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Origins of emotional consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2016

Hans L. Melo ,
Timothy R. Koscik ,
Thalia H. Vrantsidis ,
Georgia Hathaway  and
William A. Cunningham
Hans L. Melo
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G3, [email protected]@[email protected]@mail.utoronto.cahttp://socialneuro.psych.utoronto.ca/
Timothy R. Koscik
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G3, [email protected]@[email protected]@mail.utoronto.cahttp://socialneuro.psych.utoronto.ca/
Thalia H. Vrantsidis
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G3, [email protected]@[email protected]@mail.utoronto.cahttp://socialneuro.psych.utoronto.ca/
Georgia Hathaway
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G3, [email protected]@[email protected]@mail.utoronto.cahttp://socialneuro.psych.utoronto.ca/
William A. Cunningham
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G3, [email protected]@[email protected]@mail.utoronto.cahttp://socialneuro.psych.utoronto.ca/ Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G3, Canada. [email protected]
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Abstract

While the field of emotions research has benefited from new developments in neuroscience, many theoretical questions remain unsolved. We propose that integrating our iterative reprocessing (IR) framework with the passive frame theory (PFT) may help unify competing theoretical perspectives of emotion. Specifically, we propose that PFT and the IR framework offer a point of origin for emotional experience.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e187
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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