Bentley et al. bypass the relevance of emotions in decision-making, resulting in a possible over-simplification of behavioral types. We propose integrating emotions, both in the north–south axis (in relation to cognition) as well as in the west–east axis (in relation to social influence), by suggesting a Z-axis, in charge of registering emotional depth and involvement.

Cook et al. laudably call for careful comparative research into the development of mirror neurons. However, they do so within an impoverished evolutionary framework that does not clearly distinguish ultimate and proximate causes and their reciprocal relations. As a result, they overlook evidence for the reliable develop of mirror neurons in biological and cultural traits evolved to work through them.

Hibbing et al.'s article isolates a plausible psychological factor contributing to differences in political orientation. However, there are two potential difficulties. Both the nature of negativity and the liberal–conservative opposition are ambiguous. A possible way of treating these problems enhances the theoretical framework through fuller reference to emotion systems and categories of triggers for those systems.

Domain-general mechanisms are evolutionarily ancient, resulting from the evolution of affective cues signaling the attainment of evolutionary goals. Explicit processing is a particularly important set of domain-general mechanisms for constructing human groups – enabling ideologies specifying future goal states and rationalizing group aims, enabling knowledge of others' reputations essential to cooperation, understanding the rights and obligations of group membership, monitoring group members, and providing appropriate punishments to those who deviate from group aims.

We address two questions regarding the relationship between political ideology and responses to threatening or aversive stimuli. The first concerns the reason for the connection between disgust and specific political and moral attitudes; the second concerns the observation that some responses to threat (i.e., neuroticism/anxiety) are associated with a more left-wing political orientation.

From the viewpoint of pattern recognition and computational learning, mirror neurons form an interesting multimodal representation that links action perception and planning. While it seems unlikely that all details of such representations are specified by the genetic code, robust learning of such complex representations likely requires an appropriate interplay between plasticity, generalization, and anatomical constraints of the underlying neural architecture.

Bentley et al. propose a thought-provoking approach to the question of causal factors underlying human choice behavior. Their map model is interesting, but too simplified to capture the essence of decision making. They disregard, among other matters, qualitative differences between various subcategories of social influences, and the role of neurobiological factors engaged in interdependent individual and social decision-making processes.

Wilson et al. draw our attention to the problem of a science of intentional change. We stress the connection between their approach and existing paradigms for learning and goal generation that have been developed in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and psychology. These paradigms outline the structural principles of a domain-general and teleologically open agent.

Wilson and colleagues are correct that a modern theory of evolution must go beyond reliance on natural selection. Niche-construction theory, although it does not ignore selection, emphasizes the capacity of organisms to modify environmental states, often in a manner that suits their genotypes. Such matches are the dynamic products of a two-way process that involves organisms both responding to “problems” posed by their environments through selection and setting themselves new problems by changing environments through niche construction.

Our past work linking motivation and morality provides a basis for understanding differences in political ideology and positions across the political spectrum. Conservatism is rooted in avoidance-based proscriptive morality, whereas liberalism is rooted in approach-based prescriptive morality. Two distinct, binding, group moralities reflect these different regulatory systems and emphasize social coordination through Social Order versus social cooperation through Social Justice.

The two-dimensional map by Bentley et al. concerns decision-making and not games. The east–west dimension is interpreted as the level at which individuals identify with some larger group. We think that this should be linked to the concept of social ties. We argue that social ties will lead to different outcomes in the “north” compared to the “south.”

The associative account described in the target article provides a viable explanation for the origin of mirror neurons. We argue here that if mirror neurons develop purely by associative learning, then they cannot by themselves explain intentional action understanding. Higher-level processes seem to be involved in the formation of associations as well as in their application during action understanding.

The textual, big-data literature misses Bentley et al.’s message on distributions; it largely examines the first-order effects of how a single, signature distribution can predict population behaviour, neglecting second-order effects involving distributional shifts, either between signature distributions or within a given signature distribution. Indeed, Bentley et al. themselves under-emphasise the potential richness of the latter, within-distribution effects.

A comprehensive review by Hibbing et al. establishes close links between physiological and psychological responses and ideological preferences. However, existing research cannot resolve the “chicken-and-egg problem” in political neuroscience: Which is cause and which is effect? We consider the possibility, which they reject, that general ideological postures, if consistently adopted, could shape psychological and physiological functioning.

Mirror neuron–based associative learning may be understood according to associative learning theories, in addition to sensorimotor learning theories. This is important for a comprehensive understanding of the role of mirror neurons and related hormone modulators, such as oxytocin, in complex social interactions such as among parent–infant dyads and in examples of mirror neuron function that involve abnormal motor systems such as depression.

At the core of Wilson et al.'s paper stands the question of intentional change. We propose to extend this notion by introducing concepts from the domains of innovation and knowledge creation. By going beyond their “acceptance and commitment therapy” approach we present a comprehensive framework for a theory of change culminating in the change strategy of “learning from the future as it emerges.”

The negativity bias in human cognition emerges in infancy and continues throughout childhood. To fully understand the relationship between differences in attention to negative stimuli and variance in political ideologies, it is critical to consider human development and the process by which early individual differences in negativity unfold and are shaped by both genes and environment.

Bentley et al. make the deliberate choice to blur the distinction between learning and decision making. This obscures the social influence mechanisms that operate in the various empirical settings that their map aims to categorize. Useful policy prescriptions, however, require an accurate understanding of the social influence mechanisms that underlie the dynamics of popularity.

Speech is commonly claimed to relate to mirror neurons because of the alluring surface analogy of mirror neurons to the Motor Theory of speech perception, which posits that perception and production draw upon common motor-articulatory representations. We argue that the analogy fails and highlight examples of systems-level developmental approaches that have been more fruitful in revealing perception–production associations.

The goal of forming a science of intentional behavior requires a more richly detailed account of symbolic systems than is assumed by the authors. Cultural systems are not simply the equivalent in the ideational domain of culture of the purported Baldwin Effect in the genetic domain.