A higher-order function may evolve phylogenetically if it is demanded by multiple domain-specific modules. Task-specificity to solve a unique adaptive problem (e.g., foraging or mating) should be distinguished from function-specificity to deal with a common computational demand (e.g., numeracy, verbal communication) required by many tasks. A localized brain function is likely a result of such common computational demand.

The cultural intelligence hypothesis is an exciting new development. The hypothesis that it encourages general intelligence is intriguing, but it presents a paradox insofar as social learning is often suggested to instead reduce reliance on individual cognition and exploration. There is thus a need to specify more clearly the contexts in which cultural transmission may select for general intelligence.

Burkart et al. present a paradox – general factors of intelligence exist among individual differences (g) in performance in several species, and also at the aggregate level (G); however, there is ambiguous evidence for the existence of g when analyzing data using a mixed approach, that is, when comparing individuals of different species using the same cognitive ability battery. Here, we present an empirical solution to this paradox.

The goal of our target article was to lay out current evidence relevant to the question of whether general intelligence can be found in nonhuman animals in order to better understand its evolution in humans. The topic is a controversial one, as evident from the broad range of partly incompatible comments it has elicited. The main goal of our response is to translate these issues into testable empirical predictions, which together can provide the basis for a broad research agenda.

Contempt is typically studied as a uniquely human moral emotion. However, this approach has yielded inconclusive results. We argue this is because the folk affect concept “contempt” has been inaccurately mapped onto basic affect systems. “Contempt” has features that are inconsistent with a basic emotion, especially its protracted duration and frequently cold phenomenology. Yet other features are inconsistent with a basic attitude. Nonetheless, the features of “contempt” functionally cohere. To account for this, we revive and reconfigure the sentiment construct using the notion of evolved functional specialization. We develop the Attitude–Scenario–Emotion (ASE) model of sentiments, in which enduring attitudes represent others' social-relational value and moderate discrete emotions across scenarios. Sentiments are functional networks of attitudes and emotions. Distinct sentiments, including love, respect, like, hate, and fear, track distinct relational affordances, and each is emotionally pluripotent, thereby serving both bookkeeping and commitment functions within relationships. The sentiment contempt is an absence of respect; from cues to others' low efficacy, it represents them as worthless and small, muting compassion, guilt, and shame and potentiating anger, disgust, and mirth. This sentiment is ancient yet implicated in the ratcheting evolution of human ultrasocialty. The manifolds of the contempt network, differentially engaged across individuals and populations, explain the features of “contempt,” its translatability, and its variable experience as “hot” or “cold,” occurrent or enduring, and anger-like or disgust-like. This rapprochement between psychological anthropology and evolutionary psychology contributes both methodological and empirical insights, with broad implications for understanding the functional and cultural organization of social affect.

Gervais & Fessler's (G&F's) Attitude–Scenario–Emotion (ASE) model reduces sentiments to superficial patterns of emotional responding that emerge when an underlying evaluative attitude interacts with appraisals of a range of specific scenarios. Thus construed, sentiments are epiphenomenal. We argue that G&F would do better to identify each sentiment (love, say) with the attitude that underlies and explains the patterns of emotional responding (in the case of love, this might be the attitude of valuing the good of a specific other).

Prejudice, like contempt, is a general evaluation rather than a specific emotion. I explore the idea that emotions and attitudes are conceptually distinct by applying Gervais & Fessler's model to the intergroup context. I argue that prejudice is an affective representation of a social group's relational value (friend or foe) and dispute the idea that there are many distinct prejudices.

Analyzing the contempt as an intergroup emotion, we suggest that contempt and anger are not built upon each other, whereas disgust seems to be the most elementary and specific basic-emotional antecedent of contempt. Concurring with Gervais & Fessler, we suggest that many instances of “hate speech” are in fact instances of “contempt speech” – being based on disgust-driven contempt rather than hate.

“Contempt” is proposed to be a unique aspect of human nature, yet a non-natural kind. Its psychological construct is framed as a sentiment emerging from a stratification of diverse basic emotions and dispositional attitudes. Accordingly, “contempt” might transcend traditional conceptual levels in social psychology, including experience and recognition of emotion, dyadic and group dynamics, context-conditioned attitudes, time-enduring personality structure, and morality. This strikes us as a modern psychological account of a high-level, social-affective cognitive facet that joins forces with recent developments in the social neuroscience by drawing psychological conclusions from brain biology.

The hypothesis of a phylogenetic connection between protorespect in primate dominance hierarchies and respect in human prestige hierarchies lies in the principle that dominance is a domain of competence like others and, hence, that high-ranking primates have protoprestige. The idea that dominant primates manifest protocontempt to subordinates suggests that “looking down on” followers is intrinsic to leadership in humans, but that the expression of contempt varies critically in relation to the socioecological context.

We argue that natural selection operates on emotional and cognitive capacities supporting the subjective experience of sentiments, rather than on discrete sentiments themselves. We support this argument by examining the case of oxytocin in relation to the sentiment of love. We also explore future directions for health psychology research that includes “cold” aspects of contempt in conjunction with “hot” aspects.

Gervais & Fessler's analysis collapses across two orthogonal dimensions of social value to explain contempt: relational value, predicted by cooperation, and agentic value, predicted by status. These dimensions interact to potentiate specific social emotions and behaviors in intergroup contexts. By neglecting the unique roles of these dimensions – and their associated attributes: warmth and competence – the sentiment framework cedes predictive precision.

Gervais & Fessler's Attitude–Scenario–Emotion (ASE) model is a useful tool for the detection of affect in social media. In this commentary, an addition to the model is proposed – the audience – and its role in the manifestation of affect is discussed using a cyberbullying scenario. The presence of contempt in cyberbullying is also discussed.

Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, like many affective labels, it could be that “contempt” refers both to a sentiment and to a distinct emotion. This possibility is made salient by the fact that contempt can be defined by contrast with respect, but that there are different kinds of respect.

In the Attitude–Scenario–Emotion (ASE) model, social relationships are subpersonnally realized by sentiments: a network of emotions/attitudes representing relational values. We discuss how relational values differ from moral values and raise the issue of their ontogeny from genetic and cultural factors. Because relational values develop early in life, they cannot rely solely on cognition as suggested by the notion of attitude.

The constructs of attitudes, emotions, and sentiments are often only verbally defined and therefore somewhat vague. The sentiment construct might be fruitfully modeled as a result of sampling processes, complementing the Attitude–Scenario–Emotion model in explaining similarities and differences in sentiments across different cultures.

Gervais & Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude) but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, like many other emotions, can be both an emotion and a sentiment.

Gervais & Fessler argue that contempt is an attitude state defined as a lack of respect that potentiates the activation and deactivation of two different clusters of emotions. However, clinical and experimental findings do not support this view. We provide evidence that contempt is not an emotion, nor an attitude, but a reactive defensive mechanism evolved to help individuals avoid shame.

“Sentiment” is a potentially appealing concept for social and personality psychologists. It can render some complex affective phenomena theoretically tractable, help refine accounts of social perception, and illuminate some personality dispositions. The success of a future sentimental psychology depends on whether “sentiment” can be delimited as a distinct domain, and whether a credible classification of sentiments can be developed.

Gervais & Fessler dissect the folk concept of “contempt” to argue for a functionally integrated model of attitudes and emotions in the context of social relationships. Existing studies of how evaluations of warmth, competence, and closeness shape people's reactions and behaviors towards others may help in operationalizing and testing the proposed model.