This article examines the role of spirit possession cults in the Swahili coastal area of Kenya and Tanzania, based on three years (1982–85) of doctoral dissertation research in seven field sites (including the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba). It provides a reassessment of the conventional theoretical viewpoint that such cults are peripheral to the wider society's value and socio-cultural structure, asserting that in this case they are, in fact, not only central to it but actually one of its most illuminating expressions.

This article examines two opposing strategies – one used by government officials and businesses, the other expressed by urban workers – that have emerged in postsocialist Mozambique. On the one hand, government officials and businesses have pursued a deliberate strategy of what several writers in other contexts have called ‘organized forgetting', whereby they seek to airbrush the socialist past from history. They have revised the country's ideological orientation, built new coalitions of support among domestic and internal investors, and remade the ruling party's legitimacy following the abandonment of socialism and the transition to a free‐market democracy. On the other hand, some urban workers have revived and repackaged the language of socialism to protest against the effects of neo‐liberalism. Relying on collective and individual memories of socialism, they denounce ‘exploitation', ‘recolonization', ‘injustice’ and ‘inequality’ as they struggle to understand, resist or modify the impact of structural adjustment and privatization. I argue that, although the end of socialism has allowed a plurality of voices to surface in Mozambique, such discursive pluralism is characterized by increasing power inequities. The consolidation of capital and the ideological pronouncements that accompany it may ultimately silence the now dissident language of the socialist past.

Africa as a major culture area has been characterized by many writers as being -marked by a high development of law and legal procedures. In the past few years research on African law has produced a series of highly competent monographs such as those on law among the Tiv, the Barotse, and the Nuer. These and related shorter studies have focused primarily on formal processes for the settlement of disputes, such as those which take place in a courtroom, or those which are, in some other way, set apart from simpler measures of social control. However, many African societies have informal, quasi-legal, dispute-settlement procedures, supplemental to formal ones, which have not been as well studied, or—in most cases—adequately analysed.

Science is the worst nuisance and the greatest calamity of our days. It has made us into robots, into standardized interchangeable parts of an enormous mechanism; it pushes us with a relentless persistence and a terrible acceleration towards new forms of existence; it changes the world around us; it transforms our inner selves with an uncannily thoroughgoing penetration. An ever-increasing speed in communication; accessibility of superficial knowledge and meretricious art; endless opportunities in cheap and mean forms of enjoyment; leisure to do a thousand irrelevant things—these, from the side of human consumption and enjoyment, are the benefits of our modern civilization. Kept down intellectually by journalism; moving and feeling to the rhythm of jazz; united by the world-wide net of broadcasting—modern man has indefinitely to increase his passive receptivity. He has to start with a standardized level of taste and to develop an indefinitely elastic nervous system, all at the cost of originality and spontaneous life. This may be the extreme pessimistic view of ‘progress’, but many of us feel it strongly and see a menace to all real spiritual and artistic values in the aimless drive of modern mechanization.

In the first part of this paper I began by dealing with those of Fisher's objections to the Intellectualist Theory which seemed to me to require short, sharp, and destructive answers. I then went on to consider an objection which seemed to require a longer and more constructive answer. This was the objection that the Theory did not account adequately for variation in the concept and cult of the supreme being in settings uninfluenced by Islam and Christianity. I suggested that, although the evidence was probably insufficient for a decisive verdict, the Theory appeared to give a rather good account of religious dynamics in such settings. A demonstration of its plausibility in this context was, as I pointed out, an important preliminary to my main argument. For it was crucial to the credibility of the thesis that Islam and Christianity were more than anything else catalysts for changes that were ‘in the air’ anyway.

The Tiv of Northern Nigeria, who number some 800,000, believe that they are all descended from one man, Tiv, through some 14 to 17 generations of known ancestors (Fig. 1). These ancestors are constantly named in casual conversation and in discussion of serious affairs. To understand things Tiv one must know Tiv genealogies. By genealogical reference a Tiv traces ties of kinship and marriage, claims a place to live and farm, argues his case in a moot, conducts matters of magic and ritual, and decides against whom he will fight on any given occasion. Genealogies are the key to Tiv social organization. Tiv political structure is based on a lineage system: a system of segmented groups in which each segment (save the maximal) is included in a segment of a higher order but of the same kind, and each segment (save the minimal) includes segments of a lower order but of the same kind. The Tiv system has an almost one to one correlation between lineage and territorial segments. Both are called ‘those of X’, the eponymous ancestor; thus Mbaduku (those of Aduku) describes both the lineage segment (ipaven, pl. uipaven) and the discrete territory which they inhabit (tar, pl. utar).

This article seeks to explain the resurgence of the ‘community’ scale as a central organising principle guiding contemporary environmental initiatives in Africa. It sets policies centred on the notion of community-based natural resource management in their regional political-economic context, demonstrating that fiscal constraints have forced environmental managers to rely more heavily on community efforts to accomplish environmental objectives. In effect, it argues that environmental managers confronted with increased expectations on the part of donors and their government superiors have seized the opportunity to devolve responsibility for environmental management to ‘the community’ as a means of expanding programmes while incurring minimal additional costs. The case study involves a German-funded community forestry project in the Gambia. In 1991, in order to speed up the implementation of ‘scientific’ management on state-controlled forest land, the Gambian-German Forestry Project, a branch of the national Forestry Department, began granting rural communities leasehold rights to community forestry reserves. In each instance, however, community representatives were required by contract to commit their constituencies to a rigorous set of management tasks. Participatory rhetoric notwithstanding, the project offered communities little more than graduated sovereignty over forests. Programme conditions ensured that project personnel would control the finest details of forest management, not despite, but because of, the evolution of tenure rights to the community.

The languages dealt with in this paper are Bush ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’, Kwadi, Hottentot, and about 20 Bantu language groups, comprising more than 50 distinct dialects. It is concerned with pre-Bantu history and the Bush, Kwadi, and Hottentot languages, but material on Bantu is included for the following reasons: (a) The information relevant to a discussion of the peopling of Southern Africa by Bantu-speaking peoples is scattered in the available literature or is not available at all, and, (b) Bantu traditional lore has something to say on the subject of pre-Bantu indigenous peoples of Southern Africa, and there must therefore be some evaluation of the relationship of modern and early Bantu languages and an attempt must be made to define their recent and early traditional language areas.

A much neglected perspective on Zimbabwe's post-independence war is that held by its insurgents, the so-called dissidents. The experience of dissidents has been little explored, in part because of the difficulty of doing so until recently but also because scholars and journalists have analysed post-1980 violence primarily in terms of the political interests of either ZAPU or ZANU-PF, Zimbabwe's dominant nationalist parties, or the South African state. No account has sought to explore the motives, goals and organisation of the dissidents themselves; the how-and-whys of the turn to war have remained obscure. Though dissidents' views are often as partisan as those of their detractors, focusing on the perspectives of the dissidents allows a substantial reinterpretation of the war and its aftermath. From the dissidents' point of view, post-Unity politics is bitterly disappointing: they say Unity is meaningful only for the national leaders. Unity has not overcome the political tribalism of the 1980s nor has it brought an end to economic hardship. Though the dissidents' perspective on Zimbabwe's post-independence war is unique in many ways, the stress on the unresolved wrongs of the 1980s—continued developmental neglect, the lack of restitution or even recognition for losses and suffering, the failures to make peace with the High God of Njelele and the spirits—finds a much wider resonance within Matabeleland as a whole.

Cet article décrit la situation des personnes âgées du point de vuede l'argent, et examine la signification de l'argent du point de vue des personnes âgées. Des études anthropologiques ont été réalisées en 1994, 1995 et 1996 dans une communauté Kwahu rurale située dans la partie sud du Ghana. Ces études ont pris principalement la forme de longues conversations avec des personnes âgées et leurs familles. L'argent est un symbole fondamental de la vie quotidienne, étalon de mesure dela valeur des relations entre les individus. Il ne permet pas de tenir les personnes à distance, mais plutôt d'établir et d'entretenir des lienssociaux, et de garantir la prise en charge des personnes âgées. Le fait deposséder de l'argent suscite le respect, car c'est le signe d'unevie réussie, tandis que le manque d'argent traduit l'échec et la honte. Le don d'argent est une marque de respect, d'affection et d'attention à l'égard des personnes âgées.

In his Frazer Lecture of 1952, Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa (1954), Professor Max Gluckman considers certain types of ritual behaviour as institutionalized expressions of rebellion against authority. He maintains that this expression is an important function of such ritual. The following quotations present the gist of his interpretation:

I shall therefore consider the social components of ceremonies, analogous to those which concerned Frazer, among the South-Eastern Bantu.…Here there are…performed, as elsewhere in Africa, national and local ceremonies at the break of the rains, sowing, first fruits, and harvest.…But whatever the ostensible purpose of the ceremonies, a most striking feature of their organization is the way in which they openly express social tensions. Women have to assert license and dominance as against their formal subordination to men, princes have to behave to the kings as if they covet the throne, and subjects openly state their resentment of authority. Hence I call them rituals of rebellion. I shall argue that some ritual rebellions proceed within an established distribution of power, and not about the structure of the system itself. This allows for instituted protest, and in complex ways renews the unity of the system (1954, p. 3).

We are here confronted with a cultural mechanism which challenges study by sociologists, psychologists, and biologists, the analysis in detail of the process by which this acting of conflict achieves a blessing—social unity. Clearly we are dealing with the general problem of catharsis set by Aristotle … the purging of emotion through ‘pity, fear and inspiration’. Here I attempt only to analyze the sociological setting of the process (1954, p. 20).

In the academic debate on labour migration and urbanisation in Southern Africa the persistence of links between urban workers and people in rural areas has proved a pertinent issue. As is implied by the term labour migration, economic forces have always been regarded as a major determinant of migratory behaviour. State-centred perspectives have dominated studies of rural–urban migration in Zimbabwe, where a restrictive legal framework regulated migration to urban centres during the colonial era in an attempt to prevent large numbers of Africans becoming permanent town dwellers. This ethnographic study of labour migrants in Harare originating from the Buhera district, however, shifts away from perspectives that reduce migratory behaviour to an effect of state intervention and/or economic forces. Such external forces are mediated by migrants’ networks that encompass both rural and urban localities. Rather than being only economically motivated, individual migrants’ participation in these networks has to be understood as an expression of a socio-cultural pattern in which rural identification and kinship ideology are of major importance. Viewing migration practices in this way—i.e. as observable outcomes of migrants’ socio-cultural dispositions—not only helps us to understand better the preferences that motivate economic behaviour but also challenges conventional perspectives in which the rural and urban are often viewed as distinct social worlds and the urbanisation process as part of a wider evolutionary development or transition towards a modern class society.

There is a growing body of research that addresses issues of income distribution and the mechanisms of inequality in rural farming communities in Africa (see, for example, Hill, 1972; Matlon, 1981; Kitching, 1980; Sutter, 1981; Watts, 1983). Unfortunately a recognition of the importance of economic inequality in African societies dependent on animal husbandry has lagged behind. Much of the research on pastoral systems of production of the past several decades has been carried out by anthropologists whose work, to the extent that it addresses issues of economic heterogeneity at all, has emphasised the types of ‘levelling’ and ‘adaptive’ mechanisms common to pastoral systems. Recurrent issues of focus have been the ideology of equality which tends to predominate in pastoral societies, the limited development of political hierarchies, the limitations on herd size imposed by family labour and ecology, the wide-spread transfer of assets at critical moments in the life cycle, and the apparent similarities in consumption levels of different households (see, for example, Barth, 1961; Goldschmidt, 1971; Dahl, 1979a; Schneider, 1979).

I am here concerned with social control as it exists in Tonga society, where there are no obvious political institutions concerned in the maintenance of order. As in any society, control rests eventually on the sanction of force, here applied through a resort to vengeance on the part of an organized group if it feels that this is the only way to enforce its rights.

This article examines the current commercialisation and expansion of Asante funeral celebrations in Ghana. Funerals have always been the main public social events in Asante, but the growing funeral business significantly alters the way death is celebrated. The article takes as a point of departure a view of death as a field of strategic interaction, providing the ritual context for the creation of remembrance and identities, the elaboration of differences, the competition for status and power, and the negotiation of culture and social bonds and values. Within the framing narrative of respect for the dead and guiding the spirit to the next world, funerals are much about life. The article describes how, in shaping death, people deal with money to negotiate values of life and relations between the living, and shows that, contrary to both popular belief and critique on global commercialisation, in Asante the money economy and the social significance of the funeral tradition do not contravene, but rather reinforce each other. The funeral celebration is not wiped away by monetisation, nor is it a kind of last defence against it. Indeed, it is exactly through money and commodification that funeral celebrations are expanding, social ties forged, and cultural performances stimulated, albeit in new ways. In Asante funerals, people appropriate practices of consumption and commercial enterprise as well as indigenous traditions and exchange patterns in a process of ‘cultural bricolage’, and develop new, local styles of celebrating death, in which money has come to play a central role as social glue and as an expression of lifestyles, cultural values and ideals. It is argued that we cannot understand ‘traditional ritual’ unless we move beyond the rather rigid opposition between tradition and modernity still prevalent in ritual studies to acknowledge the open, flexible nature of tradition that makes it so vibrant in modern African life.

The article explores the ways in which post-independence political practices in Mozambique's rural areas have shaped attitudes towards official authority, and considers the legacy of those attitudes for the recently promulgated Municipalities Law. The law will transfer a range of state functions to elected district institutions, and grant a greater role to ‘traditional authorities’ (chiefs). Mozambican officials and academics see the law—and decentralisation more widely—as a means of making the state more efficient and more responsive to local needs. However, drawing on case study material from Manica Province, the article argues that neither the Frelimo party-state, nor the opposition military movement Renamo, inculcated a political practice which prepared the way for democratic demands. Nor are chiefs likely to represent community interests effectively. In Manica's rural areas ‘local leaders’ such as businessmen, political party leaders, chiefs and church leaders strongly associate official authority with a level of wealth and education that they do not possess, and which consequently exclude them from holding such positions. They also see elections as potentially destabilising. While there is a strong popular desire for chiefs to resume various roles, officials (and chiefs themselves) usually see their future in terms of a late colonial model, i.e. as an extension of administrative authority. Academic literature on democratisation and civil society often posits an opposition between state and civil society, and democratic aspirations within civil society. However, local attitudes towards authority in Manica Province were strongly based in the history of political practice, and are not necessarily sympathetic to democratic ideals. Nor is there a clear opposition between what has often been called ‘civil society’ and the state: individuals moved in and out of association with official authority; leaders of ‘civil society’ often sought to become part of, not to oppose, the state.

Scholars in several disciplines have recently turned their attention to the effects of community characteristics on attitudes and behaviour. ‘Social capital’ figures prominently in this new literature. This article explores the influence of trust, optimism, voluntarism and other standard components of social capital on political participation and institutional performance in two African contexts: Uganda and Botswana. It concludes that generalised trust and participation in social clubs help shape decisions to participate in formal politics, although their influence is dwarfed by gender and urbanisation. However, social capital bears no clear relation to institutional performance, as measured by residents' levels of satisfaction with government services.

The question as to who are the Swahili has long been controversial. Captain C. H. Stigand is responsible for the most widely accepted definition,

A Swahili … in the more confined sense of the word, is a descendant of one of the original Arab or Persian-Arab settlers on the East African Coast. In the broader sense of the word it includes all who speak a common language, Swahili.

This article describes how cross-border trade in West Nile, north-western Uganda to a large extent takes place outside of the legal framework. This does not mean that this trade is unregulated. We make use of the concept of ‘practical norms’ to show the existence of regulation within this trade, which diverges both from official norms and social norms (‘moral economy’). The article describes how these practical norms emerged and how they are enforced. First, it is shown how the moral economy of cross-border trade plays an important role in their articulation. Second, we ask which practical concerns play a role in sustaining these norms and how deviations from them activate open power struggles. And third, we show how concrete events have played a role in their emergence.

The article provides insight into the current violent practices of urban youngsters in Kinshasa. At nightfall youth gangs transform the streets of Kinshasa's townships into arenas of the fight. Frequent regular clashes between these gangs create young violent leaders, who not only sow terror but also provide security for the inhabitants (young and old) of their territories. Although many of these boys and young men are trained in foreign fighting styles such as judo, jujitsu and karate, in the public clashes between the fighting groups, these boys and young men perform mukumbusu. This fighting style, inspired and based on the gorilla, was invented during the last decade of colonialism, and is an original mixture of a traditional Mongo wrestling practice, libanda, and Asian and Western fighting practices. In the article, I scrutinize the practices of these young fighters through the diverse images of masculinity (kimobali) upon which they draw, such as the fighter and the soldier; and the models of masculinity that they contest, the sapeur and the staffeur.