We reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules, focusing on the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness. When committees are heterogeneous, full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive open rule as well as the somewhat restrictive modified rule. In contrast, the restrictive closed rule always leads to inefficiencies. When committees are homogeneous, the situation is different. All equilibria are inefficient regardless of legislative rules, but the closed rule leads to greater informational efficiency than does the open rule. Furthermore, the efficiency gains under the closed rule more than offset distributional losses regardless of the degree of preference divergence. We also examine the incentives provided by the different rules for information acquisition and committee specialization.

Recent analyses of collective choice predict convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. I estimate the extent of convergence under restricted preference maximizing through a computer simulation of majority choice by committees in which individual decisions on proposal location and voting are constrained. The simulation generates distributions of majority-adopted proposals in two-dimensional space: nondeterministic outcomes of simple-majority choice. The proposal distributions provide data for a quantitative evaluation of the effects on convergence of relaxing conventional preference-maximizing assumptions. I find convergence of majority-adopted proposals in all cases, and that convergence increases under restricted proposal location. Moreover, under some voting restrictions, experiments yield stable outcomes that demonstrate remarkable convergence. I conclude that restricted preference maximizing generally increases the probability that simple-majority outcomes reflect the central tendency of member preference distributions. Since committees and legislatures are important formal procedures for democratic collective choice, this conclusion applies to a large class of political decisions.

We analyze party discipline in the House of Representatives between 1947 and 1998. The effects of party pressures can be represented in a spatial model by allowing each party to have its own cutting line on roll call votes. Adding a second cutting line makes, at best, a marginal improvement over the standard single-line model. Analysis of legislators who switch parties shows, however, that party discipline is manifest in the location of the legislator's ideal point. In contrast to our approach, we find that the Snyder-Groseclose method of estimating the influence of party discipline is biased toward exaggerating party effects.

The apparent decline in voter participation in national elections since 1972 is an illusion created by using the Bureau of the Census estimate of the voting-age population as the denominator of the turnout rate. We construct a more accurate estimate of those eligible to vote, from 1948–2000, using government statistical series to adjust for ineligible but included groups, such as noncitizens and felons, and eligible but excluded groups, such as overseas citizens. We show that the ineligible population, not the nonvoting, has been increasing since 1972. During the 1960s the turnout rate trended downward both nationally and outside the South. Although the average turnout rates for presidential and congressional elections are lower since 1972 than during 1948–70, the only pattern since 1972 is an increased turnout rate in southern congressional elections. While the voting age was lowered to 18 in 1971, the lower turnout rate of young voters accounts for less than one-fourth of reduced voter participation.

Contrary to the claims of McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, our method does not estimate the ideal points of moderates significantly less accurately than the ideal points of extremists. This is true for at least two reasons: (1) there is significant randomness in voting; as a consequence, on a lopsided vote moderates often vote with the extremists; and (2) our data set includes some roll calls that require a supermajority for passage; for these we define a 50%–50% roll call as lopsided. We also show that the classification-success method of McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal severely understates the presence of party influence. Furthermore, we show that a proper interpretation of some of their results reveals a significant amount of party influence in Congress.

The garbage can theory of organizational choice is one of the best-known innovations in modern organization theory. It also has significantly shaped a major branch of the new institutionalism. Yet, the theory has not received the systematic assessment that it both deserves and needs. We evaluate the early verbal theory and argue that it fails to create an adequate foundation for scientific progress. We then analyze and rerun Cohen, March, and Olsen’s computer model and discover that its agents move in lockstep patterns that are strikingly different from the spirit of the theory. Indeed, the simulation and the theory are incompatible. Next, we examine how the authors have built upon these incompatible formulations in developing the theory further. We assess this larger program, which includes the March-Olsen version of the new institutionalism, and find that many of the problems that attended the original article have intensified over time. We conclude that a fundamental overhaul is required if the theory is to realize its early promise.

Krishna and Morgan propose “amendments” to two of Gilligan and Krehbiel’s theoretical studies of legislative signaling. The new results for homogeneous committees do not significantly change the empirical expectations of prior works, but the results for heterogeneous committees contradict earlier claims. This note gives primary attention to heterogeneous committees and compares and contrasts the new and old equilibria and their empirical implications. The notion of signaling is somewhat nebulous in all such games but seems distinctly less plausible in the key Krishna-Morgan proposition than in previous legislative signaling games. Furthermore, the empirical literature on choice of rules—specifically, the finding of a positive relationship between committee heterogeneity and restrictive rules—is inconsistent with the Krishna-Morgan analysis but consistent with Gilligan-Krehbiel analyses, even though the former is informationally efficient and the latter are not.

Much of contemporary feminist theory presents itself as radically opposed to liberalism. Certain claims made by Catharine MacKinnon have contributed significantly to this view. In this article, however, I argue that certain fundamental aspects of MacKinnon's work must be understood within a liberal framework, even as she challenges the epistemological assumptions that tend to inform liberal political theories. I highlight the ways in which MacKinnon makes use of several fundamental liberal tenets, such as the primacy of individual choice, and then consider how her work contributes to an ongoing discussion about the relevance of liberal theory to contemporary feminist concerns.

This study is intended as the first of a two-volume presenta- tion of positive political theory. As the authors indicate in the preface, in this volume they develop what may be termed Arrovian direct preference aggregation, a theory that exam- ines the properties of a direct aggregation rule, f, mapping from a domain of preference profiles on a set, X. For any profile, , the image of f is a social preference relation denoted f( ). The social relation may exhibit maximal or unbeaten outcomes, mf( ), in X itself. Thus, the volume is concerned with the "classification" of all social rules that map from preference profiles into X itself.

Bendor, Moe, and Shotts want to rescue some of the ideas of the garbage can model and the new institutionalism. Their rescue program, however, is alien to the spirit of not only our work but also some recent developments that may promise a climate of dialogue between different approaches in political science. Bendor, Moe, and Shotts place themselves closer to a tradition of unproductive tribal warfare than to more recent attempts to explore the limits of and the alternatives to (means-end) rational interpretations of political actors, institutions, and change. By building on a narrow concept of what is valuable political science, they cut themselves off from key issues that have occupied political scientists for centuries.

"I continue to believe," states Brian Barry (Justice as Impar- tiality, 1995, p. 3), "in the possibility of putting forward a universally valid case in favor of liberal egalitarian princi- ples." Barry's belief is not idiosyncratic but widely shared by Western intellectuals. In fact, a traditional trademark of Western philosophy has been to insist on the universal validity of its teachings, while relegating other cultures and ideas to a merely contingent or particularistic status. The belief tends to be shared by much of Western social science.

MacKinnon responds that her theory, while not liberalism in denial or disguise, is engaged in dialogue with liberalism (as well as with other theoretical traditions).

It is a daunting assignment to review a book after it has garnered a major award bestowed by the organization that publishes this journal. Judith Baer's Our Lives before the Law not only is a very worthy recipient of the 2000 Victoria Schuck Award for the best book on women in politics but also is an erudite and wide-ranging critique of feminist thought with the goal of "forc[ing] feminists to confront mainstream discourse and mainstream discourse to confront feminism" (p. 175). This goal is in the service of Baer's desire to construct a new jurisprudence of sexual equality, one that avoids the pitfalls Baer perceives as inherent in the efforts of others to date.

This is a welcome and provocative addition to the growing literature on the politics of the Internet. In addition to its rich intellectual texture and mother-lode of information about computer hard- and software, it is a quick read because the author has a sharp tongue and makes excellent points. It is a unique blend of political philosophy, political economic theory, and computer network technology in support of a political F-5 tornado warning.

Interest in Michael Oakeshott's political philosophy has been growing for a generation, since the publication of the original edition of his Rationalism in Politics (1962), a collection of essays dating from 1947 to 1960. Few then were aware of Experience and Its Modes (1933), a book that has since become the subject of much attention as the desire to understand Oakeshott's work as a whole has grown. With the publication of On Human Conduct (1975), Oakeshott gave us the work he hoped would confirm his place in the tradition of British political thought going back to Hobbes. Of course, his notable essays on Hobbes are now available in Hobbes on Civil Association (2000).