's forty member countries were told that worldwide housing demands in the next thirty years will require the creation of 3,500 new cities.

Alienation, if sufficiently pervasive and profound, poses obvious dangers to a democratic political order. But obvious dangers are not the only dangers. Indeed, allegiance may pose at least as serious a threat to democratic politics as alienation, as I shall attempt to show in this paper.

Critics of the American House of Representatives frequently cite, in one form or another, a national model of representation as a basis for criticizing both the House and the behaviour of some of its individual members. One of the more familiar criticisms, for example, is that members of the House are so motivated by local or regional concerns and interests that representation in some meaningful national form is rendered almost impossible. So widely is this characterization shared that it is hardly ever asked whether or not members of the House behave in ways that would be consistent and meaningful in terms of a national model of representation.

The introduction of a ‘one-party participatory democracy’ in Zambia in 1973 under the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of President Kenneth Kaunda made significant changes in the nature and extent of political participation, regime structure and public policy in that country. Among a number of constitutional changes, the proscription of the opposition parties – African National Congress (ANC) and United Progressive Party (UPP) – was probably the most important. There is a relatively extensive literature describing these changes and evaluating their significance. A number of further changes which affected these political variables in varying degrees occurred during the life of the one-party system, which lasted until 1991, but much less has been written about these changes, at least in part because they have been assumed to be insignificant. This Note describes the collection of a systematic events dataset on changes in electoral and political party participation (including changes in policies towards participation and changes in party structures affecting participation), regime structure (including party–government relations, central government structure and central–local government relations), and policies affecting the economy, class structure and culture in Zambia from 1973 through 1985. It then describes the use of expert judges to scale events in the dataset and evaluate their cumulative significance for dimensions of change delineated by the investigator or themselves. Finally, it presents one substantive application of this methodology: specification of the overall directions and extent of change in electoral and party participation under the one-party system. Two contradictory directions of change not so far identified in the literature on the Zambian one-party state are uncovered. It is suggested that changes in the one-party state helped to undermine its support, even among some of those Zambians who initially believed in it.

To review books introducing students to the British political system will not strike everyone as an edifying experience even when, as here, the task includes only some of many available textbooks plus a few supplemental works. Focusing on textbooks, despite their often admirable scholarship, reflects primarily our concern as teachers. My concern comes from almost forty years of teaching British politics in American classrooms. What I look for in a text probably differs from expectations of teachers in Britain. But I may also evaluate such books differently from American colleagues who teach British politics only within a broader and more popular course covering several nations. I am among the modest number of American professors devoting an entire semester to British subject-matter, and I can only try to take into account other teaching experiences when I describe the books at hand.

Mathematical languages and computer algorithms are becoming important modes of analysis for theory evaluation in political science. Typically, the process involves (1) translating the major theoretical relationships into a ‘formal’ language for the logical analysis of internal consistency, or, (2) empirically interpreting the formal language in order to make specific predictions, which, in turn, allow evaluation of external consistency with theoretically significant real world phenomena. In this paper I wish to discuss, first, some basic concepts and, second, some aspects of the technology and methodology of these modes of theory evaluation.

This article analyses the influence of economic conditions upon the behaviour of voters in elections to Australian, Canadian and New Zealand legislatures between the First and Second World Wars. It shows that this influence need be neither uniform nor unconditional: rather, it is contingent upon both political and economic phenomena. The existence of the relationship as well as its form and strength differ systematically in different settings. It varies according to the stratum of the electorate, the point in time and the type of party analysed.

How does an individual's criminal record shape interactions with the state and society? This article presents evidence from a nationwide field experiment in the United States, which shows that prospective applicants with criminal records are about 5 percentage points less likely to receive information from college admission offices. However, this bias does not extend to race: there is no difference in response rates to Black and White applicants. The authors further show that bias is all but absent in public bureaucracies, as discrimination against formerly incarcerated applicants is driven by private schools. Examining why bias is stronger for private colleges, the study demonstrates that the private–public difference persists even after accounting for college selectivity, socio-economic composition and school finances. Moving beyond the measurement of bias, an intervention designed to reduce discrimination is evaluated: whether an email from an advocate mitigates bias associated with a criminal record. No evidence is found that advocate endorsements decrease bureaucratic bias.

Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, a parliamentary democracy or something akin to a monarchy, in which heredity plays a primary role. These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in the fight for control of church doctrine and finances. They also induce different institutional responses. This article explains cases in which screening is highly institutionalized and when a person's age may be an important strategic factor in choosing a leader. It thus explains what otherwise would be very puzzling differences in the age of appointment across religions and within a particular religion, over time. The study also applies the methodology to politics more generally by looking at elections in Venice and Genoa in the eighteenth century and the appointment of leaders in present-day China.

Rational voters care about outcomes, while parties campaign on policy proposals, the outcomes of which are never perfectly known. Can parties exploit this uncertainty to shape public opinion? This article presents a spatial preference model for policy proposals with uncertain outcomes. It reports the results of a large pre-registered survey experiment that involved presenting respondents with predictions about the effects of three policy proposals. The findings show that respondents update their attitudes to the proposals as their beliefs about outcomes change, and that parties are no less able to influence beliefs than non-partisan experts. Contrary to previous research, respondents discount outcome uncertainty by giving equal weight to conflicting optimistic and pessimistic predictions. The study shows that parties can shape public opinion by influencing voter beliefs, and that voters are not repelled by the uncertainty inherent in conflicting information.

To what degree are news websites in autocracies resilient to online censorship? I explore this question in Egypt, which has begun to heavily censor news websites in recent years, alongside several other autocracies. Relying on a sample of 145 news outlets, I systematically explore how blocking affects traffic on outlets and their current statuses. Statistical tests show that blocked Egyptian outlets lost on average 54–55 per cent of their global traffic and are more likely to halt their activity. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that the loss in traffic was particularly strong for independent, Islamist opposition and larger outlets, and that permanently blocked websites were substantially more likely to halt services. These results support previous work on state repression and information control showing that censorship often works in reducing the consumption and provision of alternative political information.

The literature on populist attitudes frequently makes one of two assumptions: populist attitudes are either stable or unstable. However, few studies have examined these diverging assumptions empirically. We use panel data collected over six panel waves between 2017 and 2021 in Germany to assess the stability of populist attitudes. Integrating inter-individual stability (variable-centred) and intra-individual stability (individual trajectories), we find that populist attitudes are neither fully stable (trait) nor fully flexible (state). For example, some respondents constantly changed their view on populism while the attitudes in one out of three individuals remained stable. We also explore empirical consequences and find that populist attitudes are more closely linked to vote choice when they are stable. Accordingly, we argue for a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of populist attitudes, both at the variable and individual levels, where these attitudes are stable and consequential for only a subset of individuals.

Extant literature argues that ethnic minority representation in plurality systems will benefit from the presence of sizable co-ethnic populations. I argue that the threshold for election depends not only on a minority population's group size but a district's level of segregation. I show that residential segregation can facilitate the increased representation of ethnic minority populations. Contrary to the prevailing literature, however, I find that increased segregation levels in cities with sizable minority populations decrease the percentage of co-ethnics elected to office. I support this argument with evidence from an original dataset on the local representation outcomes of Muslims in England between 2011 and 2021, which covers 434 district council elections. Using threshold modelling, I introduce the concept of the population threshold, above which increases in segregation level decrease Muslim representation. This article contributes to the electoral geography literature on ethnic minority representation.

This article provides an accessible introduction to the phenomenon of monotone likelihood in duration modeling of political events. Monotone likelihood arises when covariate values are monotonic when ordered according to failure time, causing parameter estimates to diverge toward infinity. Within political science duration model applications, this problem leads to misinterpretation, model misspecification and omitted variable biases, among other issues. Using a combination of mathematical exposition, Monte Carlo simulations and empirical applications, this article illustrates the advantages of Firth's penalized maximum-likelihood estimation in resolving the methodological complications underlying monotone likelihood. The results identify the conditions under which monotone likelihood is most acute and provide guidance for political scientists applying duration modeling techniques in their empirical research.

Sunday, 29 October 1994 was cool, partly cloudy, and almost warm when the sun was out, a pleasant autumn day in Washington. Clusters of sightseers strolled along Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House, others sat across the street in Lafayette Square, some of them paying concessionaires to have themselves photographed beside life-size images of President Bill Clinton and his wife. At approximately 2.55 p.m., a man in a long, bulky, tan trench coat stood next to the wrought-iron fence, gazing intently towards the White House. He had been standing there for nearly an hour when two young boys on a field trip ran to a spot near him, pointing excitedly towards a small group of men in dark suits strolling near the north portico of the White House. ‘That looks like Bill Clinton,’ one of them said. ‘Yeah it does,’ replied the other.

At that moment, the man near the fence, pushed the boys aside, slipped a semiautomatic assault rifle from beneath his coat, extended its folding stock, and began firing at the person he mistakenly believed was President Clinton. Running back and forth along the fence as he fired, the shooter quickly emptied a clip of thirty rounds at his intended victim as bystanders scattered in panic, one of them leaving unattended an infant in a baby carriage. When he stopped to insert another thirty-round clip, a very courageous tourist, Michael Rokosky, tackled him from behind. As they struggled on the sidewalk, two other courageous bystanders joined Rokosky, subduing the attacker before uniformed Secret Service officers arrived. No one had been injured.Another bystander cooly recorded the whole event on videotape. As he was being handcuffed, Francisco Martin Duran spoke for the first time: ‘I wish you had shot me,’ were his only words. Meanwhile, President Clinton was watching a televised football game on the opposite side of the White House, unaware until he was informed moments later by his Secret Service detail of what had happened.The account is drawn from, White House Security Review Public Report: Francisco Martin Duran, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ustreas/usss/t1pubrpt.htm, p. 1. Hereafter cited as White House Security Report Website.