Questions dealing with group organization

1.1 How many members are there in your group?

1.1a About what percentage of the total potential audience does that represent?

1.2 How many employees does your group have at the national level?

1.2a How many of these employees are involved primarily in trying to influence government policy as opposed to running the organization itself?

1.3 How are responsibilities divided between the national office and lower levels of your organization?

1.4 Are some of the federations or regional level branches more powerful than others?

1.4a If yes, which ones?

1.4b If yes, why are they more powerful?

1.5 In the ———, how are political goals decided upon?

1.6 In an organization as large as yours, you must sometimes find that the interests of one part conflict with the interests of other parts. When this happens, how do you resolve the conflict?

1.7 Often in large organizations such as yours the lack of homogeneity and the consequent internal differences reduce the influence of the group. Do you believe that the diversity and large membership of your group reduce its political influence?

1.7a If yes, how? Can you give me some examples?

1.7b If no, why not? How do you avoid the dangers?

1.8 Often in large organizations there are serious problems in assuring that the grass-roots will accept the agreements and compromises negotiated among the leaders of the group and other interests and the state. Do you sometimes have such problems?

8a If no, why doesn't this happen?

In this concluding chapter, I will first compare French interest-group politics in the Fourth and Fifth Republics and in the Gaullist/Giscardian era and the Socialist period of the Fifth Republic. These comparisons over time have two objectives: first, to see if there are indications of trends in changing patterns of government/interest-group interaction, and second, to identify probable causes of these changes. Finally, we will look at the consequences of interest-group/government relations for French representative democracy.

Change and continuity in French interest-group politics

The flirtation of many in political science with group theory during the 1950s produced a number of excellent analyses of the overall pattern of French interest groups during the Fourth Republic. We have already had occasion to refer often to these studies because many of the perceptions of Ehrmann, Lavau, Brown, and Meynaud remain valuable 30 years later. But the changes from this period to the present probably outweigh the elements of continuity, especially in the crucial issue of government/group interaction. This study represents the first major effort to analyze the overall system of interest-group politics during the Fifth Republic. Since the study also extends over the transfer of power in the Fifth Republic from the Right to the Left, it is also possible to look for change in interest-group politics as this major political shift occurred. Here the evidence suggests much more continuity during the Fifth Republic than change.

From the Fourth to the Fifth Republic: a new system of group politics

Under the Third Republic (1872–1940) and the Fourth Republic (1946–58), interest groups grew out of the weakness of other political institutions.

Amis de la Terre

Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d'Agricole (APCA)

Assemblée Permanente des Chambres de Commerce et d'Industrie (APCCI)

Assemblée Permanente des Chambres de Métiers (APCM)

Association Française des Banques

Association Générale des Producteurs de Blé

Association Générale des Producteurs de Mais

Association Nationale de l'Industrie Agri-Alimentaire

Centre des Jeunes Patons (CJD)

Chambre Syndicale de la Métalurgie

Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie Française (CSSF)

Comité d'Information et de Défense-Union Nationale des Travailleurs Indépendants (CID-UNATI)

Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT)

Confédération Française des Patrons Chrétiens (CFPC)

Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC)

Confédération Générale de l'Alimentation en Détail

Confédération Générale de l'Artisanat Français (CGAF)

Confédération Générale des Cadres (CGC)

Confédération Générale des Petits et Moyens Entreprises (CGPME)

Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT)

Confédération Nationale du Logement

Confédération Nationale de la Mutualité, de la Coopération et du Crédit Agricole (CNMCCA)

Confédération Nationale des Artisans et des Métiers (CNAM)

Confédération Nationale des Cadres Dirigeants

Confédération Nationale des Jeunes Agriculteurs (CNJA)

Confédération Nationale des Syndicats Dentaires

Confédération Syndicale des Avocats

Confédération de l'Epargne

Confédération des Syndicats Libres (CSL)

Confédération des Syndicats Médicaux Français (CSMF)

Conseil National d'Action Laique (CNAL)

Conseil National du Commerce

Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF)

Entreprise et Progrès

Episcopat Catholique

Fédération Française des Families (FFF)

Fédération Française des Sociétés d'Assurance

Fédération Nationale de la Mutualité Française (FNMF)

Fédération Nationale des Associations Familiales Rurales (FNAFR)

Fédération Nationale des Coopératives de Consommateurs

Fédération Nationale des Proprietaires Forestières

Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA)

Fédération Nationale des Transports Routiers

Fédération Nationale des Travaux Publics

Fédération Nationale du Crédit Agricole

Fédération Nationale de l'Education Nationale (FEN)

Fédération de la Mutualité Agricole

Fédération des Chirugiens Dentaires

Fédération des Conseils des Parents d'Elèves (FCPE)

In order to understand French interest-group politics it is useful to have a broad impression of the general pattern of politics in which the groups operate. This is not the place for a comprehensive review of the French political system, but it is important to note a few aspects of the political environment.

Perhaps the most important feature of contemporary French politics is the strong political executive. In reaction to the weakness of the executive during the Fourth Republic, with its vulnerability to pressure from special interests as an often invoked example, the framers of the constitution of the Fifth Republic were interested foremost in strengthening the executive. A powerful, popularly elected president exercises dominant control over the policy agenda and largely dictates policy content in areas of his concern. The extent of presidential policy control has continued to broaden over the years of the Fifth Republic as successive presidents have proved willing to expand the range of policy and political decisions they wish to control.

The president's powers are augmented by those of the prime minister whom he names and whom he can usually dismiss at will. Together with the president, the prime minister controls the legislative calendar and can push controversial measures through a reluctant parliament. The government can prevent parliament from considering without its prior approval any measure, whether a full bill or simply an amendment, that either increases government expenditure or decreases government revenues.

In recent years, many observers have noted with concern the apparent decline of representative bodies such as political parties and parliaments. The erosion of these traditional forms of representing the public is viewed as contributing to a crisis of democracy. It also raises questions about the effectiveness of established means of public participation in the policy-development processes of western democracies.

Just as there has been anxiety over the decline of these bodies, there is also concern that the social and political changes in post-industrial societies have diminished the ability of traditional interest groups to adequately represent their members. The leaders of trade unions, farm groups, and business associations are purportedly losing touch with their members and no longer are able to accurately represent the economic and social interests or to fulfill the task of conveying interests to policy-makers that they once did. New groups focusing on single interests have drawn members away from the more traditional interest groups and undermined established political parties. These single-issue groups have assumed new political importance in several western democracies. The consequences that the emergence of these new types of groups will have for stable representative democracy are still uncertain. But some see cause for concern because they appear to lack the staying power of more established groups. Concentrating on a single issue leads to intense commitment to a cause and sometimes to unconventional political tactics in pursuit of their goals. The narrow concentration on a single cause may make them less inclined to compromise since they are less likely to be satisfied with partial victories and since they have fewer concerns on which to negotiate.

Among the most significant factors in understanding interaction between interest groups and the state are those dealing with the overall structure of interest groups and the basic relationship between groups and the state. In chapter 2, the summary of variations among different models of interest-group politics found a number of important structural distinctions: the number of interest groups likely to seek a political role, the extent of competition within social sectors, the degree of autonomy available to the groups and/or the state, the relationship between group elites and their memberships, and the professional nature of the organization and its staff. Clearly, these are important issues in determining which pattern most closely resembles actual practice in France and also in explaining the nature and significance of interest-group/government interaction.

Numbers of interest groups

As we saw in the lengthy listing of major interest groups in chapters 3 and 4, the number of interest groups active in Fifth Republic politics is very large and growing rapidly. The formation of new interest groups is free from government control. Groups must register with the ministry of interior but the ministry cannot refuse to accept any applications. Registration is a procedure by which groups acquire legal identity thus enabling them to rent office space or open a bank account. It is not a source of direct or indirect government monitoring of the creation of new groups. An earlier requirement in 1884 that trade unions register elicited concerns from union leaders that it might be a police trap. One trade-union leader complained at the time: “It puts us in the same situation as streetwalkers.”

Much of the recent theoretical writings on interest-group politics has centered on the discovery or definition of appropriate models of interest-group/government interaction. Out of these writings have emerged a number of competing ideal-type models of the relations between groups and government, notably pluralism, elitism, and, most recently, neo-corporatism. Many of the attempts to apply these interest-group “theories” to real world practices have amounted to little more than mechanical measuring of which of the models most closely corresponds to observable actions and structures in particular countries. While this issue is an important one, such studies often result in the discovery of a mixture of elements from two or more of the models. They offer little explanation of why the particular patterns exist in the real world and why they are found in hybrid forms rather than more closely resembling the theorized ideal types.

In this chapter, I will review the principal characteristics of four major models of interest-group/government interaction: the pluralist model; the elitist, neo-Marxist model; the neo-corporatist model; and a protest model. As already noted, there is disagreement among students of French politics as to which of these models most closely corresponds with the reality of contemporary French politics. My own conclusions are that the pattern is a mixed one with elements from each of the four alternative models. This blend is not the product of an interim stage in the progression toward one of these ideal types but a permanent feature of interest-group/government relations in France.

From the theoretical standpoint, the more important questions probe why the particular forms of interest-group structures and activities found in France are there.

In this chapter we will return to the alternative models of interest-group politics defined in chapter 2 to see which ones are useful in understanding contemporary French politics. From this will come some general theoretical perspectives that may be useful in interpreting interest-group politics in other industrial democracies.

Alternative models of interest-group politics

As should be apparent by this point, none of the four models of interest-group politics presented in chapter 2 is sufficient to describe the reality of group/government relationships in France. Instead, there are some features from each model present in contemporary French interest-group politics. Before explaining the significance of this blending, it is important to first review the models to note how each corresponds and differs from the real world.

The applicability of the neo-corporatist model

Neo-corporatism has caught the fancy of many students of western democracies who see a gradual but inevitable trend toward neo-corporatist patterns of interest-group/government relationships. Most analysts have seen few signs of neo-corporatism in France and my own observations confirm this. A brief review of some of the principal interest-group structures, actions, and leadership attitudes will demonstrate the paucity of neo-corporatist traits.

There are certain features of French interest-group politics that suggest corporatist relationships. Perhaps the most important is the large number of official committees that bring interest-group representatives formally and by statute into the decision process. However, to give much importance to these bodies without examining their actual operation and significance in policy decisions is to give excessive weight to formal, legal definitions of these institutions rather than objective judgments on their actual operation and influence.

For most French interest groups, politics is only one of many activities. There is abundant evidence from the study of interest groups in other settings that the organization and continued vitality of groups depend heavily upon other motives than the urge to represent interests before government policy-makers. While there have been few attempts to study this empirically in France, my observations indicate that many groups are at least as concerned and often more concerned with the providing of material benefits and social interaction for their members than with political action. Trade unions devote most of their attention to aiding their members in increasing their wages and benefits; medical associations provide technical information and advice; veterans' groups offer social activities as well as practical help for those who encounter problems in obtaining their state pensions. Such practical and usually non-political activities are vital to the organizations' ability to attract and retain members. They are usually easier to deliver than are most abstract political goals. It is also easier to demonstrate the group's role in obtaining them than it is to show that even concrete pay-offs from government policies are the product of the group's activity and not the natural or self-interested beneficence of the politicians themselves. These non-political services can also be restricted to members only while the government policy changes cannot be withheld from “free riders.”

For nearly all interest groups, the tasks of maintaining the organization absorb much of the time and energy of their staffs. This is especially true in a country where so many groups compete for the same potential membership. As we have seen in the previous chapter, French interest groups are not very powerful structures.

This chapter focuses on the attitudes, expectations, and evaluations of interest-group leaders about their interaction with government. In earlier chapters, we focused on the reports of group leaders and independent observers on the structure of group politics and the kinds of political activities engaged in by French groups. This chapter reports on the general attitudes of group leaders toward their interaction with government: why they interact with government, their perceptions of the importance of their autonomy and that of the state, what they see as the advantages and disadvantages of contacts with the state, and so forth. These attitudes will help in understanding why groups act the ways they do. How effective groups leaders believe their actions are in influencing policy decisions and their beliefs about the comparative efficacy of alternative influence wielding strategies are important in explaining the forms of action opted for by various groups.

In addition, group leaders' expectations and evaluations of their interaction with government will help in determining the nature of the overall pattern of group politics. As we saw in chapter 2, there are attitudinal differences associated with each of the four patterns of interest-group/government interaction. These attitudinal variations are of crucial importance in differentiating these alternative models. As an illustration, the protest model is founded on the assumption that a certain political culture prevails among group leaders. The careful examination of attitudes about interest-group politics is important whatever the current structural or behavioral patterns. They can help us to understand why these patterns prevail or the direction of likely changes in interest-group politics.

From the standpoint of size and influence, interest groups representing occupational sectors have been the most important in modern French politics. Shared socioeconomic interests and concerns of individuals engaged in the same economic activity give occupationally-based groups a large pool from which they can recruit members. The primacy of these groups comes from their size but also the multiple functions that they fulfill. Officially recognized by the state as its “social partners,” these occupational groups increasingly have been drawn into the political process as the state has expanded its role in managing the economy. Occupational groups not only represent the interests of their members to the state but they also serve as agents for interacting with each other in the economy and society whether or not the state is involved. They bargain over salaries, working conditions, status, and social relationships. The resulting accords have broad impact on society as a whole even if they lack the authoritative imprimatur of the state. Because these occupational groups are closely aligned with social classes they become the vehicles for often lively class conflict. For these reasons, it is appropriate to devote considerable attention to the organization and political strategies of the principal occupational interest groups.

Trade unions

The trade-union movement in France has faced a series of difficult obstacles that have obstructed its development: hesitant workers, with the minority that is interested more attracted to anarchism than to organized efforts; a strong syndicalist tradition that encouraged awaiting the mythical general strike and discouraged the building of ties between the labor movement and political parties or the state; ideological cold wars; bitter internal divisions among alternative labor unions; an unsympathetic state; and employers regarded as among the most reactionary in Europe.

Out of the myriad of political and non-political groups now operating in France, only a minority have national significance. Most of the groups which might claim to exercise some political influence on the national level can be classified in three categories: occupationally-based groups, groups promoting the interests of specific elements of society which are not primarily defined by an economic function, and groups purporting to defend broader public interests. Before turning to the pattern of group/government relations, it is important to briefly describe the principal interest groups operating in France, their organizations, and their overall strategies of political influence. The occupational groups, by virtue of their mass bases, organizational strength, and strategic political positions, are generally the most active and influential interest groups in France. They will be examined in chapter 4. In this chapter, after a very brief look at institutional interest groups, the focus will be on the non-occupational groups: advocacy groups representing special interests such as students, veterans, and parents; and public-interest groups of consumers and ecologists.

This survey of French interest groups is necessarily incomplete. Many others are active politically and often wield important power. Almost every government department faces a set of groups whose interests are affected by that department's decisions and actions. For example, senior officials in the ministry of the environment told me of the great power exercised by the state-owned electric power utility and by hunters' associations. The few groups that will be treated in the next two chapters have been selected for more detailed examination because they are simply the ones that have most consistently played a part in the interaction between interest groups and government.

The chapters in this volume are the results of the second research cycle of the Joint Committee on Western Europe of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies. A first volume of papers, published in 1981 as Organizing Interests in Western Europe, examined the changing structures of representation and interest intermediation. Collectively, as Suzanne Berger explained in her introduction, those essays argued for a model of the relationship between state and civil society that significantly departed from the paradigms of American social science in the 1950s and 1960s. Whereas this earlier work described a system of decentralized competitive pluralism, the contributions to Organizing Interests suggested that policy emerged from a more restrictive collaboration of state agencies and large producer interests. The authors explored the growth, the patterns, and – just as significant – the limits of what is often termed “corporatism”.

The contributions to this second volume take up a theme that is an outgrowth of our earlier work. Beyond the issue of the representation of interests and opinions lies that of the claims of politics in general. When the then members of the Joint Committee on Western Europe framed this inquiry, they were acutely aware that the agendas of political discussion in Western Europe and other industrial countries had become crowded with issues that had not been subjects of controversy for many years. These intrusive issues included questions of family and sexual relationships, of environmental degradation, fundamental dilemmas of national security and sovereignty, and the heightened perception of economic vulnerability.