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Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) are increasingly attracting academic and societal attention, as they represent the institutional cornerstone of the regulatory state and play a key role in policy-making. Besides the expected benefits in terms of credibility and efficiency, these regulators are said to bring about a ‘democratic deficit’, following their statutory separation from democratic institutions. Consequently, a ‘multi-pronged system of control’ is required. This article focuses on a specific component of this system, that is, the media. The goal is to determine whether media coverage of IRAs meets the necessary prerequisites to be considered a potential ‘accountability forum’ for regulators. The results of a comparison of two contrasted cases – the British and Swiss competition commissions – mostly support the expectations, because they show that media coverage of IRAs corresponds to that of the most relevant policy issues and follows the regulatory cycle. Furthermore, a systematic bias in media coverage can be excluded.
Does an increasing emphasis on individual freedom in mass values erode or revitalize democratic societies? This paper offers a new approach to this debate by examining it through the lens of Isaiah Berlin, and his distinction between positive and negative freedom. I show that, contrary to the common assumption among scholars who study mass values regarding freedom, these do not consist of one dimension but two: negative and positive freedom. I also show that, while valuing negative liberty clearly leads a person to become more morally permissive and more condoning of non-compliance with legal norms, valuing positive liberty does not seem to have the same effects at all; in fact, it shows the very opposite relationship with respect to some of these attitudes. Thus, it matters what kind of freedom people value. The results rely on confirmatory factor and regression analyses on World Values Survey data from ten affluent Western countries in 2005–2006.
This paper deals with the often-observed complex relationship between the so-called old, ‘economic’ left/right alignment (egalitarianism) and the new, ‘cultural’ alignment. Many authors have observed that the less educated members of society occupy an apparently contradictory position, combining a leftist stand in favor of more equality and government intervention, with a rightist stand on minority rights, the treatment of criminals, and other aspects of democratic citizenship. Various explanations have been offered for this paradox. This paper proposes an explanation in terms of vulnerability and the way in which it is culturally processed. Less educated people are often vulnerable and long for more equality. The stronger their desire for equality, the greater their frustration when feeling vulnerable, and the greater the need to cope with that vulnerability. They do so, using particular narrative-coping strategies that create an affinity with the attitudes that form the new left/right alignment. One such coping strategy is based on feelings of relative deprivation. In the empirical part of the paper it is shown that relative deprivation completely explains the paradoxical position of the less educated, and that, when taking feelings of deprivation into account, the two left/right dimensions are in fact independent of each other at all levels of education, creating a situation that leads to tensions within parties that pursue egalitarian policies. The mechanism uncovered in this analysis reveals a tension at the heart of egalitarianism: the stronger the longing for equality among the vulnerable members of society, the more likely they are to opt for right wing positions on the new left/right dimension.
Feminism and rational choice theory have both been hailed as approaches with the potential to revolutionize political science. Apart from a few exceptions, however, work utilizing these two perspectives rarely overlaps. This article reviews their main contributions and explores the potential for a combined approach. It argues that a synthesis of feminism and rational choice theory would involve attending to questions of gender, strategy, institutions, power, and change. The contours and benefits of this approach are illustrated with reference to one particular area of research: the adoption of electoral gender quotas. Despite a current lack of engagement across approaches, this example illustrates that the tools of feminist and rational choice analysis may be brought together in productive ways to ask and answer theoretically and substantively important questions in political science.
Within the last decade, European migration law has undergone significant changes, starting with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 and cumulating in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. Title IV of the Amsterdam Treaty for the first time established (shared) Community competence to legislate on migration law. Ten years later, several aspects surrounding the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals (TCNs) are regulated at the European Union (EU) level. Yet, for a long time, the extent to which the Union has competence to legislate in the domain of integration of TCNs was a matter of debate between the European Commission and the Member States. The Lisbon Treaty has put a (formal) end to this ongoing discussion by introducing an explicit legal basis for the adoption of legal measures supporting Member States’ integration policies.
In his Opinion in the Federutility case, Advocate General Colomer observed that:
In the early days of the welfare state, certain areas of the economy were set apart from the free market philosophy with the aim of reducing the distance between the ‘dominated lebensraum (living space)’ and the ‘effective lebensraum’. Inspired by ideals which went beyond the strictly economic – enshrined in the time-honoured continental legal concept of service public – state intervention in some sectors was intensified, monopolies were created and regulation was increased. Since the Single European Act, when competition was installed as the new deity on ‘the altar of political ideas’, public service has become an obstacle to be overcome in the name of a liberalisation on which all hopes were pinned. The creation of an open market is the first step of this policy, but once barriers have been removed there remain certain requirements which the market alone is not able to meet. […]
A European SME [Social Market Economy] cannot come about, and SMEs at the national level will be destroyed, unless the politically uncontrolled dynamics of (negative) ‘integration through law’ can be contained.
As demonstrated in the last chapters, through its early rulings in Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL the Court of Justice (ECJ) had created a European economic constitution. It was revolutionary in the sense that, through this constitution, a unique legal system was created which proved to be a powerful means of pushing forward liberalisation and economic integration. The famous cases Viking, Laval and Rüffert, however, demonstrated the inability of this constitution to defend social norms in the same manner and raised the question as to whether and how the EU’s economic dimension can be realigned with a social one. This chapter explores this issue taking a different field as a starting point: European company law. It is an area in which harmonisation attempts are nearly as old as Van Gend en Loos and the academic discussions even older. While the clear objective of company law is to support profit maximisation, another goal is to regulate the diverging interests between shareholders, managers, creditors and employees. In the EU, several national models exist which afford different degrees of influence and levels of safeguards to those constituencies. Whilst the German approach of a social market economy provides more influence to employees, the Anglo-Saxon liberal model in the UK grants more power to shareholders. European company law is therefore required to incorporate these contrasting social and economic approaches.
Tensions between the economic and the social dimensions of European integration are being perceived as increasing, and so is the potential for conflict between national and European levels of policy-making. Both are well illustrated by a highly controversial line of Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) cases on industrial relations: Viking and Laval have become symbols for the continuing dominance of the economic over the social dimension of European integration and for an increasing tendency of the EU to diminish national autonomy. As one consequence, demands to protect Member States’ social policy choices from EU law pressures arise. For such demands to be tenable, isolation of national and EU policy-making and of economic and social dimensions of European integration would have to be possible. This is arguably not the case. Economic and social dimensions of integration will thus have to be reconciled across EU and national levels, if the EU and its Member States are to maintain the ability of enhancing social justice against the pulls of economic globalisation.
When I give food to the poor, they call me a saint. When I ask why the poor have no food, they call me a communist.
While the asymmetry of the economic and social dimension of the European integration project has been thoroughly analysed and documented, it remains open as to what could and should be done to achieve a more balanced integration process. In particular, it is disputed whether related efforts should focus on the national or supranational level and whether these efforts should be of a regulatory or soft-law nature. With regulation having become more difficult after the Eastern enlargement rounds, considerable attention has been directed towards so-called new modes of governance, in particular the open method of co-ordination (OMC). Another instrument that emerged on the EU agenda in the context of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 is ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR). The aim of CSR is to call upon firms’ sense of responsibility to contribute to certain social standards, to social cohesion, to environmental awareness or sustainable development. CSR could thus be seen as an attempt to balance the economic and social dimensions of the European integration project. This chapter asks, in an explorative way, in how far a European CSR policy that would work in favour of the social dimension is possible in light of the institutional differences between Member States.
Ten years ago the Lisbon Strategy proclaimed that the EU was to become ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world’. In order to guarantee sustainable economic growth, full employment and an increase of highly skilled labour participants is considered to be essential. Beyond this, international migration must also be regarded in its global context, both socially and economically. From economists’ perspectives, liberalisation of migration will achieve greater welfare benefits than liberalisation of trade in goods and services and of capital flows.
In the light of Europe’s declining fertility rates and an ageing population, the Member States and the EU, specifically in the 2009 Stockholm Programme, have argued in favour of a more demand-driven immigration policy even in a period of economic crisis. At the same time, the idea of temporary and specifically circular labour migration has regained increasing popularity.
This book results from a ‘Multilateral Jean Monnet Research Group’ called ‘European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon: an Interdisciplinary Perspective’, which took up its work in September 2008. The idea for the group originated in collaborations between Hildegard Schneider and Dagmar Schiek within the framework of the IUS COMMUNE research school, where both had attempted to establish a research focus ‘Economic and Social Constitutionalism’, as well as in the contacts between Ulrike Liebert and Dagmar Schiek, who had been working at neighbouring universities for quite a while, often noticing that they had some overlap in research interests, but not succeeding in teaming up for research.
Since many of the goods and services desired in a modern economy are not pure private goods, this leads to the prescription that the State – in the singular – should provide and produce all the goods and services where markets fail. Showing that one institutional arrangement leads to sub-optimal performance is not equivalent, however, to showing that another institutional arrangement will perform better.
The most recent global financial and economic crisis has accelerated the European Union to a crossroads where it can either strengthen or fall apart. Amidst the contemporary capitalist constellation, achievements of several decades of economic and social integration are at stake. Hence, after a decade-long contentious EU Treaty reform, the newly enacted Lisbon Treaty has to prove itself under quite unfavourable conditions. Faced with failing markets and states, many suspect the EU under the new Lisbon rules of seeking to further empower ‘Market Europe’ while others are concerned it might unduly advance a burdensome supranational ‘European social polity’. As a matter of fact, European integration has been shaped by the ‘competitive fight for survival’ between these two paradigms of a legitimate social and economic order at least since the 1980s. While the economic liberalistic project has been striving for monetary unification and financial rigidity, the social solidarity venture has sought to promote a ‘Social Europe’ with redistributive ambitions, albeit ‘less in financial terms than in terms of equal standards and political co-ordination’. Moreover, in the complex multilayered EU, tensions between national and EU levels have grown over the years, ‘as economic decision-making has increasingly moved upwards towards the EU level while social politics and identity have largely remained national, along with the mechanisms of electoral sanctions’.