The United Kingdom's economy is relatively highly concentrated and the importance of decisions taken by very large firms for the economy as a whole encourages direct contacts between government and such firms. The scale and importance of such direct contacts has created a need within very large firms for a specialized capability to interpret the external political environment, and to relate that appreciation to the development of the firm's corporate strategy. A number of large firms in the United Kingdom have developed specialized government relations divisions in the last ten years. The titles of such divisions vary, but their most important function is the strategic co-ordination of the firm's relationships with government and other political actors.

The Enlightenment model of social life is a seductive one. It depicts rational (or anyway reasoning) individuals choosing goals and plans and projects for themselves, with those autonomous individuals then coming together, of their own volition, in pursuit of shared interests and common goals. This founding fiction of the modern social world is well captured in the words of one Renaissance writer, who has God saying to Adam:

Access to information about candidates' performance has long stood as a key factor shaping voter behaviour, but establishing how it impacts behaviour in real-world settings has remained challenging. In the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, unpredictable technical glitches caused by the implementation of biometrics as a form of identification led some voters to cast ballots after official tallies started being announced. In addition to providing a source of exogenous variation of information exposure, run-off elections also enable us to distinguish between different mechanisms underlying the impact of information exposure. We find strong support for a vote-switching bandwagon effect: information exposure motivates voters to abandon losing candidates and switch support for the frontrunner – a finding that stands in the second round, when only two candidates compete against each other. These findings provide theoretical nuance and stronger empirical support for the mechanisms underpinning the impact of information exposure on voter behaviour.

Traditional research on political parties pays little attention to the temporal focus of communication. It usually concentrates on promises, issue attention, and policy positions. This lack of scholarly attention is surprising, given that voters respond to nostalgic rhetoric and may even adjust issue positions when policy is framed in nostalgic terms. This article presents a novel dataset, PolNos, which contains six text-based measures of nostalgic rhetoric in 1,648 party manifestos across 24 European democracies from 1946 to 2018. The measures combine dictionaries, word embeddings, sentiment approaches, and supervised machine learning. Our analysis yields a consistent result: nostalgia is most prevalent in manifestos of culturally conservative parties, notably Christian democratic, nationalist, and radical right parties. However, substantial variation remains regarding regional differences and whether nostalgia concerns the economy or culture. We discuss the implications and use of our dataset for studying political parties, party competition, and elections.

When a party or candidate loses the popular vote but still wins the election, do voters view the winner as legitimate? This scenario, known as an electoral inversion, describes the winners of two of the last six presidential elections in the United States. We report results from two experiments testing the effect of inversions on democratic legitimacy in the US context. Our results indicate that inversions significantly decrease the perceived legitimacy of winning candidates. Strikingly, this effect does not vary with the margin by which the winner loses the popular vote, nor by whether the candidate benefiting from the inversion is a co-partisan. The effect is driven by Democrats, who punish inversions regardless of candidate partisanship; few effects are observed among Republicans. These results suggest that the experience of inversions increases sensitivity to such outcomes among supporters of the losing party.

Why are voters in some electoral constituencies able to successfully co-ordinate their balloting decisions on viable party offerings, while those in other constituencies are not? Prior work on voter co-ordination failures has focused on institutional and elite-level explanations. This article demonstrates that characteristics of the voting constituencies themselves – specifically their socio-demographic diversity – can play an important role in shaping voters’ collective ability to co-ordinate around viable party offerings. It synthesizes theories of collective decision making from the field of organizational psychology with theories of institutions as incentive structures to argue that diversity inhibits collective co-ordination in some contexts, but not others. In so doing, the article offers a new causal mechanism that links diversity and district magnitude to party system size. The argument is tested using a cross-national analysis of tens of thousands of voters across lower house elections in twelve countries.

Once upon a time, during the early 1960s, all undergraduate International Relations courses in the United Kingdom were deemed incomplete if they did not contain a number of lectures on the question of the relationship between a country's foreign policy and the shape, size and other attributes of its national political community. The lectures often evolved into a discussion of the relative advantages of possessing a large population, and whether or not this was an element in a state's power (as in the case of the Soviet Union) or of a state's weakness, and hence of its inherent inability to attain a wider range of desirable foreign policy goals (as in the case of India). The debate was usually fairly inconclusive.

Evidence for long-term cycles in the parliamentary seat share of the major British parties is presented in this article. Spectral analysis of data from 1832 to 2005 suggests a cycle period of about twenty-eight years, similar to findings in US studies and to cycle-length estimates restricted to the post-1950 period in Britain. A four-parameter voter–party interaction model developed by Merrill, Grofman and Brunell is adapted and applied to Britain. That model depends on tensions between parties’ policy and office motivations and between voters’ tendency to sustain the governing party while reacting against non-centrist policies. The model operates homeostatically, projects patterns consistent with the empirical record and fits the data better than models based on economic factors or autoregressive predictions.

I am, of course, extremely pleased that my M+1 hypothesis has received so much attention. Under the principle of ‘as long as you spell my name right’, I appreciate every single citation. Nevertheless, I have been surprised at some of the interpretations of my argument. Browne and Patterson offer me an opportunity to clarify my position. Eric C. Browne and Dennis Patterson, ‘An Empirical Theory of Rational Nominating Behaviour Applied to Japanese District Elections’, British Journal of Political Science, 29 (1999), 259–89.

Supporters of liberal neutrality distinguish between ‘weak’ conceptions of autonomy which operate as background features of liberal democratic regimes, and ‘strong’ conceptions, which amount to conceptions of the good. These latter are to be excluded from the political realm on the grounds that in order to protect and promote a conception of the good, in the context of a pluralistic society, the state would have to resort to illiberal methods. The result of this will be the destablization and fragmentation of the regime. In this article I argue two things: first, that autonomy ought to be understood, not as a neutral background assumption of liberal theory, but as a partially comprehensive conception of the good in its own right; secondly, that protecting and promoting autonomy need not lead either to illiberalism or to the destabilization and fragmentation of liberal democratic society.

According to Steven Lukes ‘A exercises power over B when A affects A in a manner contrary to B's interests’. Although he is not willing to contend that this general concept of power is altogether beyond reasonable dispute Lukes argues that it is the specific conceptions of power to which this more general concept gives rise when we fill in what is to count as B's interests that pose the fundamental problem for social and political science. For, although the conceptions are, to some degree, assessable in terms of their descriptive accuracy and explanatory scope, they are also ‘ineradicably evaluative’ and ‘essentially contested’. Three important ‘normatively specific conceptions of interests’, implying three corresponding conceptions of power, particularly concern him:

(1) the liberal conception, which relates men's interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their policy preferences as manifested by their political participation; (2) the reformist conception, which, deploring that not all men's wants are given equal weight within the political system, also relates their interests to what they actually want and prefer, but allows that this may be revealed in the form of deflected, submerged, or concealed wants and preferences; and (3) the radical conception, which maintains that men's wants may themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests and, in such cases, relates the latter to what men would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice.

The critical importance of marginal constituencies and wards in determining national and local election results in England leads to the question ‘What makes a ward marginal? ’ The results of research on 384 electoral contests over ten years in Birmingham shows that the social class composition of a ward primarily determines its marginality or safety. The class composition associated with a high degree of marginality is as follows: for every non-manual worker there are likely to be twice as many foremen and skilled manual workers, and for every non-manual worker there are likely to be between one and a half and twice as many semi and unskilled manual workers. The further a ward departs from these ratios the more likely it is to be safe for the Labour or Conservative Party. The ratios are highly reliable in picking out marginal and safe wards in normal political periods involving only small swings of electoral opinion between the parties. During abnormal periods, such as the landslide against the Labour Party between 1965 and 1969, the ratios shift slightly but are nevertheless a good indicator of marginal propensity.

In their commentary on our paper, Atkinson, Coleman and Lewis, although acknowledging that ‘studies of political support are particularly appropriate in Canada’, are very critical of our effort for two principal reasons. Firstly, they argue that we have presented no compelling evidence that citizens are unable or unwilling to distinguish sharply between regime and the party in power. On the contrary, they note that Shanks and Citrin have concluded that ordinary American citizens routinely distinguish between regime and authorities. Secondly, they claim that rather than measuring regime support, the dependent variable is simply measuring partisan orientations toward the governing Liberal party and its leaders (e.g. ‘evaluation of incumbent authorities’ (p. 403); ‘the party in power and not the regime’ (p. 403); ‘the incumbent Liberal authorities’ (p. 404); and ‘the dependent variable is measuring feelings toward a Liberal party government and not the regime’ (p. 409)).

Following the exchange between Shackleton and Marsh on the work of Olson and its applicability to the case of the Confederation of British Industry, I wish to criticize some of Shackleton's points and develop some of those made by Marsh. I intend to ignore some of Shackleton's criticisms of the methodology Marsh and I employed in our book (for example, our use of semi-structured interviews, a respectable technique in elite interviewing) and instead to concentrate on substantive questions of more general interest.

Until the establishment of regional governments in the early 1970S, Italy was a formally centralized, unitary state. Both the legal and formal administrative frameworks within which local officials worked were such as to support the prevailing scholarly view that, in such a centralized state, the possibilities for local autonomy and initiative were very limited. The formal role of local governments after the Second World War continued to be that which had been specified by the Fascists in legislation designed to complete the centralization of the Italian state. Such a role left little room for local independence and initiative. Administratively, most decisions had to be approved by officials in Rome. Moreover, the policies and finances of local governments were closely supervised by the Prefects, who served as agents of central government.

We are pleased at the opportunity to respond to Professor Cox’s observations on our article ‘An Empirical Theory of Rational Nominating Behaviour Applied to Japanese District Elections’, which appeared in the previous issue of the Journal (pp. 259–89). His comments address several points including the motivation of our article, the way in which we characterize his prior work (with various co-authors) on the subject, and the adequacy of our effort to model the nominating process in Japanese district elections. While these points are not always separable, we shall address each of them.

Costs associated with voting affect an individual's willingness to turn out for an election as well as aggregate rates of voting across political jurisdictions. Barriers to participation also skew the social and economic composition of electorates. In this Research Note, we suggest that the costs of participation affect candidate behaviour as well – the strategic purposes of their appeals to voters and the media they choose to deliver messages. Why? By making the trip to the ballot box more or less difficult, electoral laws select voters with respectively less or more interest in and thus knowledge of politics. Given the systematic variations in how people with different levels of political knowledge learn during a campaign, we anticipate that election laws ultimately influence the communication tools that candidates use.

We propose that the costs of voting have a compositional effect on electorates: as voting becomes increasingly difficult, the average level of political knowledge and interest among voters should decrease. This is not due to a micro-level effect in which registration laws somehow make individual voters smarter or better informed. Institutionally imposed costs simply affect who can and will vote. For a brief example, if one state charged its citizens £50 to vote while another paid its citizens £50 at their polling site, we would expect quite sizeable differences in turnout and composition of the electorate across the two states. The main contribution of this note, however, is our recognition that campaigns adapt to these differences in systematic ways. Real world differences in the cost of voting are not as great as these financial disparities, but the idea is the same: costs borne by individuals will have selection effects that produce different types of electorates and prompt different campaign styles by candidates.

Jonathan Aldred shares our desire to promote a reconciliation between social choice theory and deliberative democracy in the interests of a more comprehensive and compelling account of democracy. His comments on some details of our analysis – specifically, our use of Arrow's conditions of universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives – give us an opportunity to clarify our position. His discussion of the independence condition in particular identifies some ambiguity in our exposition, and as such is useful. We are less impressed by the way Aldred characterizes the overall terms of the reconciliation we propose. We believe that his argument on this matter should be resisted because it provides deliberative democrats with a bad excuse to dismiss social choice theory altogether, which is surely not what he intends.