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Mapping the terra incognita of economic cognition will require an experimental paradigm that incorporates context

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2018

Aaron D. Lightner
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, Washington State University, Vancouver, WA 98686-9600. [email protected]@wsu.eduhttp://anthro.vancouver.wsu.edu/faculty/hagen/
Edward H. Hagen
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, Washington State University, Vancouver, WA 98686-9600. [email protected]@wsu.eduhttp://anthro.vancouver.wsu.edu/faculty/hagen/

Abstract

Researchers, including Boyer & Petersen (B&P), commonly use experimental economic studies to draw their conclusions. These studies conventionally strip away context and present participants only with abstract rules. Because context is a strictly necessary component of the decision-making process, it is not clear that inferences about high-level folk psychological concepts (e.g., rationality) can be drawn from decontextualized economic games.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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