Using Voting Advice Application (VAA) data from the EU Profiler/euandi Trend File, we studied how parties’ positions towards European integration relate to their positions on other important issues, and how this varies across EP elections, and between European regions. We hypothesized that the association between parties’ EU-integration positions and their positions on other issues was affected by the three major crises that hit the European Union (EU) between 2009 and 2019: the economic, migration, and climate crises. Additionally, we hypothesized that the economic and migration crises asymmetrically affected the association between cultural and economic issues on the one hand and the EU dimension on the other across the EU’s three macro regions (NWE, SE, and CEE). Our results show that neither the economic crisis nor the migration crisis or the climate crisis had an EU-wide impact on how European integration relates to other issue dimensions. As we hypothesized, economic issues were particularly strongly linked to EU-integration positions in SE in 2014, but our results additionally indicated that the longstanding interpretation of EU integration as a mainly economic issue in SE diminished after the start of the migration crisis. Finally, EU integration became related to immigration issues in CEE while this is not the case in the other regions. The main takeaway is that EU integration is interpreted differently by parties across the EU, which is important to recognize for parties that seek to work together in transnational party groups, and for scholars that aim to understand EU policy making.

A hegemonic power can guarantee the status quo in an international economic system. However, domestic or international changes may unsettle a hegemon’s priorities. In such phases, smaller states benefiting from the existing system may fear that the hegemon will fail to keep the system stable. How do they react if they lose trust in the hegemon’s ability or will to maintain the status quo? This article argues that in such cases, free riding becomes less rewarding. Therefore, smaller states build publicly visible coalitions to ‘voice’ their preferences. Applying this argument to the role of small ‘creditor states’ in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the article draws on original in-depth interviews to analyze the ‘New Hanseatic League’ as a strategy to defend the present euro regime and counterbalance the Franco–German tandem. By elaborating and tracing a fine-grained causal mechanism, the article thus explains the emergence of vocal small-state coalitions in a hegemonic environment.

In this paper, we focus on the completion of a government reintegration program in Colombia for former non-state armed actors, such as rebel forces and militias, in the post-conflict period. As the members of these groups lay down their arms and return to a peaceful existence, the effectiveness of their transition to ‘normal’ lives can be critical in preventing the re-emergence of conflict and violence. Former combatants face numerous challenges and hardships such as criminal violence, political violence, economic hardship that, if not properly addressed, may increase the likelihood that some of them become involved in criminal work, political violence, or other activities that undermine peace. We develop a theory of the impact of violence and insecurity challenges facing former, non-state armed actors (henceforth, ANSAs). We suggest that the numerous challenges involved in leading a normal life under conditions of abnormal security will likely make successful completion of government reintegration programs more difficult for ANSAs. We also consider and account for the powerful effects of gender and family in the successful completion of a reintegration program. We test our theoretical model on the successful completion of a government reintegration program in Colombia, and test our hypotheses on a large database of ANSAs. We find support for our hypotheses, as well as social factors that greatly influenced the likelihood of successful completion of the Colombian government’s reintegration program.

Why are democracies backsliding? I contend that a large productivity gap between economic groups motivates those with low productivity to capture the state for rent-seeking. They assess their relative position as weak and are willing to sacrifice certain democratic guarantees in exchange for favorable policies. Erosion takes two forms. (1) With high inter-class inequality and a large productivity gap among economic industries, losing economic elites capture the state through a political outsider who enacts favorable policy. Once in office, the outsider expands his personal executive control and attacks key democratic veto players. (2) When inter-class inequality is high but the inter-industry productivity gap is small, a united economic elite coordinate to stop a populist takeover. Traditional political elites respond to the populist threat by curtailing basic freedoms of speech and association. I use both quantitative and case study evidence from the US and Spain to support my main hypotheses.

For the past decade, populist left- and right-wing parties have been on the rise in Europe. Yet, there are only a few studies on the internal organizational dynamics of these parties. Drawing on a new and unique data from fieldwork observations and interviews with party members from the Alternative for Germany (AfD), this article examines the internal democratic mechanisms in policy formation. The AfD displays a high degree of internal participation – an important but contrasting addition to the comparative research on radical right parties, which fail to sustain a democratic internal organization and consistently adopt mechanisms to centralize power in the leadership. The findings from this field research suggest that populist parties may actually engage in meaningful intra-party democracy and internal deliberative practices to invigorate the connections between citizens and their party representatives.

Support for social distancing measures was, globally, high at the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic but increasingly came under pressure. Focusing on the UK, this article provides a rigorous exploration of the drivers of public support for social distancing at their formative stage, via mixed methods. Synthesizing insights from crisis management and securitization theory, thematic analysis is employed to map the main frames promoted by the government and other actors on the nature/severity, blame/responsibility, and appropriate response to the pandemic, which ‘follows the science’. The impact of these on public attitudes is examined via a series of regression analyses, drawing on a representative survey of the UK population (n = 2100). Findings challenge the prevailing understanding that support for measures is driven by personal health considerations, socio-economic circumstances, and political influences. Instead, crisis framing dynamics, which the government is well-positioned to dominate, have the greatest impact on driving public attitudes.

Why do parties change candidate lists between elections? Although candidate list volatility is an important indicator of the responsiveness of electoral representation, it has received little attention in research. We offer a critical case study of party list volatility in Finland, using a candidate-centred open-list proportional (PR) electoral system with ideal conditions for ‘ultra-strategic’ party behaviour. Our explorative two-stage research design begins with party elite interviews, to extract factors that can affect list volatility, which in the following step are tested in a regression analysis of 564 party lists in parliamentary elections 1983–2019. Our results show that list formation is a complex phenomenon, where demand and supply factors interact in a contingent fashion. Following trends of voter dealignment, personalization and ‘electoral-professionalization’ of parties, volatility has increased over time. Electoral defeats and declining party membership increase volatility, but a member-driven mass-party heritage that limits party elites’ strategic capacity has a stabilizing effect.