The approach of Hobson et al. is limited to the description of global states of consciousness, although more detailed analyses of the specific contents of consciousness would also be required. Furthermore, their account of the mind-brain relationship remains obscure. Nielsen's discussion suffers from conceptual and definitional unclarity. Mentation during sleep could be clarified by reconceptualizing it as an issue about the contents of consciousness. Vertes & Eastman do not consider the types of memory (emotional) and learning (implicit) that are relevant during REM sleep, and therefore dismiss on inadequate grounds the possibility of memory functions associated with REM sleep.

[Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Vertes & Eastman]

Many studies have demonstrated differential resistance to change in the context of negative behavioral contrast. That is, as a result of introducing a disruptor, response rates decrease to a greater extent when the maintaining reinforcement schedule is leaner. Resistance to change also applies to positive contrast, in that increases in response rate are greater in leaner schedules. The negative contrast effects seen in studies of intrinsically motivated behavior reflect an increase in resistance to change as a result of adding extrinsic reinforcers.

Therapists and their patients must deal with the negative sequelae of short term mating strategies. Implications for therapy of Gangestad & Simpson's strategic pluralism theory are compared with those of Buss's sexual strategies theory and Eagly's social role theory. Naive theories held by therapists and patients, as well as prevailing societal views, are posited as influential in determining the course and outcome of therapy.

The target articles on sleep and dreaming are discussed in terms of the concept of search activity integrating different types of behavior, body resistance, REM sleep/dream functions, and the brain catecholamine system. REM sleep may be functionally sufficient or insufficient, depending on the dream scenario, the latter being more important than the physiological manifestation of REM sleep. REM sleep contributes to memory consolidation in the indirect way.

[Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]

Although we welcome Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group's shift of emphasis from “coherence” to “correspondence” criteria, their rejection of optimality in human decision making is premature: In many situations, experts can achieve near-optimal performance. Moreover, this competence does not require implausible computing power. The models Gigerenzer et al. evaluate fail to account for many of the most robust properties of human decision making, including examples of optimality.

Two important assumptions of behavioral momentum theory are contradicted by existing data. Resistance to change is not due simply to the Pavlovian contingency between a discriminative stimulus and the rate of reinforcement in its presence, because variations in the response-reinforcer contingency, independent of the stimulus-reinforcer contingency, produce differential resistance to change. Resistance to change is also not clearly related to measures of preference, in that several experiments show the two measures to dissociate.

The complexity and mysteriousness of mental processes during sleep rule out thinking only in term of generators. How could we know exactly what mental sleep experience (MSE) is produced and when? To refer to REM versus NREM as separate time windows for MSE seems insufficient. We propose that in each cycle NREM and REM interact to allow mentation to reach a certain degree of complexity and consolidation in memory. Each successive cycle within a sleep episode should contribute to these processes with a different weight according to the time of night and distance from sleep onset. This view would avoid assuming too great a separation between REM and NREM functions and attributing psychological functions only to a single state.

[Nielsen]

The strategic pluralism model depends upon pathogen prevalence and environmental hardship being independent. Evidence is presented that they are positively correlated. The rise in short-term mating strategy in the United States is better explained by changes in the operational sex ratio than by increases in pathogen prevalence. Nonetheless, in highlighting the advantages of a high-investment strategy to less attractive males, Gangestad & Simpson's model helps to clarify the dynamics of frequency-dependent selection.

Simple heuristics that make us smart offers an impressive compilation of work that demonstrates fast and frugal (one-reason) heuristics can be simple, adaptive, and accurate. However, many decision environments differ from those explored in the book. We conducted a Monte Carlo simulation that shows one-reason strategies are accurate in “friendly” environments, but less accurate in “unfriendly” environments characterized by negative cue intercorrelations, that is, tradeoffs.

In reply to the comments on our target article, we address a variety of issues concerning the generality of our major findings, their relation to other theoretical formulations, and the metaphor of behavioral momentum that inspired much of our work. Most of these issues can be resolved by empirical studies, and we hope that the ideas advanced here will promote the analysis of resistance to change and preference in new areas of research and application.

Gangestad & Simpson's model of the evolution of within-sex differences in reproductive strategies requires a degree of female choice that probably did not exist because of male coercion. We argue as well that the tradeoff between current and future reproduction accounts for more of the within-sex differences in reproductive strategies than the “good-genes-good parenting” tradeoff they propose.

We propose a conceptual model that maps the causal pathways relating biological evolution to cultural change. It builds on conventional evolutionary theory by placing emphasis on the capacity of organisms to modify sources of natural selection in their environment (niche construction) and by broadening the evolutionary dynamic to incorporate ontogenetic and cultural processes. In this model, phenotypes have a much more active role in evolution than generally conceived. This sheds light on hominid evolution, on the evolution of culture, and on altruism and cooperation. Culture amplifies the capacity of human beings to modify sources of natural selection in their environments to the point where that capacity raises some new questions about the processes of human adaptation.

There are parallels between Gigerenzer et al.'s emphasis on the rationality of adults' reasoning in terms of simple heuristics and developmental researchers' emphasis on the rationality of children's reasoning in terms of intuitive theories. Indeed, just as children become better at using their theories, so might some people, experts, become better at using simple heuristics.

Solms and the other authors in this series of BBS target articles accept the findings that the executive control of the REM/NREM cycle is still localized within a narrow region of the pontine brainstem. However, recent findings challenge this notion. We will review the recent data and suggest instead that the hypothalamus is the primary regulator of states of consciousness. If the hypothalamus indeed controls all the fun stuff, such as sex, eating, drinking, sleeping, and so on, then one can more easily accept Solms's argument that dreams are also generated from the forebrain.

[Solms]

We are not convinced by Gangestad & Simpson that differential mating strategies within each sex would be greater than such strategies between sexes. The target article does not provide actual evidence of human males who do not desire mating with multiple females, or evidence that the benefits for females of short-term matings with multiple males have ever outweighed the associated costs.

All five target articles are of high quality and very stimulating for the field. Several factors such as dream report length and NREM/REM differences, may be affected by the waking process (transition from sleep to wakefulness) and the recall process. It is helpful to distinguish between a model for REM sleep regulation and a physiological model for dreaming. A third model accounting for cognitive activity (thought-like dreaming) can also be of value. The postulated adaptive function of dreaming in avoidance learning does not seem very plausible because the two major basic assumptions (specificity of dream content and benefit of negative dreams) are not clearly supported by modern dream research: The critique of studies investigating memory consolidation in REM sleep is justified. Future studies integrating the knowledge of memory processes and sleep research will shed more light on the role of sleep, especially REM sleep in memory consolidation.

[Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]

The simple heuristics described in this book are ingenious but are unlikely to be optimally helpful in real-world, consequential, high-stakes decision making, such as mate and job selection. I discuss why the heuristics may not always provide people with such decisions to make with as much enlightenment as they would wish.

Though the target article is not without fertile suggestions, at least two problems limit its overall validity: (1) the extended gene-culture coevolutionary framework is not an alternative to standard evolutionary theory; (2) the proposed model does not explain how much time is necessary for selective pressure to determine the stabilization of a new aspect of the genotype.

The phenogenotype, a routinely co-occuring combination of a cultural and genetic trait, is unlikely to survive over time because of the potentially varying evolutionary pressures upon cultural as opposed to genetic traits. This is because the production and evaluation of cultural inputs will themselves be based on information previously acquired culturally. As a result, treating both cultural and genetic inheritance in a single recursion may be problematic.

Gangestad & Simpson review sexual selection theory and discuss their work on fluctuating asymmetry and mate preference in humans. We question some aspects of their account and mention problems with the data. We also suggest that more theoretical work on complex but realistic mating systems is required.