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Mapping the terra incognita of economic cognition will require an experimental paradigm that incorporates context
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 August 2018
Abstract
Researchers, including Boyer & Petersen (B&P), commonly use experimental economic studies to draw their conclusions. These studies conventionally strip away context and present participants only with abstract rules. Because context is a strictly necessary component of the decision-making process, it is not clear that inferences about high-level folk psychological concepts (e.g., rationality) can be drawn from decontextualized economic games.
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Target article
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Author response
What is seen and what is not seen in the economy: An effect of our evolved psychology