In this study formal spatial models are applied to cross-sectional analysis of district results on the second ballot of French legislative elections. A model of probabilistic spatial voting better accounts for the data than either standard “ecological” models or a model of deterministic spatial voting. There are three substantive findings concerning voter behavior. First, the adjustment of voters to external information can be largely viewed as a shift in the spatial (Left-Right) distribution of voters. This shift, plus decisions by parties and candidates as to which districts parties will contest, determines the first ballot outcome. In arriving at second ballot choices, voters then appear to utilize decision rules that have a substantial degree of temporal stability. A second and related finding is that the second ballot can be reasonably accounted for by a single Left-Right dimension. Third, in those districts with three or more candidates on the second ballot, there may be substantial strategic voting with voters switching from candidates close to their ideal points but unlikely to win to more distant candidates who are more likely to win. The existence of strategic voting is suggested by the finding that models based solely on spatial preferences perform well for two-candidate districts, but less well for three- or four-candidate districts.

The purposes of this essay are (1) to identify Hegel's role in the propagation of certain philosophic principles essential to the development of an interpretive social science, (2) to demonstrate in what ways Hegel himself can be understood as an early sociologist, and (3) to indicate those aspects of Hegel's thought that might be of greatest use to contemporary philosophers of social and political inquiry.

The first part of the exposition relies on the Preface to The Phenomenology of Mind in order to outline Hegel's epistemological and methodological recommendations. The second part demonstrates the practical meaning of these recommendations by looking at the analysis of ancient Greece found in the Philosophy of History. It is concluded that this analysis is indeed a social scientific analysis and, moreover, is suggestive of subsequent work by such interpretivists as Weber, Schutz, and G. H. Mead.

This paper has the twofold purpose of exploring how and whether it may be said that value arises from human need and, in particular, how the value of equality may arise from an alleged human need for recognition. It traces two opposite dispositions toward recognition, one seeing it as destructive of the minimum conditions for political life, the other viewing it as the principal agency through which men achieve their humanity. The concept of a basic human need is then exposed to the criticism of “social apperception,” which apparently renders meaningless the concept altogether. Nevertheless, two “faces” of recognition are explored – one affirming that common human nature in virtue of which all men are said to be equal, and the other, affirming the concrete specificity of each individual. The paper concludes by arguing that this second aspect of the drive for recognition, which is viewed by some as the primary political obligation, is actually not a legitimate aspiration of political life.

Many studies have sought to investigate contextual influences on individual electoral behavior using aggregate data. The shortcomings of this approach are discussed, focusing on the relationship between black concentration and southern white support for George Wallace for president in 1968. Through combining aggregate and individual-level data and comparing a series of models, black concentration is found to increase white support for Wallace. Intraregional differences in the relationship between white support for Wallace and local black concentration are equalized when contextual influences at the state level are brought into the analysis. Black concentration contextual effects are independent of those of urbanization, education, or residence in Wallace's home state of Alabama. Relative primary group support for Wallace and relative issue proximity to Wallace are then shown to be the intervening variables linking contextual characteristics and electoral choice.

A method of scaling is proposed to estimate the positions of candidates and voters on a common issue dimension. The scaling model assumes that candidates occupy true positions in an issue space and that individual level perceptual data arise from this in a two step process. The first step consists of a stochastic component, satisfying the standard Gauss Markov assumptions, which reflects true misperception. The second step consists of a linear distortion which is introduced in the survey situation. Estimates of the parameters of the model are developed by applying the least squares criterion, and distributions of the estimates are investigated by Monte Carlo methods.

The scaling technique is applied to the seven-point issue scales asked in the 1968 and 1972 SRC survey. The resulting ideal point estimates are related to candidate positions in 1968 to test a simple Downsian voting model.

The reliability and stability of survey items designed to measure political attitudes are important to the study of political behavior. Several past studies have examined the reliability and stability of items measuring one construct, that of political efficacy. The results of this prior research have been contradictory, in part because of the limitations of the methodologies used. In this article, the authors employ path analysis to examine more closely the stability and reliability of the four SRC items commonly used to measure political efficacy. The American Panel Study (1956–1960), in which efficacy is measured at two points in time, is used as the data base. The authors conclude that two of the four items (NO CARE and NO SAY) seem to measure best what is meant by political efficacy. These two items are more stable and reliable than previously thought, while the other items are relatively unstable and unreliable, and they display systematic differences from each other and from the NO CARE and NO SAY items.

This study examines postwar patterns in macroeconomic policies and outcomes associated with left-and right-wing governments in capitalist democracies. It argues that the objective economic interests as well as the subjective preferences of lower income and occupational status groups are best served by a relatively low unemployment-high inflation macroeconomic configuration, whereas a comparatively high unemployment-low inflation configuration is compatible with the interests and preferences of upper income and occupational status groups. Highly aggregated data on unemployment and inflation outcomes in relation to the political orientation of governments in 12 West European and North American nations are analyzed revealing a low unemployment-high inflation configuration in nations regularly governed by the Left and a high unemployment-low inflation pattern in political systems dominated by center and rightist parties. Finally, time-series analyses of quarterly postwar unemployment data for the United States and Great Britain suggests that the unemployment rate has been driven downward by Democratic and Labour administrations and upward by Republican and Conservative governments. The general conclusion is that governments pursue macroeconomic policies broadly in accordance with the objective economic interests and subjective preferences of their class-defined core political constituencies.

In legislatures and committees, a number of issues are voted on separately, leading to an outcome consisting of positions on each of these issues. I investigate the effects this separation of issues has on collective choices, assuming a very abstract collective choice model, whose assumptions are presupposed by many less abstract models, notably spatial models. Assuming the model, if there exists an undominated outcome (one to which no winning coalition prefers any other feasible outcome), it must be chosen in the absence of vote trading, although vote trading can (perversely) lead to a very different outcome. But vote trading does not necessarily lead to a “voting paradox” situation, contrary to several recent papers. The model enables us to define a natural solution concept for the case where every feasible outcome is dominated. Variations on this concept are explored. The effects of weakening the model are investigated.

Institutional experiences at the young adult stage may act to alter or reinforce pre-existing political attitudes. This paper focuses on military service during the Vietnam War as one such institutional experience. Data are drawn from a two-wave, 1965-1973 national panel study of 674 males. Approximately half of the panel saw active duty. Comparisons are made between civilian and military respondents and, among military respondents, according to the duration, recency, intensity, affective qualities, and institutional salience of the military experience. Bivariate and regression techniques are used in the analyses.

Veterans are somewhat less cynical and have broader attention frames than civilians. Civic tolerance and feelings toward minority groups are also affected by aspects of military service. War-related opinions vary between civilians and veterans and across categories of veterans. These effects remain when other relevant factors, including prior attitudes, are taken into account. The results underscore the potential significance of adult experiences in the socialization process.

This paper analyzes Vincent Ostrom's major work, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, which he offers as providing paradigmatic direction for public administration and political science. The analysis urges caution as to that theory's status, especially from five analytic perspectives. Basically, attention is directed at the methodology or mode of inquiry associated with Ostrom's grounding of his argument in public choice theory, with special attention to the role of values. The adequacy of major assumptions of Ostrom's argument as descriptions of reality also is evaluated. Moreover, the critical lack of content in several key concepts is established. In addition, the analysis shows how opposite and simultaneous courses of action are implied by the argument. Finally, attention is directed at how Ostrom's argument can lead to unexpected consequences, even some that are opposite those effects Ostrom intends.

“Political gerontology” is the study of the political aspects of aging and the aged. Although psychology and sociology have research subfields concerning aging, this interest is just beginning to develop systematically within political science. Consequently, this article describes theory and research from several disciplines which together provide a foundation for research in “political gerontology.” Demographic analysis suggests that old people constitute a continuously growing component of the American population. Social-psychological analysis indicates that the aged are likely to engage in substantial political activity. Political analysis suggests that old people are likely to make increasing demands upon the political system. This multidisciplinary knowledge base, combined with the predicted increasing political salience of the aging population, suggests the contours of a research agenda for “political gerontology.”

In the period following World War II before the declaration of martial law in the Philippines, politics and heavy demands for patronage affected the allocation of resources, the administrative process, and personnel policies in ways inimical to the interests of businessmen and technocrats. When faced with intense competition, politicians pressed to employ growing numbers of clients and protégés in local administration. Strong political machines were better able than weak machines to ignore pressures for social services benefitting largely the lower class. The level of political mobilization and size of the lower class increased expenditures on primary education, and expenditures on intermediate and secondary education grew as the percentage of the electorate that was lower class increased. To the dismay of business interests and technocrats, “wasteful” expenditures on local administration and social services were most institutionalized and difficult to cut, while expenditures on economic improvements proved more elastic.

When citizens contact local government agencies, they generally attempt to influence service delivery decisions made by these bureaucracies. This paper examines the nature of citizen contacts, and the results of such contacts, with respect to the enforcement of environmental ordinances in Detroit, Michigan. We first examine the mechanisms responsible for the generation of citizen contacts. Assuming relations among citizen awareness, service need, and social well-being, we derive a downward-opening parabola as appropriate for describing the relationship between social well-being and propensity to contact a service agency. Using data on citizen contacts from City of Detroit agencies merged with census data, we find the expected relationship in evidence. We find that the Environmental Enforcement Division generally responds to citizen contacts, but the quality of the response varies with social characteristics of neighborhoods.

Political scientists have devoted considerable attention to the ways in which economic power can be translated into political influence. Yet there has been little empirical research capable of confirming or denying general hypotheses about the political implications of various aspects of economic structure. This article seeks to begin filling this gap by first identifying five aspects of economic structure likely to affect an industry's political influence (firm size, industry size, market concentration, profitability, arid geographic dispersion) and then testing these aspects by analyzing how well they account for variations among industries in their success at securing public policies of benefit to them, especially in two policy arenas: federal corporate income taxes and state excise taxes. What emerges most clearly from this analysis is an empirical confirmation of the popular hypothesis linking firm size to political influence with respect to both federal corporate tax policy and state excise tax policy. Beyond that, we find reasonably strong negative relationships between political influence and market concentration, profitability, and industry size – the latter lending interesting support to Mancur Olson's argument about the political disabilities of large groups. In the process, the article suggests a potentially fruitful new way to get beyond the case study approach in studying the impact of economic power on political influence, and thus a way to bring to bear more powerful methodological tools on this central issue of modern democracy.

This analysis shows, in contrast to previously published work, that a divisive primary hurts a senatorial candidate's chances for success in the general election. The relationship between divisiveness and lack of success continues to hold when incumbency and state party orientations are controlled. This relationship has an important implication regarding representation. The fact that divisive primaries do hurt strengthens the representation of weak and minor state parties in the U.S. Senate.

The problem of authority has a practical and a theoretical side. Practically, the decline of authority contributes to the crisis of legitimacy in contemporary governments and to difficulties in the practice of morality. Theoretically, authority is often confused with power, force, or coercion. Thus, it is viewed with suspicion. The thesis of this paper is that authority is not a form of power; rather, it transforms power. Like power, force, and coercion, authority is directive, but it is so in quite a different way. An examination of the concept of authority in three very different theorists – Carl Friedrich, Yves R. Simon, and Michael Polanyi – reveals that a sound concept of authority must be rooted in community as a system of shared beliefs, experiences, and traditions and in transcendent standards referred to by such beliefs, experiences, and traditions. Authority is that which directs a community to its proper end.

Several authors have observed a decline in the number of competitive congressional districts during the past two decades. Various explanations have been proposed for this change. Among these are theories attributing major causal significance to changing methods of drawing district boundaries, and increasing control of campaign resources by incumbents. These theories are examined critically and arguments are advanced for their rejection. The principal cause of the decline of competition for congressional seats appears to rest on a change in individual voting behavior.