Perruchet & Vinter (P&V) ground their arguments in a view they call “the mentalistic tradition.” Here I point out that such a view has already been advocated by two old masters of psychological science, William James and James Gibson, as well as by the philosopher Merleau-Ponty. In fact, in the writings of these older thinkers, arguments very similar to those presented in the target article are found.

In the target article Pylyshyn revives the spectre of the “little green man,” arguing for a largely symbolic representation of visual imagery. To clarify this problem, we provide precise definitions of the key term “picture,” present some examples of our definition, and outline an information-theoretic analysis suggesting that the problem of addressing data in the brain requires a partially analogue and partially symbolic solution. This is made concrete in the ventral stream of object recognition, from V1 to IT cortex.

Carruthers’ notion that natural language(s) might serve as the medium of non-domain-specific, propositionally based inferential thought is extended to the case of effortful retrieval of autobiographical memory among bilinguals. Specifically, the review suggests that the resources of bilingual inner speech might play a role in the cyclical activation of information from various informational domains during memory retrieval.

Shanker & King's (S&K's) proposal is consistent with a Vygotskian model of development which assumes that cognition is first social and visible, and only later internalized and invisible. Rather than slipping into positing “epistemic operators” like understand or intend as generative of behavior during language learning or theory of mind tasks, this approach profits from keeping its focus on charting the ontogeny of embodied interactions.

Pylyshyn provides sound arguments against the dominant picture theory of mental imagery. However, we claim that mental imagery is intrinsically dynamic and that the very nature of mental imagery will not be uncovered by studying static pictures. Understanding mental imagery of motor actions reveals that any theory of mental imagery should start off with the temporal nature of real-life experiences.

Neuropsychological studies on hemineglect and extinction show that “neglected” or “extinguished” stimuli can access a semantic level. However, processing of these stimuli is usually not accomplished at the same level as non-neglected stimuli. These data are compatible with Perruchet & Vinter's hypothesis of the importance of consciousness in the construction of representations and knowledge.

Special design criteria are largely unable to discriminate between claims that specific competencies in judgements under uncertainty are a result of an adaptation for representing naturally sampled frequencies, or due only to inherent properties of such a format. Because divisions between these perspectives are thin, evidence via additional criteria are persuasive only in combination, using inference to the best available explanation.

Empathy is a developmental process whereby individuals come to understand the emotional states of others. While the exact nature of this process remains unknown, PAM's utility is that it establishes empathy along a continuum of behavior ranging from emotional contagion to cognitive forms, a very useful distinction for understanding the phylogeny and ontogeny of this important process. The model will undoubtedly fuel future research, especially from comparative domains where data are most problematic.

This commentary suggests that there are two distinct types of interacting cognitive processes. Conscious processes emerge from unconscious processes. The key problem of SOC is that it uses an overly narrow notion of the “cognitive unconscious” to show that the “cognitive unconscious” is not necessary. Yet, it has little to say about the roles of conscious and unconscious processes in general.

To understand adaptation (and exaptation), a more comprehensive view of development is required: one beyond a constraining force. Developmental plasticity may be an adaptation by natural selection simultaneously favored (or sometimes in conflict) at multiple levels of biological organization (e.g., cells, individuals, groups, etc.). To understand the interrelationships between developmental plasticity and adaptive evolution I borrow heavily from West-Eberhard (2003) and Frank (1995; 1997). Developmental plasticity facilitates evolution, results in particular patterns of evolutionary change, and may produce exaptations by design rather than by chance.

The possible role of language in intermodular communication and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”

The “new” paradigm proposed by Shanker & King (S&K) is neither new nor a significant advance in our understanding of communication. Although we agree that social interaction is important, ignoring the roles of mental processes and the significance of information exchange is theoretically dangerous. Moreover, the “communicative dance” is sequential. If one partner does not lead, how is the other to follow?

The depiction of pictures as specified points in a functional space is achieved by vector encoding. Picture-selective neurons are added to the declarative memory in the process of learning. New neurons are recruited from stem cells through their proliferation and differentiation. Electrical stimulation of the temporo-parietal cortex produces subjective scenes of the past similar to imagery.

The comparative study of empathy should be based on the developmental taxonomy of vicarious experiences offered by the abundant literature on infants and children's cognitive, social, and emotional development. Comparative research on the topic should refer to the various kinds of empathy emerging in an orderly fashion early in human development.

Empathy represents one of the basic forms of human expression. Empathy evolved to facilitate social behavior. The perception action model, extended to empathy, is an exciting paradigm in which to undertake contemporary cognitive and comparative neuroscience. It renders the perception of events as an active affair, both when watching others, and when performing actions.

We argue that the dance metaphor does not appropriately characterize language. Indeed, language may be a red herring, distracting us from the intriguing question of the nature of apes' social interactions.

Carruthers’ “mentalese expressions” take the form of English sentences, thus suggesting an isomorphism between thought and language that ignores linguistic diversity. Furthermore, complex syntax is not the only linguistic means of combining information from various domain-specific modules into domain-general expressions, nor is such syntax the preferred means of encoding basic experiences in all languages. The analysis seems to rest on an unacknowledged version of linguistic determinism.

The imagery debate re-enacts controversies persisting since Descartes. The controversy remains important less for what we can learn about visual imagery than about cognitive science itself. In the tradition of Arnauld, Reid, Bartlett, Austin and Ryle, Pylyshyn's critique exposes notorious mistakes being unwittingly rehearsed not only regarding imagery but also in several independent domains of research in modern cognitive science.

In this commentary I show that the SOC framework implies automaticity of both the materialization of phenomenological conscious experience and the application of the primitives resulting from the emergence of consciousness. In addition, SOC implies that cognition refers to conscious experience. Consequently, I propose automatic/nonautomatic instead of unconscious/conscious as the basic contrast characterizing human cognition.

There are two kinds of useful traits: adaptations, and all the others. Exaptations are just all the others. Exaptations are not for anything. Because there is such diversity in all the others, exaptation is not an explanatory concept. Its only real use is to block adaptationist excesses.